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Marathon Ashland Petroleum (3165), Garyville
Causal Factor: Human Factors
| LDEQ Accident Number Accident Date |
Point Source(s) | Notes | Amount of Release |
| 78037 2005-04-05 | North Flare (EIQ No. 83-74) | Cause: The Unit 42 boiler was inadvertently tripped, along with the air compressor, which caused an upset condition at the Unit 26-FCCU. During start-up of the unit, the Debutanizer overpressurized and vented to the North Flare. Followup: Yes Notes: "Operations personnel took all actions possible to minimize emissions." | C3: 10.2 pounds C3=: 32.5 pounds iC4: 28.9 pounds nC4: 7.1 pounds isoC4=: 12.6 pounds 1-C4=: 10.9 pounds t-C4=: 12.2 pounds c-C4=: 8.4 pounds |
| 76432 2005-01-25 | South Flare (EIQ No. 69-74) | Cause: Control logic for Unit 47 Amine Unit's Lean Amine Pump was inadvertently tripped during maintenance. Human error caused this release. Followup: No Notes: Valve was closed within a minute of its opening. | Sulfur Dioxide: 16.0 pounds Hydrogen Sulfide: 1.0 pounds |
| 96829 2007-06-06 | Truck near Marathon Avenue and Hwy 61 | Cause: Upon leaving asphalt terminal driver noticed that the top hatch of his tank truck was not properly secured. Followup: No Notes: Claims emission was below RQ. | Asphalt: 2.0 gallons |
| 94921 2007-03-26 | Dock 4 floating barge | Cause: A tug boat was moving barges from Dock 3 and accidentally ran into the Dock 4 floating barge. Operators noticed Dock 4 was listing backward and small holes were discoverved near the water line. Followup: Notes: The ballast water contains small concentration of corrosion inhibitor. The inhibitor contained dilute concentrations of sodium nitrate and sodium hydroxide. Estimated amount spilled reported by refinery is between 42 and 420 gallons. LDEQ reported 100 gallons spilled. The total amount of inhibitor originally contained in the ballast water was less than 14 lbs. = 4 lbs sodium nitrate, 0.14 lbs sodium hydroxide. After 7 years these compounds would most likely be inert. | Dock Ballast Water: 100.0 gallons |
| 94400 2007-02-27 | Marine Dock 1 | Cause: The piping on a newly installed liquid separation vessel was incorrectly piped Followup: Yes Notes: Root Cause Analysis is being performed. DEQ Field Interview Report states that the facility failed to have control device in place to ensure that the newly installed piping was correctly piped prior to loading. | Benzene: 0.1 pounds Highly Reactive Volatile Organic Compounds (HRVOCs): 4.0 pounds Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs): 439.8 pounds Compressed Flammable Gas: 2,036.4 pounds |
| No LDEQ Reported 2007-02-27 | Marine Dock 1 | Cause: The piping on a newly installed liquid separation vessel was incorrectly piped Followup: Yes Notes: Root Cause Analysis is being performed. DEQ Field Interview Report states that the facility failed to have control device in place to ensure that the newly installed piping was correctly piped prior to loading. | Benzene: 0.1 pounds Highly Reactive Volatile Organic Compounds (HRVOCs): 4.0 pounds Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs): 439.8 pounds Compressed Flammable Gas: 2,036.4 pounds |
| 110717 2008-11-08 | 3/4" bleeder valve on the 56-1301 Exchangers in Unit 56 Hydrotreater | Cause: A bleeder valve was left open and Light Cycle Oil was released. Followup: Yes Notes: Open bleeder valve blocked in and clean up begun immediately. | |
| 106589 2008-06-19 | Product Barge at Dock 3 | Cause: Product barge was overfilled with asphalt allowing some of it to spill into the river. Followup: Yes Notes: Asphalt that was spilled into the river "sank immediately" but the refinery claims that here was no offsite impact. Loading operations ceased when overfilling occurred. Incident under investigation. | Asphalt: 210.0 gallons |
| 119673 2009-11-23 | kerosene hydrotreater unit | Cause: During start-up of the kerosene hydrotreater unit (KHT), a bleeder valve o a piperack outside the unit was inadvertently left open, releasing gas into the atmosphere. Followup: Yes Notes: the line was isolated, and the valve was closed. | Nitrogen: 24.2 pounds Hydrogen: 3.7 pounds Hydrogen Sulfide: 3.5 pounds Methane: 0.5 pounds Ethane: 0.8 pounds Propane: 2.7 pounds n-Butane: 2.0 pounds 1-Pentene: 0.5 pounds n-Pentane: 3.2 pounds Butane: 5.0 pounds |
| 113740 2009-03-26 | tank-500-1 | Cause: There is a frac tank that drains tank-500-1 when it overflows, after drainage the valve that drains the tank was left open. Followup: No Notes: roof drain was blocked. another vacuum truck was called in to drain the tank, and on-site cleanup was started. | Hydrocarbon: 500.0 pounds Benzene: 3.6 pounds |
| 134862 2011-10-25 | C-can storage container in Contractor Village | Cause: While welding brackets on the outside wall of the C-can storage container the interior wood shelving and floor began to smolder and caught fire. The C-can was located in the Contractor Village. Followup: No Notes: The refinery response team extinguished the fire and brief air monitoring was conducted. | |
| 152399 2013-11-14 | Heater on Unit 43 Fuel Gas Mix Drum | Cause: Unit 19 received a slug of rich amine, during the unit 15 start-up, causing the amine regenerator to slump and was unable to be removed from the stream. The amine, still rich with Hydrogen Sulfide, was then sent to the Fuel Gas Absorber tower and was unable to remove Hyrdogen Sulfide from the fuel gas. The fuel gas was then sent to the Fuel Gas Mixed Drum, which was supplying fuel gas to 22 sources. As a result, several heaters and boilers experienced an increase in Sulfur Dioxide above the maximum allowable permitted lbs/hr rate.
A TAPROOT investigation concluded that the accident was caused by Human Performance (the 519 operator thought the board operator meant to close the spillback instead of the lean internal circulation) and Equipment Difficulty (steam trap system malfunctioned due to new Fuel Gas Project tie in).
LDEQ conducted an Air Quality Compliance Incident Investigation Report in response to this accident. Followup: Yes Notes: See Page 3 for very detailed list of point sources with names, unit numbers etc. The 60-day report recommends that the refinery revise the Unit 19 Start up procedure with more detailing events on when to use the internal lean circulation line while starting up Unit 15 with the appropriate line terminology, label lines accordingly, and retrain operators with the revisions. This report recommends additionally that the refinery evaluate the design of the existing steam tracing for the analyzer, and recommend proper mitigation. No report does not provide information of the the refinery's implementation of these recommendations. LDEQ Enforcement Division found that MPC failed to operate the lean amine circulation line in the closed position for the proper working order of the Lean Regenerator to control emissions by the facility. Facility will revise Unit start up procedures with operators. | Sulfur Dioxide: 1,699.4 pounds |
| 152171 2013-11-06 | North Ground Flare, Heaters on Unit 243, Unit 43, and Unit 59 North Ground Flare | Cause: According to the the 60-day report, the Triconix safety control system inadvertently tripped the Unit 247 Amine Unit Lean Amine Pumps. The pump shutdown caused lean amine to stop circulating to the Fuel Gas Treaters which caused high H2S-laden fuel gas to be sent to the Unit 243 Fuel Gas Drum. In addition, untreated fuel gas was sent to the Unit 43 Fuel Gas Mix Drum. The Fuel Fuel Gas Mix Drums were supplying fuel ga to 26 different process heaters and boilers with the refinery during the incident. As a result, each heater and boiler experienced an increase in SO2 emissions above the maximum allowable permitted lbs/hr rate. In addition, the Unit 247 Flash Drum overfilled into the vapor line to the Unit 210 Compressor Suction Drum, thus causing the compressor to temporarily shut down which resulted in venting to the North Ground Flare. Followup: Yes Notes: The refinery Air Monitoring Team was dispatched inside and outside the refinery fenceline. All SO2 and H2S readings were non-detect except for one 4ppm SO2 reading on Marathon Avenue in the refinery. No elevated ambient air monitoring readings from MPCs four ambient air monitoring stations were detected during the event. Operations re-started the Unit 247 lean amine pumps and re-established amine circulation to the Amine Treaters. This recirculation brought the H2S amounts in the fuel down to acceptable levels. The reportable quantity for sulfur dioxide was exceeded during the event. In addition, the permitted SO2 and the NSPS Subpart J/Ja SO2 limit for the emission sources was exceeded for multiple hours. The opacity limits for the above listed heaters and boilers were exceeded. Report was unable to be uploaded. Recommendations made for the Root cause were:1) Human Performance- Revise the Unit 19 Start up procedure with more detailing events on when to the internal lean circulation line while starting up Unit 25 with the appropriate line terminology, label lines accordingly, and retrain operators with the revision. 2) Equitment Difficulty- Evaluate the design of the existing steam tracing for the analyzer, and recommend proper mitigation. | Sulfur Dioxide: 15,961.8 pounds Hydrogen Sulfide: 5.0 pounds NOx: 6.0 pounds Carbon Monoxide: 32.4 pounds Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs): 51.9 pounds Methane: 20.5 pounds Ethane: 5.8 pounds Ethylene: 0.3 pounds Propane: 11.2 pounds Propylene: 1.8 pounds n-Butane: 12.3 pounds Isobutane: 4.8 pounds 1-Butene: 1.0 pounds Isobutylene: 0.5 pounds T-butene2: 0.3 pounds Pentane: 19.4 pounds Carbon Dioxide: 1.4 pounds Nitrogen: 3.3 pounds Highly Reactive Volatile Organic Compounds (HRVOCs): 2.1 pounds |
| 146849 2013-02-21 | Unit 259 South Ground Flare and Unit 259 North Ground Flare | Cause: The Unit 214 Kerosene Hydrotreater experienced an emergency shutdown at 16:18 hours on February 21, 2013. The process unit vented to the South Ground Flare for 94 minutes. The Unit 210 Crude Overhead Compressor shutdown at 16:39 hours on February 21, 2013 was re-started at 16:58 hours on February 21, 2013. The duration of Unit 210 venting to the North Ground Flare was 19 minutes.
On February 21, 2013, at 16:18 hours, a power failure caused the Unit 214 Kerosene Hydrotreater to experience an emergency shutdown. As a result of the event, liquid was carried over from Unit 214 to the Unit 210 Crude Overhead Compressor system. The liquid filled the Unit 210 Overhead Compressor Feed Knockout drum which shut down the Overhead Compressor. The ambient air monitoring stations located by the ground flares did not detect a significant increase in sulfur dioxide emissions.
The main parts of this accident were the emergency shutdown of the 214 Kerosene Hydrotreater and flaring from the Unit 210 Crude Overhead Compressor.
The causal factor for the Unit 214 Power Failure and subsequent emergency shutdown was determined to be Equipment Difficulty/Tolerable Failure. The Causal factor for the Unit 210 flaring event was determined to be Human Performance Difficulty/Management System/SPAC Not Used/Enforcement Needs Improvement. Followup: Yes Notes: Power was restored to the Unit 214 Kerosene Hydrotreater and the unit was re-started. Liquid was drained from the Unit 210 Crude Overhead Compressor Feed Knockout Drum. The Unit 210 Crude Overhead Compressor was re-started. An incident investigation will result in recommendation items designed to prevent the recurrence of this event. In the 60 day follow up report dated 4/22/13, the following remedial actions were listed in response to the release: Unit 214 portion of the upset: 1) Maintenance corrective actions immediately following release. Electricians and instrument Techs responded to the Satellite building. Power panel 214-PP-B01 main breaker and substation 214-MCC-B01 were reset establishing power to the first power supply. 214-HVAC-B008 was repaired and brought back online. 2) Operations corrective actions after the release. Unit 214 board operator started procedures for shutting down unit. Unit 214 valves 214FC0007 (Heavy Coker Naptha Feed Valve) and 214FC0006 (Kerosene from tankage valve) were closed 15 minutes after the start of the release. Operations awaited Maintenance's confimation that the unit was ready to restart. Unit 210 portion of the upset: 1) Unit 210 operators followed the event reponse matrix to verify the compressor suction drum (210-1202) level, the compressor suction drum valve position, and whether or not the suction drum pumps were running. Operations than began working to get the level down in the suction drum in preparation for restarting the OFFGAS compressors. For the Unit 214 portion of the incident the following recommendations were made: 1) Update the Marathon Standard Practice to require a cicuit breaker cooridination study for all 480V power panel installations for future projects - due 12/31/13; and 2) Evaluate the cicuit breaker coordination for all existing 480V power panels throughout the refinery and determine necessary solutions to achieve coordination where required - due 8/30/14 3) For the Unit 210 portion of the incident the following recommendation was made: Review and Reinforce the Emergency Shutdown Procedures for Unit 214 with the Board Operators - complete. An additional followup on 10/23/13 corrected the initial followup report's emissions data regarding greenhouse gas releases. | Sulfur Dioxide: 2,498.7 pounds Methane: 113.6 pounds Ethane: 75.5 pounds Ethylene: 0.1 pounds Propane: 45.1 pounds Propylene: 0.1 pounds n-Butane: 14.9 pounds Isobutane: 14.4 pounds 1-Butene: 0.0 pounds T-butene2: 0.0 pounds n-Pentane: 4.4 pounds Pentene Plus: 3.9 pounds Carbon Monoxide: 207.7 pounds Hydrogen: 82.0 pounds Nitrogen: 0.2 pounds Hydrogen Sulfide: 27.1 pounds NOx: 38.2 pounds Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs): 89.3 pounds Particulate Matter 10: 4.2 pounds Particulate Matter 2.5: 4.2 pounds Highly Reactive Volatile Organic Compounds (HRVOCs): 0.2 pounds Pentane: 3.8 pounds |
| 154587 2014-03-18 | Blowdown Settling Drum in Unit 05 Coker (HV-0705) | Cause: The Coke Drum was at a higher pressure than normal after the drum swap because HV-0705 was not opened from 40 to 70% prior to the swap. When swapping the offline drum to the blowdown tower, a much larger surge of flow occurred than normal due to the higher drum pressure. This caused the Blowdown Settling Drum to pressure up and its pressure control vent to open to the flare. There were no known offsite impacts.
It appears that the operator failed to follow appropriate drum swap procedures, causing the incident to occur. Followup: Yes Notes: An incident investigation was conducted to determine the cause or causes of the incident. Per this investigation, the root cause was identified as a failure to complete/follow the steps in the Coke Drum Swap procedure. Multiple recommendation items have been identified to prevent a recurrence of this event. The MPC process control department has been tasked with implementing alarms and designing an interlock or control logic to prevent a quick increase in pressure to the Blowdown Settling Drum during a Coker Drum Swap (anticipated completion 9/15/14). The coke drum swap procedure will be modified by 7/7/14 to ensure the outside operator has verified and communicated with the board operator that each step of the procedure has been followed and completed. A training and auditing program will be instituted by 12/2/14 for field and board operators about the importance of procedural compliance. | Sulfur Dioxide: 751.0 pounds |
| 153584 2014-01-27 | Unit 59 North Flare (EQT#0162) | Cause: During propylene truck offloading activities, truck rack personnel began the normal Unit 65 process by opening a line to the flare to begin the transfer process. The line should be closed after the transfer to storage begins. However, the Unit 65 personnel failed to close the flare line and an amount of material went to the flare instead of to storage. Followup: No Notes: Upon discovery, the line that was open to the flare was closed and the procedure was reviewed with the operator to prevent reoccurrence. | Propane: 17.4 pounds Propylene: 92.0 pounds n-Butane: 0.1 pounds Pentene Plus: 0.9 pounds NOx: 13.6 pounds Carbon Monoxide: 73.8 pounds Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs): 111.1 pounds Particulate Matter 10: 1.5 pounds Particulate Matter 2.5: 1.5 pounds Highly Reactive Volatile Organic Compounds (HRVOCs): 92.0 pounds Carbon Dioxide: 199.0 pounds Methane: 1.3 pounds |
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