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Marathon Ashland Petroleum (3165), Garyville
LDEQ Accident Report
| Accident # | 148807 |
| State Police # | 13-02196 |
| Accident Date | 2013-05-19 |
| Report Date | 2013-05-23 |
| Follow-up Date | 2013-07-17 |
| Follow-up: | Yes |
Pollutants Released
| Pollutant | Duration | Point Source | Greenhouse Gas | Criteria Pollutant | Ozone forming chemical | Amount of Release |
| Methane | 38m | Flow indicator 15FI0214 | YES | NO | YES | 829.2 pounds |
| Ethane | 38m | Flow indicator 15FI0214 | NO | NO | YES | 797.6 pounds |
| Propane | 38m | Flow indicator 15FI0214 | NO | NO | YES | 1,063.9 pounds |
| n-Butane | 38m | Flow indicator 15FI0214 | NO | NO | NO | 382.4 pounds |
| Isobutane | 38m | Flow indicator 15FI0214 | NO | NO | YES | 412.7 pounds |
| n-Pentane | 38m | Flow indicator 15FI0214 | NO | NO | NO | 105.5 pounds |
| Pentene Plus | 38m | Flow indicator 15FI0214 | NO | NO | NO | 556.6 pounds |
| Hydrogen | 38m | Flow indicator 15FI0214 | NO | NO | NO | 1,847.9 pounds |
| Hydrogen Sulfide | 38m | Flow indicator 15FI0214 | NO | NO | NO | 28.8 pounds |
| Isopentane | 38m | Flow indicator 15FI0214 | NO | NO | YES | 218.5 pounds |
Accident Classified As: Reportable Quantity
Cause of Problem: Equipment Design
On May 19, the impulse lines on flow indicator 15FI0214 pulled away from the root valve. Blow taps on the valve blew off and released make-up hydrogen to the atmosphere. The causal factors leading to the failure of the tubing was Equipment Difficulty/Design Specs/Problem Not Anticipated. There were issues with the metallurgy of the tubing and the elevation of the transmitter in relation to the orifice taps.
Discharge Preventable - No
There were issues with the metallurgy of the tubing and the elevation of the transmitter in relation to the orifice taps.
Notes/Remedial Actions
Water from the fire monitors was sprayed on the release to help disperse the gas and prevent ignition. The board operator began depressurizing the unit through the dump valve in preparation for emergency shutdown. The line was isolated from the rest of the process unit to prevent further release of make-up hydrogen. To prevent recurrence, the following recommendations were made: 1) relocate the transmitter above the orifice taps on 15FE0214, and 2) replace stainless steel components of 15FT0214, including the impulse tubing with Hastelloy to prevent chloride-induced stress corrosion cracking. Also to tag the instrument tubing to indicate that the material is Hastelloy. Approximately 6.214 pounds of compressed flammable gas and 28 pounds of hydrogen sulfide were released.
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