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Marathon Ashland Petroleum (3165), Garyville
LDEQ Accident Report
| Accident # | 146849 |
| State Police # | 13-00800 |
| Accident Date | 2013-02-21 |
| Report Date | 2013-02-28 |
| Follow-up Date | 2013-04-22 |
| Follow-up: | Yes |
Pollutants Released
| Pollutant | Duration | Point Source | Greenhouse Gas | Criteria Pollutant | Ozone forming chemical | Amount of Release |
| Sulfur Dioxide | 1h 53m | Unit 259 South Ground Flare and Unit 259 North Ground Flare | NO | YES | NO | 2,498.7 pounds |
| Methane | 1h 53m | Unit 259 South Ground Flare and Unit 259 North Ground Flare | YES | NO | YES | 113.6 pounds |
| Ethane | 1h 53m | Unit 259 South Ground Flare and Unit 259 North Ground Flare | NO | NO | YES | 75.5 pounds |
| Ethylene | 1h 53m | Unit 259 South Ground Flare and Unit 259 North Ground Flare | NO | NO | YES | 0.1 pounds |
| Propane | 1h 53m | Unit 259 South Ground Flare and Unit 259 North Ground Flare | NO | NO | YES | 45.1 pounds |
| Propylene | 1h 53m | Unit 259 South Ground Flare and Unit 259 North Ground Flare | NO | NO | YES | 0.1 pounds |
| n-Butane | 1h 53m | Unit 259 South Ground Flare and Unit 259 North Ground Flare | NO | NO | NO | 14.9 pounds |
| Isobutane | 1h 53m | Unit 259 South Ground Flare and Unit 259 North Ground Flare | NO | NO | YES | 14.4 pounds |
| 1-Butene | 1h 53m | Unit 259 South Ground Flare and Unit 259 North Ground Flare | NO | NO | YES | 0.0 pounds |
| T-butene2 | 1h 53m | Unit 259 South Ground Flare and Unit 259 North Ground Flare | NO | NO | NO | 0.0 pounds |
| n-Pentane | 1h 53m | Unit 259 South Ground Flare and Unit 259 North Ground Flare | NO | NO | NO | 4.4 pounds |
| Pentene Plus | 1h 53m | Unit 259 South Ground Flare and Unit 259 North Ground Flare | NO | NO | NO | 3.9 pounds |
| Carbon Monoxide | 1h 53m | Unit 259 South Ground Flare and Unit 259 North Ground Flare | NO | YES | NO | 207.7 pounds |
| Hydrogen | 1h 53m | Unit 259 South Ground Flare and Unit 259 North Ground Flare | NO | NO | NO | 82.0 pounds |
| Nitrogen | 1h 53m | Unit 259 South Ground Flare and Unit 259 North Ground Flare | NO | NO | NO | 0.2 pounds |
| Hydrogen Sulfide | 1h 53m | Unit 259 South Ground Flare and Unit 259 North Ground Flare | NO | NO | NO | 27.1 pounds |
| NOx | 1h 53m | Unit 259 South Ground Flare and Unit 259 North Ground Flare | NO | NO | YES | 38.2 pounds |
| Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs) | 1h 53m | Unit 259 South Ground Flare and Unit 259 North Ground Flare | NO | NO | YES | 89.3 pounds |
| Particulate Matter 10 | 1h 53m | Unit 259 South Ground Flare and Unit 259 North Ground Flare | NO | YES | NO | 4.2 pounds |
| Particulate Matter 2.5 | 1h 53m | Unit 259 South Ground Flare and Unit 259 North Ground Flare | NO | YES | NO | 4.2 pounds |
| Highly Reactive Volatile Organic Compounds (HRVOCs) | 1h 53m | Unit 259 South Ground Flare and Unit 259 North Ground Flare | NO | NO | NO | 0.2 pounds |
| Pentane | 1h 53m | Unit 259 South Ground Flare and Unit 259 North Ground Flare | NO | NO | YES | 3.8 pounds |
Accident Classified As: Reportable Quantity
Cause of Problem: Human Factors
The Unit 214 Kerosene Hydrotreater experienced an emergency shutdown at 16:18 hours on February 21, 2013. The process unit vented to the South Ground Flare for 94 minutes. The Unit 210 Crude Overhead Compressor shutdown at 16:39 hours on February 21, 2013 was re-started at 16:58 hours on February 21, 2013. The duration of Unit 210 venting to the North Ground Flare was 19 minutes. On February 21, 2013, at 16:18 hours, a power failure caused the Unit 214 Kerosene Hydrotreater to experience an emergency shutdown. As a result of the event, liquid was carried over from Unit 214 to the Unit 210 Crude Overhead Compressor system. The liquid filled the Unit 210 Overhead Compressor Feed Knockout drum which shut down the Overhead Compressor. The ambient air monitoring stations located by the ground flares did not detect a significant increase in sulfur dioxide emissions. The main parts of this accident were the emergency shutdown of the 214 Kerosene Hydrotreater and flaring from the Unit 210 Crude Overhead Compressor. The causal factor for the Unit 214 Power Failure and subsequent emergency shutdown was determined to be Equipment Difficulty/Tolerable Failure. The Causal factor for the Unit 210 flaring event was determined to be Human Performance Difficulty/Management System/SPAC Not Used/Enforcement Needs Improvement.
Discharge Preventable - No Information Given
The causal factor for the Unit 214 Power Failure and subsequent emergency shutdown was determined to be Equipment Difficulty/ Tolerable failure. The causal factor for the Unit 210 flaring event was determined to be human performance difficulty/ management system/ SPAC not used/ enforcement needs improvement.
Notes/Remedial Actions
Power was restored to the Unit 214 Kerosene Hydrotreater and the unit was re-started. Liquid was drained from the Unit 210 Crude Overhead Compressor Feed Knockout Drum. The Unit 210 Crude Overhead Compressor was re-started. An incident investigation will result in recommendation items designed to prevent the recurrence of this event. In the 60 day follow up report dated 4/22/13, the following remedial actions were listed in response to the release: Unit 214 portion of the upset: 1) Maintenance corrective actions immediately following release. Electricians and instrument Techs responded to the Satellite building. Power panel 214-PP-B01 main breaker and substation 214-MCC-B01 were reset establishing power to the first power supply. 214-HVAC-B008 was repaired and brought back online. 2) Operations corrective actions after the release. Unit 214 board operator started procedures for shutting down unit. Unit 214 valves 214FC0007 (Heavy Coker Naptha Feed Valve) and 214FC0006 (Kerosene from tankage valve) were closed 15 minutes after the start of the release. Operations awaited Maintenance's confimation that the unit was ready to restart. Unit 210 portion of the upset: 1) Unit 210 operators followed the event reponse matrix to verify the compressor suction drum (210-1202) level, the compressor suction drum valve position, and whether or not the suction drum pumps were running. Operations than began working to get the level down in the suction drum in preparation for restarting the OFFGAS compressors. For the Unit 214 portion of the incident the following recommendations were made: 1) Update the Marathon Standard Practice to require a cicuit breaker cooridination study for all 480V power panel installations for future projects - due 12/31/13; and 2) Evaluate the cicuit breaker coordination for all existing 480V power panels throughout the refinery and determine necessary solutions to achieve coordination where required - due 8/30/14 3) For the Unit 210 portion of the incident the following recommendation was made: Review and Reinforce the Emergency Shutdown Procedures for Unit 214 with the Board Operators - complete. An additional followup on 10/23/13 corrected the initial followup report's emissions data regarding greenhouse gas releases.
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