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|LDEQ Accident Number
|Point Source(s)||Notes||Amount of Release|
|Flares 1 and 2||Cause: Related to Hurricane Rita but no information given|
Notes: telephone report have estimated exceedances of Sox Nitrogen Oxide Hydrogen Sulfide and Volatile Organic Compoundss
|Flare #3 (19G-301)||Cause: Start up of HGU Unit - the detection and repair of an analyzer regulator and a plugged level-control valve for a knock out dru|
Notes: Stationed an operator to manually observe the levels. Diverted the stream from the flare to the Sulfur Recovery Unit. Steamed the plugged level control to remove any obstruction. Will review and improve Start up preparation and procedures to minimizethe likelihood and quanitity of excess emissions from similar causes in the future. Motiva will also examine and change the level control valve inspection and preventative maintenance procedures as necessary.
|flare #2||Cause: piece of instrument air tubing failed causing a bypass control valve around a steam generator to close. Flow through the intermediate cycle gas oil circuit stopped, causing de-ethanizer tower to slump, increasing concentration of light material in the de-butanizer tower feed, increased pressure, causing flaring event|
Notes: "unit charge rate and riser temperature were reduced immediately following the loss of heat medium into the de-ethanizer reboiler to minimize the loading to the debutanizer tower. The bypass around 2PDC-142 was opened to re-establish flow to the de-ethanizer reboiler."
|Flare No. 2 EIQ No. 19AH-901||Cause: FCCU Wet Gas compressor shut down due to gas turbine overspeed. The servo has been sent out to identify the cause of failur|
Notes: The servo valve was replaced and the unit restarted. [Follow-up report to telephone report on 2/13/06]
|Sulfur Recovery Unit (SRU-5)||Cause: see notes|
Notes: trip on Sulfur Recovery Unit results in release
|HGU Torvex Incinerator (EPN 79J-904)||Cause: a temp. swing triggered a temperature alarm and an operator responded to the alarm by making adjustments to the operation of the unit|
Notes: Motiva will incorporate control valve set point guidance into supporting documentation for operators to prevent swings in incinerator burner outlet temp. from triggering the low temp. alarm; Implement a troubleshooting guide to assist operators with operating the control valve when it is believed to be sticking.
|Refinery Flare No. 2 19AH-901||Cause: during start up of FCCU and shut down of the electric-motor driven pump, the turbine-driven pump failed to maintain adequate feed flow and both charge heaters tripped. During FCCU Start up the Main Fractionator vented to fla|
Notes: Motiva revised the FCCU normal startup procedure to highlight the desire to slowly increase circulating reflux flow rates in an attempt to minimize pressure spikes due to water pockets.
|Tail Gas Treating Unit 3 (77H-101)|
Tail Gas Treating Unit 4 (78H-101)
Flare No 3 (19G-301)
|Cause: Upset of the ebulated-bed residuum hydrocracker (H-oil Unit) with a series of fluctuating alarms. While responding to the alarms, operators noticed a fire on the compressor turbine casing and immediately responded to extinguish the fire. The primary cause of this event was a H-Oil unit malfunctioning local level controller on the sour oil seal pot causing the drain valve to remain open and lose reference gas pressure across the seal oil pot.|
Notes: FIRE. Operations began to reduce production by reducing charge rates on units and to troubleshoot H-Oil recycle compressor and fin fan malfunctions. Immediate action was taken to begin the process of stabilizing, slowing down and shutting down the H-Oil unit and other units as necessary. Affirmative defense letter. Motiva inspected and completed insrumentation checks on the level control for thesour oil seal pots the level control drain valve and the level gauge. A faulty high-level switch was found and replaced. COR will schedulean operation's monitoring cycle to ensure proper sour oil seal pots level. COR will also add a level control loop for the sour oil seal pots levels during the next maintenance outage.
|Flares||Cause: No information given|
Notes: Letter states that emissions were BRQ.
|Flare CAP (19F-3, 19AH-901, 19G-310, 19G302)||Cause: Hurricane Gustav prompts preparatory shutdown. Natural gas was cutoff by provider (highly unusual - didn't happen w/ Katrina). Flaring occurred b/c there was not enough time for material to be processed by downstream units|
Notes: Motiva currently trying to regain power for start-up of all units. Follow-up report revises prior calculation of SO2 emissions from 2600 lbs to BRQ.
|Boiler 801 (81F-801)|
Boiler No 2 (31F-802)
|Cause: loss of accurate level and flow info to the HGU's carbon recovery section resulted in a unit upset by the carrying of hydrocarbon material to the flare system for pressure relief|
Notes: Motiva will review potential threats for the instrumentation to determine appropriate modifications or adjustments.
|Tail Gas Treating Unit 1 (17AH-103)||Cause: unplanned shutdown of boiler feed water system occurred which caused shutdown of refinery's boiler feed water syste|
Notes: Motiva secured the electrical conduit for the pump controller on the day of the incident. Motiva will evaluate and set the BFW pump auto-starts to a specific minimum BFW system pressure. Motiva has set the auto-start to 725 psi as an interim measure.
|Process Unit: Catalytic Reformer Unit||Cause: line leak developed due to internal corrosion|
Notes: Motiva Pressure Equipment Integrity Group has been tasked with evaluating this line and making recommendations that will reduce the likelihood of a recurrence.
|TORVEX Incinerator EPN 79J-904||Cause: failure of an antifriction ball bearing in the blower results in shutdown of the incinerator.|
Notes: Rotating equipmt and other supporting engineering personnel will complete the investigation of the failure and implement necessary changes to monitoring inspection and maintenance procedures
|Tail Gas Treating Unit 1 (17AH-103)||Cause: a pressure transmitter malfunctions causing a shutdown of TGTU-1 inline heater. This sparks a chain of events that result in release of SO2|
Notes: Motiva will review potential threats for the transmitter to determine appropriate modifications or adjustments if any
|flare no. 2 and wet gas scrubber||Cause: Regenerated Catalyst Slide Valve (RCSV) of the Fluid Catalytic Cracking Unit (FCCU) changed position without a corresponding command from the control system causing trip of the gas turbine driving the Wet Gas Compressor because of high exhaust temperature--overpressure control valve opened to flare.
Notes: "Took immediate action to begin the process of stabilizing, slowing down, and diverting feed from the FCCU riser." Circuit board replaced, cleaned the servo and will replace it when spare arrives.
|flare||Cause: "H-Oil recycle compressor inadvertently tripped due to a false vibration indication, which forced the H-Oil Unity to depressure;" had to flare.
No DEQ report in this file.
RQs not exceeded.|
Notes: No info given.
|SRU-4 thermal reactor; TGTU-3||Cause: Level 2 fire at Sulfur Recovery Unit (SRU)no. 4's thermal reactor due to failure of the SRU-4 thermal reactor vessel. Tail Gas Treating Unit (TGTU) No. 3 upset during firefighting efforts causing additional emissions.
Fenceline monitoring indicated no offsite impacts.
Notes: In-house fire dept and ERT worked to extinguish fire, reduced operating rates on units producing acid gas or rich amine and to distribute the acid gas flow to other operation SRU/TGTUs during firefight to safely shut down SRU/TGTU-4.
|Valve||Cause: An upset of the refinery's evulated-bed residuum hydrocracker (H-Oil Unit)cause the emitting of sulfur dioxide and hydrogen sulfide from flaring of hydrogen and hydrocarbons. A valve failure most likely caused the incident.|
Notes: Operations took action to begin the process of stabilizing, slowing down and shutting down the H-Oil Unit, as necessary.
|FLARE: Flare #3 [19G-301]||Cause: Followup Letter: Initiating cause was a collapsed oil filter in the lube oil system. Refinery letter states that this was likely caused by water contamination. A unit charge pump tripped causing a unit upset, warranting the controlled shutdown of the H-Oil unit (Ebulated-bed residum hydrocracker), causing sour hydrogen depressurizing to be sent to the flare gas recover system, resulting in SO2 and H2S to be released. Problem occurred in Flare #1 #2 and #3. FLARE.
Final Followup Letter: Incident due to an upset of the refinery's ebulated-bed residuum hydrocracker (H-Oil Unit).|
Notes: RQ. Refinery letter states that incident released nearly 5000 pounds above the required limit for SO2. Efforts were made to contain the depressured sour hydrogen within the Flare gas recovery system and to treat the sour gas prior to being sent to the flare system, however the sour gas streams were still combusted to the flare. The excess emissions ceased once Convent refinery resumed stable operations and shutdown the process units. Remedial Actions included replacing paper filter and air-operated relay which was not responding. Final Followup Letter: Reduced the speed of the reactor ebbulating pump to prevent catalyst from carrying over the top of the reactor. The air operated relay was replaced. Lab results concluded that the filter collapse was indeed a result of water intrusion which swelled the individual fibers of the fiberglass cellulose lube oil filter leading to its collapse. Motiva is changing the filter type from a fiberglass cellulose filter to a synthetic polyester material filter which is not prone to fiber swelling. Field investigation identified that steam was leaking from the turbine shaft seal area down the shaft of the turbine driver and into the bearing housing, contaminating the lube oil. The turbine steam ejector was adjusted to draw the leaking steam away from the turbine shaft and direct it to a downstream gland condenser. A pressure gauge was installed on the gland condenser piping to allow operators to monitor the seal vacuum pressure.
|VPS-2 Atmospheric Feed Heater (EPN 83H-101)||Cause: During shutdown of ARU-1 Train 2 for maintenance activities, refinery experienced an increase in H2S entering waste gas system. Mixed with refinery fuel gas and low steam ratio resulted in H2S concentration exceedance. Letter states that this was an apparent exceedance of H2s emission standard in Permit No 2560-00001-V8.|
Notes: Refinery operators increased steam to ARU-1 and exceedance ceased. No information given regarding the amount released/exceeded.
|Tubing||Cause: "tubing to the instrument broke and releasing H2 and H2S."|
Notes: No information given.
|Refinery Flare No.1, No.2 and No.3||Cause: Motiva states that initially the upset began after routine maintenance on a Wet Gas Compressor flow transmitter. The Suspected Controller sent a signal to open the anti-surge spill-back creating a recycle from the compressor discharge to suction. A compressor malfunctioned causing flaring in Refinery Flare No.1, Flare No.2 and Flare No.3 cumulatively beyond permit limit and the release of 2,097 pounds of SO2.|
Notes: LDEQ and Follow-Up provided, but there was no Refinery Letter included. Motiva states that there was a non-preventable release of approximately 1,952 pounds of SO2 and 3.68 pounds of H2S. The Catalytic cracking controllers (CCC) were replaced and the data recording software was upgraded and is being analyzed.
|flare #2||Cause: Incident occurred due to an upset of the refinery's fluid catalytic cracking unit (FCCU). The FCCU Wet Gas Compressor has three speed probes wired to the Triconex system, which performs the governor controls for the compressor's desired speed. The Triconex system processes the three speed readings and sends an electronic output signal (basically an average speed value of the three probe readings) to the CCC control system (which includes a 1st and 2nd stage antisurge controller). The CCC controller uses the speed signal to determine if the the compressor is "running" of "stopped".
The upset began when the 1st Stage Wet Gas Compressor speed signal malfunctions sending a false reading to the compressor speed controller to decrease speed. The speed controller interpreted the low speed signal to mean the compressor was shutting down. To protect he compressor it fully opened the anti surge spillback creating a recycle from the compressor discharge to the suction. Since the low speed signal was false and the machine was not shutting down the recycle overloaded and the capacity of the Wet Gas Compressor and it could not keep up with the gas coming from the Main Fractionator. With the Wet Gas Compressor maxed out, the gas from the Main Fractionator Overhead could not get out and the pressure controller opened to the flare. The flaring ceased when the spillback valve was closed and the pressure reduced on the Main Fractionator.
The flaring was a result of over pressuring of the Fractionator. The over pressure condition occurred due to the Wet Gas Compressor antisurge recycle valve going fully open due to a false low speed reading reading on the 1st stage anti surge controller.|
Notes: Operations took immediate action to begin the process of stabilizing the FCCU by cutting back unit charge rate. Both the 1st and 2nd Stage Wet Gas Compressor speed controllers were set to from automatic to manual while E&I began troubleshooting the speed signals. Actions were taken to provide the operator an alarm in the event the condition reoccurs with instructions on how to mitigate until technical support arrives. All wiring associated with the CCC Control system was inspected on 4/11/11. Voltage checks were performed on all circuits and the speed signal was tested on 4/11/11. The CCC controllers will be replaced and the data recording software will be upgraded during the 2011 FCCU turnaround for a target completion date of 8/31/11. Flare # 4 exceeded maximum opacity limits during this incident.
|VENT: Flare #1 tip||Cause: The apparent exceedance was discovered at approximately 9:20 am while Motiva Convent Refinery was preparing to perform maintenance on the Refinery Flare #1. A valve, upstream of the flare knock out drum, was used to isolate the flare line from the process to remove any residual hydrocarbons from the system prior to work being performed. However, the valve apparently leaked by allowing process gas to enter the flare knock drum and subsequently released gas through the flare tip. Since the flare was out of service at the time, there was no flame present to combust the process gas before exiting the flare tip. None of the potential exceedances listed have caused an emergency condition. There was no offsite impact as a result of this incident.
Exceeded RQ 100lb H2S and 3.3lb/hr H2S|
Notes: A water seal was re established in the flare knock down drum which created a barrier to prevent gas from entering the vessel and subsequently existing the flare tip. the barrier created by the water level in the knock out drum was monitored and controlled using level instrumentation. The water level controller was set to "Auto" to ensure drum water level (ie water barrier) is maintained. Operations vegan visual monitoring for water level at the flare drum to ensure the barrier stayed intact.
|Flare 1-4, TGTU-1,3,4 Incinerator, HTU-1 HSR Reboiler, Boiler #1, Boiler #2, Boiler (EQT0037)|
Flare 1-4, TGTU- 1,2,3,5 Incinerator,
|Cause: This incident involved an upset of the refinery due to a loss of power to the site from our energy supplier's system. Several operating units were affected by the power loss which caused emissions of sulfur dioxide and hydrogen sulfide from the release and combustion of hydrocarbons at the Motiva Enterprises LLC (Motiva) - Convent Refinery.|
Notes: Immediately, the operating units were stabilized to reduce the impact from the emissions. Several operating units were shutdown and remaining online units followed the emergency procedure for steam load shedding to minimize emissions. Exceeded the 500-pound (lb) reportable quantity (RQ) for sulfur dioxide (SO2). SO2 maximum lb/hr emission limits were exceeded at Tail Gas Treating Units 1, 3, and 4, the Flare CAP, and at combustion devices (i.e. heaters) burning refinery fuel gas. Hydrogen Sulfide (H2S) maximum lb/hr emission rates were exceeded at Tail Gas Treating Units 1, 2, 3, and 5, and at the Flare CAP. The maximum lb/hr emission rates of NOx, CO, VOC, and PM were experienced at the Flare CAP. Lastly, the maximum opacity limit as required by LAC 33:III.1101.B for SRU No. 4 TGTU Incinerator Stack was also exceeded at the time of the incident.
|Flare 4||Cause: The flammable gas is not being combusted because the flare pilot has been extinguished... Attempting to relight the pilot... As soon as they do they do they will call back... Product is still releasing... They have put the flare back into the recovery system to minimize the amount of H2S released... It is being managed and is under control... They will call back once the pilot is back on...
Flare pilot outage on Flare 4|
Notes: On the SPOC report, 300 lbs of Hydrogen sulfide was initially reported as being released; in their 7 day letter they reported that they didn't exceed the Reportable quantity of 100 lbs for hydrogen sulfide. The incident was initially reported as a potential exceedance of the 5000-lb Reportable Quanity (RQ) for flammable gas and the 100-lb Reportable Quantity (RQ) hydrogen sulfide (H2S). However, after further calculation, the total flammable gas emissions from this incident were not above the reportable Quantity. Additionally, the total hydrogen sulfide (H2S) emissions did not exceed the reportable quantity.
|Flare #3||Cause: During normal operation, two redundant level control valves on the bottom of 70F-107 failed, and liquid filled the vessel. This caused the pressure of the vessel to increase, resulting in the vessel's pressure relief device to open to the flare. Sent to Flare #3|
Notes: Gases were contained in the Flare Gas Recovery system until maximum operating pressures of the system required the refinery to flare. The operating unit immediately reduced charge to minimize the generation of gas routed to the flare. Reactor temperatures and charge rates were reduced while maintenance repaired the two valves. Stable operations were established and the flaring ended. Manager bypassed the unit to stabilize the vessel. Fugitive emissions sent to Flare #3. Another follow-up report will be submitted at the conclusion of the investigation of the root cause and any appropriate modifications or adjustments.
|HTU-2 Low Pressure Offgas Absorber||Cause: On May 18, 2012, the 500 pound reportable quantity for sulfur dioxide was exceeded at Motiva Enterprises Convent Refinery in St. James Parish. Hydrogen sulfide was also released during this event.
The incident occurred at Motiva's Convent Refinery on May 18, 2012 at approximately 2:59am and ended at approximately 4:02am. On the morning of May 18, 2012, the HTU-2 Unit was in the process of starting up, when H2S containing hydrocarbons entered the unit's low pressure fuel gas drum. The H2S containing hydrocarbons were then combusted in the West Side Refinery Fuel Gas combustion devices causing exceeedances of the SO2 RQ and maximum pounds per hour permit limits.
No information is provided in addition to defining the causal factors of this incident human error.|
Notes: This incident occurred on May 18, 2012. LABB could not locate the initial 7-day report required by law documenting this accident on EDMS. The only available report was the belated "60-day follow up report" dated March 19, 2013 (approximately 11 months after the accident). Immediately after the incident, operators initiated procedure GP058-Identifying the Source of H2S in Plant Fuel Gas to determine the source sending H2S containing hydrocarbon to the low pressure west fuel gas drum. This procedure requires operations personnel to conduct Sensidyne Sampling for H2S at potentially culpable sources. Additionally, amine circulation was immediately increased in all H2S absorber towers to cease H2S breakthrough in the event breakthrough was the cause of the event. Also at thi time, operators performed field walks on potentially affected units to identify any psv's lifting or incorrect line ups to the fuel gas system. Process engineering personnel concurrently began technical monitoring using Historian software to locate the source of the high H2S material. The sulfur dioxide emissions are reported as pounds per hour. The emissions occurred from 2:59am to 4:02am (1 hour and 3 minutes total).
|FLARE: Unspecified flare||Cause: There was an unexpected swing in the feed to the VPS-1 Unit causing an upset and flaring.|
Notes: There is no information given regarding remedial actions taken.
|FLARE: Unspecified flare||Cause: There was a power interruption of two SRUs (#3 &4) causing a release of acid gas into the tail gas treating units and recovery unit which flared. Opacity limit in SRU #4 was exceeded for the permit. SO2 and H2S RQ were surpassed by lbs/hr on Refinery flare #3.|
Notes: Air monitoring in the area detected no acid gas during the start up of the unit and values below action levels near the incinerator. All acid gas was out of the recovery system. The file is missing the incident report from the refinery.
|HTU-1||Cause: On November 1, 2013, there was a release of hydrogen sulfide due to an equipment failure on HTU-1.|
Notes: The incident was initially reported as a potential exceedance of the 100-lb Reportable Quantity for hydrogen sulfide. However, after further calculation, the total hydrogen sulfide emissions from this incident were not above the reportable quantity.
|H-Oil F-202 reactor||Cause: There was a release of hydrogen sulfide on October 6, 2013 due to damaged tubing in the F-202 reactor in the H-Oil unit.
Initially, a potential hydrogen sulfide release was reported in exceedance of the 100 pound reportable quantity, but after further evaluation, the total hydrogen sulfide emissions were below reportable quantity.|
|Flare #3||Cause: On the morning of May 18, the H-Oil Unit was operating normally when emergency pressure control valve 70HV234 inadvertently opened. Operations immediately reduced charge to the unit and closed the emergency pressure control valve in an attempt to re-engage operation, which was unsuccessful. In order to prevent an unsafe condition from the elevated temperatures and levels in equipment, operations stabilized the unit by flaring and removing charge from the unit to start a controlled shutdown.|
Notes: Operations immediately reduced charge to the unit and closed the emergency pressure control valve in an attempt to re-engage operation, which was unsuccessful. In order to prevent an unsafe condition from the elevated temperatures and levels in equipment, operations stabilized the unit by flaring and removing charge from the unit to start a controlled shutdown. After investigation, it was concluded that the restriction orifice in the valve positioner relay plugged causing air pressure from the valve positioner to the actuator to drop below the pressure threshold required to hold the valve closed. The replacement of a control valve positioner, filter, and air regulator will eliminate the recurrence of an identical event in the short term. The replacement of this equipment will be conducted during the 2013 H-Oil reactor entry shutdown which is currently underway. Motiva will complete the proposed replacements prior to completion of the 2013 H-Oil reactor entry shutdown. To reduce the likelihood of a similar event from occurring in the future, Motiva will inspect these components during subsequent H-Oil reactor entry turnarounds for evidence of plugging and replace equipment as necessary. The total amount of hydrogen sulfide does not exceed the RQ of 100 pounds, but the maximum lb/hr emissions limit was exceeded for the hours between 8 AM and 11 AM. The permitted rates and amount released above authorized emissions were listed, but not the exact total amounts emitted.
|H-Oil Unit||Cause: Reactor effluent released to air due to unknown causes. An upset on the H-Oil unit resulted in H2S being released.
On March 14, 2013, Motiva Enterprises, LLC Convent Refinery (Motiva) reported a potential Hydrogen Sulfide release which occurred at the facility due to an operational upset on Motiva's H-Oil Unit. The incident was initially reported as a potential exceedance of the 100-pound reportable quantity for H2S. After further calculation, the total H2S emissions from this incident were not above the RQ.|
|FCCU WGS||Cause: Due to a rupture on a seal SO2 was released to air.
The incident began at Motiva's Convent Refinery on February 13, 2013 at approximately 23:00, when the FCCU's Electric Quench Turbine experienced a trip. The FCCU experienced an upset which resulted in increased carbon monoxide emissions from the Fluidized Catalytic Cracking Unit Wet Gas Scrubber Stack (FCCU WGS.) The excess emissions ceased when the FCCU stabilized.|
Notes: Pressure controller that opened and caused flaring closed at 00:25...Flaring continues, stable... No high H2S releasing to flare at this time... The incident was initially reported as a potential exceedance of the 500-lb Reportable Quantity (RQ) for sulfur dioxide (SO2). However, after further calculation, the total SO2 emissions from this incident were not above the RQ.
|FCCU unit||Cause: On January 22, 2013, Motiva Convent Refinery Reported a potential sulfur dioxide (SO2) release which occured at the facility due to operational upset on the FCCU unit.|
Notes: Initially reported sulfur dioxide and hydrogen sulfide released to air during the upset. The incident was initially reported as a potential exceedance of the 500-lb Reportable Quaantity (RQ) for sulfur dioxide (SO2). However, after further calculation, the total SO2 emissions from this incident were not above the RQ.
|H-Oil Unit||Cause: Potential H2S release in the H-Oil Unit when corrosion under insulation contributed to degradation of carbon steel instrument tubing. Initial notification reported a potential exceedance of the 100 lb reportable quantity (RQ) for H2S. Refinery letter updates that this RQ was not exceeded.|
Notes: Release was determined to be below reportable quantities. No remediation actions were described.
|H-Oil Unit pump 70P-102||Cause: Motiva's H-Oil unit lost indication on pump 70P-102 resulting in a unit cut-back and associated flaring. The incident was initially reported as a potential exceedance of the 500lb RQ for SO2, but subsequent calculations determined that the RQ was not exceeded.
Both H2S and SO2 are thought to have escaped during this flare event.|
Notes: Remediation not addressed. Report indicates that no one was injured or killed and no road closures occurred in connection with the incident.
|Train-100 heater passes on HTU-2||Cause: At approximately 15:31 on February 24, 2014, a scaffolding crew was dismantling a scaffold by Train-100 heater passes on HTU-2. The crew was using a hammer to remove a scaffolding bar. A worker swung his hammer and missed the scaffold and struck a 1/2" tubing on a flow transmitter. The tubing came out of the ferrel and nut releasing H2 and diesel-range hydrocarbons. The material released due to the tubing failure was hydrogen and diesel range hydrocarbons. In addition, elevated flaring occurred as the unit was brought down to stabilize the situation.|
Notes: Follow-up was promised within 60 days. The unit was brought down in order to stabilize the situation and materials involved were routed to the flare.