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|LDEQ Accident Number
|Point Source(s)||Notes||Amount of Release|
|kerosene hydrotreater unit||Cause: During start-up of the kerosene hydrotreater unit (KHT), a bleeder valve o a piperack outside the unit was inadvertently left open, releasing gas into the atmosphere.|
Notes: the line was isolated, and the valve was closed.
|exchanger 05-1313||Cause: Pinhole leak from exchanger, 05-1313, caused a release of naphtha to the coker unit pad.|
Notes: the exchanger was isolated, and contents were directed to the oily water sewer.
|Platformer Debutanizer Trim Cooler, #1 Cooling Tower EQI: 61a-74||Cause: A high LEL was found at the #1 cooling tower, operations started checking for leaks and found that the debutanizer overhead trim cooler, 12-1309, was leaking hydrocarbons into the cooling water. Leak caused by under deposit corrosion.|
Notes: The debutanizer trim cooler was isolated and leaking tubing plugged.
|Unit 34 Sulfur Recovery Unit (EQT FUG037)||Cause: "While switching unit 34 tailgas from the Unity 34 Thermal Oxidizer to the Unit 20 Thermal Oxidizer, Unit 34 pressured up causing acid gas to back out of the low range air blower vent valve in Unity 34."
Reportable quantity for Hydrogen Sulfide exceeded.|
Notes: RQ. Reportable quantities were exceeded during this incident; detailed emissions report included. Refinery report states that "tailgas [was] switched back to the Unit 34 Thermal Oxidizer which corrected the problem immediately."
|South Ground Flare (EQT 0284)||Cause: New Naphtha Hydrotreating Unit relief valve failed--opened intermittently at lower pressures than it was supposed to and sent stream to flare. Discovered problem thanks to citizen complaint re: the smell.
Reportable quantity for SO2 exceeded.
Duration given below is an estimate; emissions were intermittent from 1758 hrs to 2215 hrs.|
Notes: RQ. Faulty valve taken out of service & sent for repairs. RQ. Detailed release calculations attached to refinery letter.
Unit 59 South Flare
|Cause: A tube leaked on the Unit 15 Hot Separator Overhead Fin Fans at 17:52 hours. At 18:00, the unit was undergoing emergency shutdown procedures and the U15 dump valve was opened to the flare. The incident was a Gas Oil leak in the Unit 15 Hot separator Overhead Fin Fan Exchangers.
This leak caused a vapor release of hydrocarbons and hydrogen in addition to a small amount of hydrogen sulfide.|
Notes: PDF was too large to upload. Unit 15 was depressurized to the South Flare to safely isolate the leaking Overhead Fin Fan. Once the unit pressure was sufficiently low in the unit, the Fin Fans were isolated and the leak stopped. An incident investigation will result in recommendations to prevent recurrence. The reportable quantities for hydrogen sulfide, compressed flammable gas, and compressed flammable liquid were exceeded during this event. A report on October 9, 2013, removed greenhouse gas emissions and revised the estimate of VOC emissions.
|Unit 59 North Flare||Cause: The initiating incident was a pump seal fire in the Gasoline Desulfurization Unit (Unit 55). The fire was fueled by a leaking seal on the pump. Extinguishing the fire was delayed by inability to close an EIV on the suction side of the pump. This resulted in emergency shutdown of the unit. Two other events also occurred on this day including an upset in Sulfur Plant Unit 234 and a flame-out of the North Flare. Due to the fire and emergency shutdown of the Gasoline Desulfurization Unit, the Fluid Catalytic Cracking Unit cut feed, sending vent gas to the North Flare. Process vent gas was sent to the North Flare which increased the steam to the flare suddenly, snuffing the flare out.|
Notes: PDF too large to upload (109 pages) To re-light the North Flare, steam was gradually decreased and natural gas was added to the flare gas to allow the two available igniters to relight the North Flare. Parts to repair the North Flare pilot system were already on order when this incident occurred. The North Flare was taken out of service when the parts were received and repaired on October 31, 2012. Spare pilot and igniter assemblies are now in stock so that repairs can be made in a timely fashion if an incident like this is to occur again. Total amount of pollutants released was 59438.44 lbs, but 90% was claimed to be efficiently burned off, resulting in 5943.59 lbs that were actually released. The reportable quantity for Highly Reactive Volatile Organic Compounds (HRVOCs) (100 pounds) was exceeded during the 24 hour period.
|Emissions from Flare|
emissions from flare and Unit 45 Thermal Oxidizer
|Cause: Marathon experienced a partial power outage caused by a malfunctioning substation in the refinery resulted in multiple pieces of equipment in the refinery losing power.
Low pressure stripper Offgas flared in the South Flare due to partial power outage.
Enterprise incident due to a plant farther downstream that had uncharacteristically ceased operation due to an upset condition. The pressure safety valve, as designed, released discharging natural gas to atmosphere due to high pressure on the pipeline caused by the upset condition farther down the line.
Emission points involved were the Unit 59 North Flare and the Unit 45 Thermal Oxidizer.|
Notes: Marathon power was restored and the equipment that was shutdown was restarted to minimize further releases. An incident investigation will result in recommendation items designed to prevent the recurrence of this event. High sulfur dioxide from one of the thermal oxidizer stacks in Unit 45 and in addition to a small amount of Unit 15 low pressure stripper offgas was flared which contains a small amount of hydrogen sulfide which is converted to sulfur dioxide in the North Flare. Emission points involved were the Unit 59 North Flare and the Unit 45 Thermal Oxidizer. Enterprise personnel immediately began the process of taking the plant down in order to end the release event. Amount of natural gas released is above reportable quantity.
|leak from process line in U263 piperack||Cause: On June 29, a pinhole leak was discovered in the LPG feedline from U212 to U222.|
Notes: The line was purged with nitrogen and isolated for repairs. The Shift Emergency Response Team was activated and fire monitors were put on the leak to suppress any vapors. Reduced the U212 charge rate to minimize the leak. The line was isolated at battery limits in U222 and U212 to stop the leak. Once the investigation is complete, recommendations will be implemented.
|U212 Platformer unit||Cause: On May 22, a small leak and hydrogen fire was observed on the 48" flange on the process piping going from cell 1 of the Unit 212 Charge Heater to Reactor #1. The leak was pinhole sized in width and no larger than 1" around the circumference of the flange.
The emission point involved was a flange on a process line in the U212 Platformer unit.|
Notes: Steam was applied to the flange to extinguish the flame and the flange was hot bolted to secure the leak. Once the investigation is complete, recommendations will be implemented. An additional followup on 10/23/13 corrected the initial followup report's emissions data regarding greenhouse gas releases.
|Flow indicator 15FI0214||Cause: On May 19, the impulse lines on flow indicator 15FI0214 pulled away from the root valve. Blow taps on the valve blew off and released make-up hydrogen to the atmosphere. The causal factors leading to the failure of the tubing was Equipment Difficulty/Design Specs/Problem Not Anticipated. There were issues with the metallurgy of the tubing and the elevation of the transmitter in relation to the orifice taps.|
Notes: Water from the fire monitors was sprayed on the release to help disperse the gas and prevent ignition. The board operator began depressurizing the unit through the dump valve in preparation for emergency shutdown. The line was isolated from the rest of the process unit to prevent further release of make-up hydrogen. To prevent recurrence, the following recommendations were made: 1) relocate the transmitter above the orifice taps on 15FE0214, and 2) replace stainless steel components of 15FT0214, including the impulse tubing with Hastelloy to prevent chloride-induced stress corrosion cracking. Also to tag the instrument tubing to indicate that the material is Hastelloy. Approximately 6.214 pounds of compressed flammable gas and 28 pounds of hydrogen sulfide were released.
|Unit 259 North Ground Flare||Cause: The two root causes identified were the benzene stripper lower level controller malfunctioned and the operator did not have sufficient response time.
On March 25, 2013 the Unit 210 Crude Overhead Compressor shut down at 18:03 hours and was restarted at 18:26 hours. A second shutdown occurred at 19:23 hours and was re-started at 19:41 hours. The duration of Unit 210 venting to the North Ground Flare was 40 minutes. Approximately 3,385 pounds of sulfur dioxide were released (above the reportable quantity of 500 pounds).
On March 25, 2013 at 17:45 hours, issues developed in the Unit 210 Desalter vessels. As a result of the event, liquid was carried over from the Desalters to downstream Unit 210 vessels. Eventually, liquid filled the Unit 210 Overhead Compressor Feed Knockout drum which shut down the Overhead Compressor. The ambient air monitoring stations located by the ground flares did not detect a significant increase in sulfur dioxide emissions.|
Notes: Liquid was drained from the Unit 210 Crude Overhead Compressor Feed Knockout Drum. The Unit 210 Crude Overhead Compressor was re-started. While sulfur dioxide was the only chemical released above reportable quantity, NOx, monoxide, VOCs, PM10, PM2.5,HRVOCs, and hydrogen sulfide were released over the permit limit. An accident investigation was conducted to determine the cause(s) of the incident. The two root causes identified were 1. Equipment difficulty, design, problem not anticipated (Benzene stripper lower level controller malfunctioned); and 2. human engineering, non-fault tolerant system, errors not recoverable (operator did not have sufficient response time). The following recommendations will be implemented: 1. redesign or upgrade the benzene stripper level indicator 210L10197 to provide backup level indication for 210LC0187 due 12/20/13; 2. add soft stops to 210L1097 to limit flow from the 1st stage Desalter to the Benzene Stripper- complete; and 3. evaluate the hydraulics of the Benzene Stripper bottoms circuit and consider developing a project to eliminate constraints in the system- due 12/20/13.
|Unit 259 South Ground Flare and Unit 259 North Ground Flare||Cause: The Unit 214 Kerosene Hydrotreater experienced an emergency shutdown at 16:18 hours on February 21, 2013. The process unit vented to the South Ground Flare for 94 minutes. The Unit 210 Crude Overhead Compressor shutdown at 16:39 hours on February 21, 2013 was re-started at 16:58 hours on February 21, 2013. The duration of Unit 210 venting to the North Ground Flare was 19 minutes.
On February 21, 2013, at 16:18 hours, a power failure caused the Unit 214 Kerosene Hydrotreater to experience an emergency shutdown. As a result of the event, liquid was carried over from Unit 214 to the Unit 210 Crude Overhead Compressor system. The liquid filled the Unit 210 Overhead Compressor Feed Knockout drum which shut down the Overhead Compressor. The ambient air monitoring stations located by the ground flares did not detect a significant increase in sulfur dioxide emissions.
The main parts of this accident were the emergency shutdown of the 214 Kerosene Hydrotreater and flaring from the Unit 210 Crude Overhead Compressor.
The causal factor for the Unit 214 Power Failure and subsequent emergency shutdown was determined to be Equipment Difficulty/Tolerable Failure. The Causal factor for the Unit 210 flaring event was determined to be Human Performance Difficulty/Management System/SPAC Not Used/Enforcement Needs Improvement.|
Notes: Power was restored to the Unit 214 Kerosene Hydrotreater and the unit was re-started. Liquid was drained from the Unit 210 Crude Overhead Compressor Feed Knockout Drum. The Unit 210 Crude Overhead Compressor was re-started. An incident investigation will result in recommendation items designed to prevent the recurrence of this event. In the 60 day follow up report dated 4/22/13, the following remedial actions were listed in response to the release: Unit 214 portion of the upset: 1) Maintenance corrective actions immediately following release. Electricians and instrument Techs responded to the Satellite building. Power panel 214-PP-B01 main breaker and substation 214-MCC-B01 were reset establishing power to the first power supply. 214-HVAC-B008 was repaired and brought back online. 2) Operations corrective actions after the release. Unit 214 board operator started procedures for shutting down unit. Unit 214 valves 214FC0007 (Heavy Coker Naptha Feed Valve) and 214FC0006 (Kerosene from tankage valve) were closed 15 minutes after the start of the release. Operations awaited Maintenance's confimation that the unit was ready to restart. Unit 210 portion of the upset: 1) Unit 210 operators followed the event reponse matrix to verify the compressor suction drum (210-1202) level, the compressor suction drum valve position, and whether or not the suction drum pumps were running. Operations than began working to get the level down in the suction drum in preparation for restarting the OFFGAS compressors. For the Unit 214 portion of the incident the following recommendations were made: 1) Update the Marathon Standard Practice to require a cicuit breaker cooridination study for all 480V power panel installations for future projects - due 12/31/13; and 2) Evaluate the cicuit breaker coordination for all existing 480V power panels throughout the refinery and determine necessary solutions to achieve coordination where required - due 8/30/14 3) For the Unit 210 portion of the incident the following recommendation was made: Review and Reinforce the Emergency Shutdown Procedures for Unit 214 with the Board Operators - complete. An additional followup on 10/23/13 corrected the initial followup report's emissions data regarding greenhouse gas releases.
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