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|LDEQ Accident Number
|Point Source(s)||Notes||Amount of Release|
|HTU-2 Fire and Release from recycle Compressor||Cause: At approximately 10:25 am on 10/29/05, there was a small fire on 14C-201 recycle compressor on HTU-2. A small fire was ignited by lube oil escaping the seals on the turbine outboard bearing cap onto the turbine case which was in full operation during the leak. It appears that the lube oil reservoir overfilled which impeded flow through the lube oil return line back to the reservoir.|
Notes: The fire was immediately extinguished by operations using a fixed fire monitor. Due to the fire the hydrogen system on the unit had to be depressured to the flare resulting in flaring for several minutes. The unit was depressured for repair. Incident is under investigation using Triangle of Prevention program. Mitigations are likely to be a combination of engineering, i.e. different technology for measuring levels and revising procedure No reportable quantities were exceeded.
|Flares 1 and 2||Cause: Related to Hurricane Rita but no information given|
Notes: telephone report have estimated exceedances of Sox Nitrogen Oxide Hydrogen Sulfide and Volatile Organic Compoundss
|flare #2||Cause: piece of instrument air tubing failed causing a bypass control valve around a steam generator to close. Flow through the intermediate cycle gas oil circuit stopped, causing de-ethanizer tower to slump, increasing concentration of light material in the de-butanizer tower feed, increased pressure, causing flaring event|
Notes: "unit charge rate and riser temperature were reduced immediately following the loss of heat medium into the de-ethanizer reboiler to minimize the loading to the debutanizer tower. The bypass around 2PDC-142 was opened to re-establish flow to the de-ethanizer reboiler."
|Steam Boiler EPN 31F-810|
Tail Gas Treatment Unit No. 4 Incinerator Stack EPN 78H-101
VPS-2 Atmospheric Tower Feed Heater EPN 83H-101
|Cause: The seal on a diesel circulation pump on VPS-2 (a crude distillation unit) failed as a reslut of a suspected bearing problem. This seal failure caused the release of approximately 434 bbls of untreated (sour) diesel, which ignited, resulting in a fire.|
Notes: Motiva has slowed down production throughout the refinery until investigations are complete. Inspected, repaired, and rebuilt the pump as necessary. W/r/t pump seal failure, rotating equipmt and other personnel will complete the investigation and implement necessary changes to monitoring, inspection, and maintenance procedures
|Tank 20D-12 (EIQ 20D-12)||Cause: While conducting demolition activities on the tank 20D-I2 floating roof, a fire began due to cutting of the roof with acetylene torches where residual hydrocarbon remained in the floating roof pontoon.|
Notes: Motiva will inspect pontoons and other difficult to access areas that may contain hydrocarbon, and remove any material present prior to resuming demolition activiti
|HTU-1 Kerosene Reboiler (EPN 3F 404)||Cause: an unexpected heater tube rupture resulted in a fire at HTU-1|
Notes: Motiva is thoroughly inspecting the heater and other affected equipment and will make necessary repairs prior to restarting the heater and process unit. Will re-evaluate inspection frequencies, preventive maintenance frequencies, operating limits and associated procedures, and make necessary changes to help prevent recurrenc
|HGU Torvex Incinerator (EPN 79J-904)||Cause: a temp. swing triggered a temperature alarm and an operator responded to the alarm by making adjustments to the operation of the unit|
Notes: Motiva will incorporate control valve set point guidance into supporting documentation for operators to prevent swings in incinerator burner outlet temp. from triggering the low temp. alarm; Implement a troubleshooting guide to assist operators with operating the control valve when it is believed to be sticking.
|TORVEX Incinerator EPN 79J-904||Cause: failure of an antifriction ball bearing in the blower results in shutdown of the incinerator.|
Notes: Rotating equipmt and other supporting engineering personnel will complete the investigation of the failure and implement necessary changes to monitoring inspection and maintenance procedures
|flare no. 2 and wet gas scrubber||Cause: Regenerated Catalyst Slide Valve (RCSV) of the Fluid Catalytic Cracking Unit (FCCU) changed position without a corresponding command from the control system causing trip of the gas turbine driving the Wet Gas Compressor because of high exhaust temperature--overpressure control valve opened to flare.
Notes: "Took immediate action to begin the process of stabilizing, slowing down, and diverting feed from the FCCU riser." Circuit board replaced, cleaned the servo and will replace it when spare arrives.
|cooling water tower exhaust||Cause: Upset in the refinery's cooling water systems resulting in the apparent exceedance of the VOC emission rate limit due to mechanical failure within a set of heat exchangers which resulted in releasing VOCs into the cooling water system.
No DEQ report in this file, follow-up letter only.|
Notes: VOCs stripped in the cooling water tower and emitted to the atmosphere in cooling tower exhaust, samples taken at the battery limits of multiple units until source was identified, isolated heat exchangers to minimize hydrocarbon carryover across cooling water system
Flare 1-4, TGTU- 1,2,3,5 Incinerator,
Flare 1-4, TGTU-1,3,4 Incinerator, HTU-1 HSR Reboiler, Boiler #1, Boiler #2, Boiler (EQT0037)
|Cause: This incident involved an upset of the refinery due to a loss of power to the site from our energy supplier's system. Several operating units were affected by the power loss which caused emissions of sulfur dioxide and hydrogen sulfide from the release and combustion of hydrocarbons at the Motiva Enterprises LLC (Motiva) - Convent Refinery.|
Notes: Immediately, the operating units were stabilized to reduce the impact from the emissions. Several operating units were shutdown and remaining online units followed the emergency procedure for steam load shedding to minimize emissions. Exceeded the 500-pound (lb) reportable quantity (RQ) for sulfur dioxide (SO2). SO2 maximum lb/hr emission limits were exceeded at Tail Gas Treating Units 1, 3, and 4, the Flare CAP, and at combustion devices (i.e. heaters) burning refinery fuel gas. Hydrogen Sulfide (H2S) maximum lb/hr emission rates were exceeded at Tail Gas Treating Units 1, 2, 3, and 5, and at the Flare CAP. The maximum lb/hr emission rates of NOx, CO, VOC, and PM were experienced at the Flare CAP. Lastly, the maximum opacity limit as required by LAC 33:III.1101.B for SRU No. 4 TGTU Incinerator Stack was also exceeded at the time of the incident.
|pump 4G-559||Cause: On August 19, 2013, a fire was experienced on pump 4G-559 due to a seal failure. HTU-1's recycle compressor tripped on high K.O. drum level. A decision was made to slowdown, stabilize, and shutdown. Part of the activities to slowdown included putting the CRU unit on hydrogen circulation; therefore, operations shutdown the CRU charge pumps, 4G-501/559. Shortly after the pumps were stopped, 4G-559 failed, and a seal fire occurred.
After thorough investigation, the cause of the seal fire was determined to be the failure of a check valve on the discharge of 4G-559. When the charge pumps were stopped, the downstream hydrogen pushed the naptha in the line backwards through the discharge line. the check valve in the discharge line did not operate as designed and the naptha and hydrogen entered 4G-559 causing it to spin in reverse. This caused friction, heat, and vibration significant enough for the pump to seize. Under these conditions, a seal fire is expected.|
Notes: The units were brought down in order to stabilize the situation. The materials involved in the fire were largely combusted, as were the materials routed to the flare; they were then dispersed naturally into the air. All residual unburned materials from the pump seal fire were captured by the unit secondary containment system and recycled back into the refinery's recovered oil system. A second check valve has been installed on the discharge line to provide an additional factor of safety against the potential failure of a single check valve.