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Shell Facility (3462), St. Rose

Releases of Xylene

LDEQ Accident Number
Accident Date
Point Source(s) Notes Amount of Release
81720, 81957, 83713

2005-08-28
7-84 (OL-5 Ground Falre, FG-101); 6-84 (OL-5 Elevated Flare, FE-101); 1-90 (GO-1 Elevated Flare, FE602); 3-84 (Utilities East Flare, FE 501)
Cause: Due to shutdown and damages associated with Hurricane Katrina

Followup:

Notes: The most significnt point source emissions were from the Elevated flare. The report does not include emissions from tanks, HCU Flare, Emergency Bypass Outfall and other equipment that was previously reported.
168.0 pounds
No LDEQ Reported

2006-07-24
St. Rose Flare
Cause: Unexpected failure of Entergy power supply resulting in flaring material from the crude column overhead system

Followup: No

Notes: Improvements to power supply are current project
0.0 pounds
No LDEQ Reported

2006-07-02
St. Rose Flare
Cause: Electrical power dip which led to a pump shutdown and causing the de-salter to overpressure resulting in a pressure relief valve opening up and material vented to the flare

Followup: No

Notes: Pump restarted. Improvements to power supply are current project
0.1 pounds
No LDEQ Reported

2007-09-24
5-77 (St. Rose Flare)
Cause: Power failure allowed two pressure relief valves to open to the flare to prevent over-pressuring of the unit

Followup: No

Notes: The power failure was unexpected. They secured the process unit until the power was restored. Electrical support will work with the energy supplier to understand what caused the failure and take appropriate corrective action to prevent reoccurence. Word for word what happened the prior month
101.2 pounds
98868

2007-08-23

EPN 5-77 St. Rose Flare
Cause: Power failure allowed two pressure relief valves to open to the flare to prevent over-pressuring of the unit

Followup: No

Notes: The power failure was unexpected. They secured the process unit until the power was restored. Electrical support will work with the energy supplier to understand what caused the failure and take appropriate corrective action to prevent it from reoccurring.
101.0
98868

2007-08-23

EPN 5-77 St. Rose Flare
Cause: Power failure allowed two pressure relief valves to open to the flare to prevent over-pressuring of the unit

Followup: No

Notes: The power failure was unexpected. They secured the process unit until the power was restored. Electrical support will work with the energy supplier to understand what caused the failure and take appropriate corrective action to prevent it from reoccurring.
1.7 pounds
98478

2007-06-03
5-77 St. Rose Flare
Tank TK-8552
Tank TK-8553
Cause: During a crude tank switch there was a unit upset when water and emulsion from a feed tank was introduced into the process, leading to the over pressuring of a de-salter vessel to the flare, a spill of water and emulsion to the water treatment facility and the shutdown of the compressor with additional flaring. During this unit upset tanks TK-8552 and TK-8553 roof legs inadvertently landed on the floor

Followup: No

Notes: Initial written report issued 6/20/07 but investigation revealed additional vent streams were routed to the flare so the numbers were updated on 8/14/07. To prevent this the water in the crude oil tank should have been drained prior to being placed in service. The crude tank was switched back to prevent further water and emulsion from being fed into the unit. Necessary steps were taken to clean up the wastewater treatment facility & return unit to normal. Tanks TK-8552 and TK-8553 were refilled to their normal levels. In the future, the water in the crude tank will be drained before the tank is placed into service
101.0
No LDEQ Reported

2008-08-25
5-77 (St. Rose Flare)
Cause: Lost power to controls for crude column overhead fans and Uninterruptable Power Supply backup ran out of batteries. Fans shut down leading to necessity of shutdown of the unit and flaring

Followup: No

Notes: The process unit was stablized until an electrician could resote control power to the fans. Once power was restored the equipment was restarted and the unit safely returned to normal conditions. The incident will be investigated and any appropriate corrective actions will be implemented to prevent reoccurrence. Report said it was preventable but did not say why or how. The cover letter/narrative (referencing the verbal notification) mentioned that naphtha and smoke were released, but these were not mentioned elsewhere in the report
5.0 pounds
No LDEQ Reported

2008-04-13
5-77 (St. Rose Flare)
Cause: Power interruption caused by fire at Entergy substation feeding the plant. Lead to shutdown of plant and flaring.

Followup: No

Notes: The power interruption from Entergy was not foreseeable and the equipment was restarted once power was returned. The incident will be reviewed with Entergy and any appropriate corrective actions will be implemented to prevent reoccurrence
0.0 pounds
No LDEQ Reported

2008-04-08
5-77 (St. Rose Flare)
Cause: Maintenance activities on the uninterruptible power supply (UPS) led to an interuption in power due to a loose connection in the UPS. Several pieces of equipment shut down and there was flaring

Followup: No

Notes: The incident occurred during routine maintenance activity on the UPS and the loose connection in the UPS was not expected. The equipment was restarted once power was returned. The incident will be investigated and corrective actions will be implemented appropriately to prevent reoccurence
0.0 pounds
No LDEQ Reported

2008-01-03
5-77 (St. Rose Flare)
Cause: Power failure lead to unit shutdown, resulting in a unit upset and flaring

Followup: No

Notes: Power failure was caused by Entergy and was unplanned. All heavy product lines were flushed with a diesel driven flush pump. Incident will be reviewed with Entergy to discuss what happened and what can be done to prevent recurrence.
0.9 pounds
151683

2013-10-17
tank 8553
Cause: On October 16, 2013 at 1600 hours, the St. Rose operators discovered that a naphtha tank, Tank 8553, transferring naphtha landed on the roof legs. The radar gauge that was being used to monitor the level was believed to have been reading incorrectly; approximately 3 feet higher than the level should have been reading.

Followup: Yes

Notes: Once the operators discovered that the tank landed on the roof legs, the transfer from Tank 8533 was immediately stopped, and product was allowed to gravitate back into the tank until the roof was floated off the legs. Currently, an investigation is occurring. The results from this investigation will be incorporated, where applicable, to prevent recurrence.
0.2 pounds