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Accident # | 139889 |
State Police # | 12-03117 |
Accident Date | 2012-05-18 |
Report Date | 2013-03-19 |
Follow-up Date | 0000-00-00 |
Follow-up: | No |
Pollutant | Duration | Point Source | Greenhouse Gas | Criteria Pollutant | Ozone forming chemical | Amount of Release |
Sulfur Dioxide | 1H 3M | HTU-2 Low Pressure Offgas Absorber | NO | YES | NO | 1,072.8 pounds |
Hydrogen Sulfide | 1H 3M | HTU-2 Low Pressure Offgas Absorber | NO | NO | NO | BRQ |
Accident Classified As: Reportable Quantity
On May 18, 2012, the 500 pound reportable quantity for sulfur dioxide was exceeded at Motiva Enterprises Convent Refinery in St. James Parish. Hydrogen sulfide was also released during this event. The incident occurred at Motiva's Convent Refinery on May 18, 2012 at approximately 2:59am and ended at approximately 4:02am. On the morning of May 18, 2012, the HTU-2 Unit was in the process of starting up, when H2S containing hydrocarbons entered the unit's low pressure fuel gas drum. The H2S containing hydrocarbons were then combusted in the West Side Refinery Fuel Gas combustion devices causing exceeedances of the SO2 RQ and maximum pounds per hour permit limits. No information is provided in addition to defining the causal factors of this incident human error.
Upon the investigation of the circumstances related to the event Motiva has determined that this event was preventable as the event was caused by human error. At 2:55am on May 18, 2012, a lineup was made on the 14F-323 off gas absorber that resulted in routing sour gas into the west side fuel gas drum. The lineup was corrected at 3:50am on May 18, 2012.
This incident occurred on May 18, 2012. LABB could not locate the initial 7-day report required by law documenting this accident on EDMS. The only available report was the belated "60-day follow up report" dated March 19, 2013 (approximately 11 months after the accident). Immediately after the incident, operators initiated procedure GP058-Identifying the Source of H2S in Plant Fuel Gas to determine the source sending H2S containing hydrocarbon to the low pressure west fuel gas drum. This procedure requires operations personnel to conduct Sensidyne Sampling for H2S at potentially culpable sources. Additionally, amine circulation was immediately increased in all H2S absorber towers to cease H2S breakthrough in the event breakthrough was the cause of the event. Also at thi time, operators performed field walks on potentially affected units to identify any psv's lifting or incorrect line ups to the fuel gas system. Process engineering personnel concurrently began technical monitoring using Historian software to locate the source of the high H2S material. The sulfur dioxide emissions are reported as pounds per hour. The emissions occurred from 2:59am to 4:02am (1 hour and 3 minutes total).
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