|Home||Search||Emissions||Pollutants||About the Database|
|LDEQ Accident Number
|Point Source(s)||Notes||Amount of Release|
|FLARE - #17 and #19 Flares||Cause: -compressors had to be shut down for repair - compressor trip.|
Notes: This incident was not preventable because the compressor trip that caused the flaring incident was unexpected. If the findings of this investigation indicate that the cause of the trip was preventable, a modified report will be issued. Remedial Measures - an investigation is ongoing and the appropriate follow-up actions will be completed. an assistant operator at the Refinery Gas Compression Unit (RGCU) noticed an unusual noise coming from one of the refinery gas compressors C-50. These was evaluated by compressor specialists and it was determined that the compressor had to be shut down for repair. An advanced notification was made in anticipation of the flaring event since the spare compressor was unavailable due to other mechan
|FLARE - #17 and #19 Flares||Cause: the cause of the flaring was high pressure in the refinery gas collection system due to a high volume of vent gas from the other refinery units. The source of the high vent gas rate was unable to be determined.|
Notes: This incident was not preventable because the remedial actions were initiated before the flaring incident. These actions should have been sufficient to reduce vent gas rates. Two primary actions were initiated to reduce refinery vent gas rates. First, the compressor at the Hydrocracker was lined with the Refinery Gas Compression Unit Compressors to assist with processing refinery vent gas. Secondly, the crude feed rate to Pipestill #10 was decreased. Remedial Actions -an invgation is ongoing and the appropriate follow-up actions will be completed. The reportable quantity for nitrogen oxide has been exceeded.
|FLARE - #5, #9, #17, #19, #23, #24 Flares||Cause: a control system power failure at the Refinery Gas Compression Unit caused a reduction in compressor capacity due to poor compressor control. As a result of the reduced capacity, the compressors were unable to process all of the refinery gas and the excess gas was routed to the refinery flare syste|
Followup: No Information Provided
Notes: This incident was not preventable because the failure of the compressor control system was a result of a failure in both the primary and alternate power supply systems. The back-up power system should have supplied power to the compressor control systemwhen the primary failed to do so because of an electrical malfunction. Remedial Measures - an investigation is ongoing and the appropriate follow-up actions will be completed. Reportable quantities for nitrogen oxide and sulfur dioxide were exceeded.
|FLARE - C-30 and C-40 compressor||Cause: at the time of this report, the cause of the flaring incident was unknown and was under investigati|
Notes: The only information provided is that the preventability of the incident had not been determined and was under investigation. Remedial Measures are listed the same way. The reportable quantities for nitrogen oxide were exceeded.
|FLARE - as a result of a leak from the ammonia gas line to the No. 100 Sulfur Plant (SRLA-100)||Cause: the pipe leaked due to new corrosion hole that had developed under the edge of a clamp that was installed in November. The existing clamp was tightened which did not stop the leak so it was replaced with a new clamp which also did not stop the leak. Since the newly installed clamp did not stop the leak, the old clamp was then reinstalled with a new gasket which still did not stop the leak. The feed spheres to the Sour Water Strippers became full which required the start up of the Sour Water Strippers to the flare syste|
Notes: The incident was not preventable because, The clamp was installed in Nov. 2005 due to a pinhole leak from condensate corrosion. At that time, the line was x-rayed and no areas of concern were discovered outside the area under the clamp. Therefore, the corrosion hole that led to the release could not have been predicted. Remedial actions- a similar line exists to the SRLA-200 unit. This line will be inspected and repaired while the SRLA 200 unit is down. The letter to LDEQ ss that the reportable quantities for ammonia, hydrogen sulfide, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, and nitrogen dioxide were exceeded. Note: there is a time discrepancy - the report states that the incident started at 2:30pm on 03/24/2006 but was discov
|FLARE - Alkylation Feed Preparation Unit||Cause: The Methyl Tertiary-Butyl Ether Unit was converted to an Alkylation Feed Preparation Unit (AFP). The AFP was beginning its initial start up. As the level in one of the towers increased, steam was added to the reboiler to begin producing overhead product. During this time, the safety valves on the tower began relieving to the flare system, which resulted in the reported flare. During the conversion of the unit the overhead pressure meter was reranged in the field, but was no reranged in the control room. Due to this oversight the operator believed he was at a significantly lower pressure and did not immediately discover that the safety valves on the tower had lifted to the flare system. The calculations automtically completed by the flare system|
Notes: The cause of the accident is listed as preventable in the company's report, but there is no explanation whatsoever as to why it was preventable - that section is blank. The only remedial measure listed is that the pressure meter range was corrected in the control room. The letter to LDEQ states that reportable quantities of nitrogen oxide and butenes were exceeded.
|FLARE||Cause: the 100, 200, 400 Sulfur Trains shut down due to high pressure on the primary burners. The 100 Train started up after 2min., the 200 Train started up after 3min., and the 400 train started up after 10min. During the time the Sulfur Trains were shutdown,the pressure increased on the MEA Regenerators, so clean acid gas was flared for 17min. Equipment failed due to a a failure to operate and maintain that equipment in a manner consistent with good engineering practice.|
Notes: This event was not preventable -SEE Follow Up Consent Decree letter dated 04/07/2006 - Had the limit switch for valve 182 not been connected in the manner in which it was to the valve posistioner, then the AG Flaring Incident would not have occurred. The fact that valve 192 lacks valve posistion feedback to the Controller to indicate the actual posisiton of the valve was a signifigant contributing factor in this incident. A second contributing factor was that there as no visual checkitiated by the Controller, on the valve to provide absolute certainty that valve 182 was actually open. This was considered, for purposes of stipulated penealties under the consent decree, equipment failed due to a failure to oper
|#2 Light Ends Unit (E-568)||Cause: #2 Light Ends Unit experinenced a leak from their rebolier exchanger. The failure mechanism causing the leak in the exchanger is listed as unknown.|
Notes: Incidents 06-00380, 06-00401 occurred simultaneously on January 19th and on Jan. 20th 06-00406 occurred, overlapping with the first two. The reportable quanitites for highly reactive volitile organic compounds and flamable vapors were exceeded whenthe emissions from these three events were summed over the first 24 hour period beginning with the initiantion of the rlease from the No. 2 Powerformer Unit. With regard to the 24 hour period beginning with the release at the MTBE Unit, there were nportable quanity exceedances for this period of time. The emissions limit exceeded the reportable quanitity threshold only during the time when all three incidents were taking place simultaneously. The mortar in T-4X will be replaced with a Furan re
|Spill||Cause: External corrosion|
Notes: clamps were installed to stop leak and blinds were installed at upstream block valves to completely isolate lines
|Leak-pinhole leak in portion of line||Cause: External corrosion|
Notes: A clamp was installed to stop leak, Unused line will be dismantled to prevent another le
|FLARE-Flare #17||Cause: water wash drum reading false high|
Notes: level control valve was closed and instrument was cleaned and checked to determine working properly. Process checks conducted periodically to ensure working properly
|Release||Cause: no information given|
Notes: no information given
|atmospheric release||Cause: |
Notes: Unit depressurized immediately in accordance with emergency process. Investigation is ongoing, appropriate follow up will be complete
|Spill||Cause: Incomplete weld on #1 PHLA Line|
Notes: Once identified line was removed from service andleak was clamped to stop release. Line will be re routed in overhead pipeband.
|FLARE-Flare #5,9,17,23||Cause: cooling tower pumps shut down due|
Notes: The cooling tower pump was restarted to restore cooling water to the unit. The speed control was repaired after it caused the unexpected shutdown.
|Leak-aviation fuel leak|
|Cause: no information given|
Notes: The material flowed out of an aboveground into a sewer located at the facility. The sewer line was blocked off to confine spillage.
|FLARE-Flare #19||Cause: |
Notes: Initially the flare was not noticed but when it was operating crews attempted to locate the source of the excess gas but by 2:37pm the system returned to normal, thus ending the flar
|Flare||Cause: cooling tower pump failed|
Notes: Several units were shut down to avoid a serious safety incident or property damage. The pump was repaired and returned to service
|Flare||Cause: broken air supply line was closed to control valve|
Notes: Closed valve was bypassed until repairs,it was then replace
|Flare/Safety valve release||Cause: leaking seal/safety valve release|
Notes: Several actions were taken to avoid or reduce the environmental impacts from this incident. The different gas streams were redirected in a manner appropriate to minimize emissions.
|Pulldown line leak/FLARE-Flare 5,17,29||Cause: Leak was discovered on the pulldown line for the Product Separator Drum at the Powerformer Unit. Initial findings indicate that the leak was caused by internal corrosion of the weld in a stagnant area of the line.|
Notes: The line could not be isolated from the drum, so the decision was made to shutdown the unit in order to stop the leak. The line was completely depressured. During the process of shutting down the unit, flaring occurred from the #5, 17, and 19 flared. No reportable quantities were exceeded as a result of the flaring. Regular air monitoring was conducted during this event. The spool piece that leaked was replaced with a straight piece of pipe to eliminate the stagnant area in the line. Reportable quantities for benzene and flammable vapors was exceeded.
|Hydrocarbon release||Cause: no information given|
Notes: no information given
|Hydrocarbon leak||Cause: They have a cooling water leak. The levels of VOCs are high.|
Notes: They added chemicals in the heat exchanger and contracted with a third party to do an analysis on the product yesterday.
|Hydrocarbon leak||Cause: A cooling tower at the LELA unit had a leak. Someone had added an unknown chemical that caused the TOC level to spike.|
Notes: They took a sample, which came back at 45 ppm for TOC, which is a type of hydrocarbon, and the second sample came back as 55 ppm.
Atmospheric release/FLARE-Flare 17,19,23
|Cause: The C-101 Recycle Compressor on the HCLA unit shut down due to a fault in the transformer that supplies power to the compressor motor. The compressor trip automatically activated the units emergency depressurization procedures, which caused gases in the HCLA reactor system to be vented to the atmosphere via the condensable blow down drum. The transformer failed due to overheating. The air conditioner in the substation was found to have failed causing the temperature in the building to increase and the transformer to overheat. FLaring also occurred.|
Notes: The unit was depressurized automatically in accordance with the emergency procedures. Temporary ventilation conditioning was installed in the substation to cool the remaining electrical equipment. Total amount of flammable vapor released was 108,206 pounds. Total amount of VOC's released was 93,904 pounds
|Cause: They were putting new instrumentation on a mixed gas oil tank, starting it up after maintenance.|
Notes: Release of unknown amounts of extremely noxious smelling gas. They are done with the start up.
|safety valve release/ FLARE-Flare 17,23||Cause: process upset/under investigation|
Notes: In response to the suspected exchanger tube leak, the unit was shut down per appropriate procedures. Safety valve inlet line was cleaned and replaced.
|leak/FLARE-Flare 5,9,19,20,24||Cause: Equipment failure-Hydrocracker unit down; Pressure Swing Absorber out of service|
Notes: Safety valve released itself once the pressure stabilized. Lights end section was depressured to stop H2S leak, which caused many flares to burn. Light ends depressured. Stream was lined up to the tower to stop flarin
|FLARE-Flare 5,17,19||Cause: Process Upset-recycle gas compressor shut down due to process upset./Other-high pressure in the refinery gas collection system due too a high volume of vent gas from other refinery units.|
Notes: Process upset conditions at the catalytic cracking unit were resolved and recycle gas compressor was restarted to stop flaring. When the high pressure burner line overpressured, efforts were made to reduce the amount of gas sent to HPBL and increase gas amount taken by Enterg
|FLARE-Flare 9||Cause: equipment failure|
Notes: Written report from Exxon Mobile surrounding the flaring accident stating that the source was found to be several leaking evacuator valves on the flare gas compressor system. Steam was injected into the flare drum, and RGCU gas gointo to the flare drumwas blocked out. The leaking evacuator valves were also replace
|FLARE-Flare 9||Cause: Equipment Failure( leaking RGCU evacuator valve)|
Notes: Report from Exxon Mobile surrounding the flaring incident stated that steam was injected into the flare drum, and the RGCU gas going to the flare drum was blocked out. The #9 flare was isolated from the rest of the flaring system. Report stated the leaking evacuator valve would be replace
|No LDEQ Reported|
|No Information Given||Cause: Sample taken showed potential for hydrocarbon leak.|
Notes: Company letter missing. Verbal report. RQ not exceeded.
|No Information Given||Cause: Sample showed potential for hydrocarbon leak. No further information provided.|
Notes: RQ not exceeded. Sheen was observed in final containment, but none was discarhged into the Mississippi River.
|Flare #17 and #19||Cause: A problem with the hydrocracking unit caused flaring.|
Notes: Release is BRQ. No further information provided.
|No Information Given||Cause: According to the SPOC verbal report, a pinhole leak in a pipeline released nonliquefied hydrocarbon gas.|
Notes: RQ not exceeded.
|T-210 Reboiler (Unit#ICN)||Cause: LDEQ states that an odor involving Hydrogen Sulfide and flammable gas was coming from T-210 Reboiler (Unit#ICN)/exchanger. After investigation, it was stated that the leak came from some transient source.|
Notes: Exxon states the exchanger was removed, steamed out, inspected and monitored for hydrocarbon leaks. After passing leak tests, the exchanger was returned. No RQs exceeded.
|no information given||Cause: LDEQ report states that there was a pinhole leak in jet fuel pipping, causing misting in air.|
Notes: This release was Below reportable quantities [BRQ].
|FLARE; D-10 Safety||Cause: LDEQ states a safety mechanism that keeps a D-10 from over pressurizing a jet drum malfunctioned and prematurely lifted. It released an unknown amount of flare gas containing like hydrocarbons.|
Notes: Facility staff isolated the gas as soon as it was noticed, and blocked it in. This release was Below Reportable Quantities [BRQ]. This incident was the second time in two days a safety valve prematurely lifted releasing hydrocarbons.
|FLARE||Cause: The LDEQ report states that a safety valve prematurely lifted due to a malfunction, but also states that an investigation by facility staff is ongoing at this time.|
Notes: Escaped hydrocarbon vapors were sent to the flare. Refinery letter provides no additional details, except that release was determined to be Below Reportable Quantities [BRQ].
|flares # 17 and 19||Cause: An upset on the process unit caused flaring.|
Notes: No further information provided,
|No Information Given||Cause: Liquid in line, suspect hydrocarbons--no other details. LDEQ report states that release was below reportable quantities [BRQ].|
Notes: LABB only has access to the LDEQ incident report. No RQs exceeded.
|#52 Cooling Tower||Cause: The leak in #52 cooling tower did not occur. An instrument gave an erroneously high reading of an unknown quantity of hydrocarbons that led the refinery to believe they had a leak. This was confirmed using El Paso cooling tower sample method as approved by the MACT CC compliance testing method.|
Notes: There was no release, so it is BRQ.
|Exchanger E-527 at Light Ends Unit #3||Cause: A leaking tube in exchanger E-527 at Light Ends Unit 3 (LEU3) reboiler is leaking hydrocarbon into an atmospheric condensate drum which is allowing material to reach the atmosphere.|
Notes: The site plans to remove and/or repair the exchanger to eliminate root cause of leak. This release is ongoing, but after further evaluation. Exxon has determined that no RQs are being exceeded.
|FLARE: #4 Unit||Cause: As the #4 unit was starting up, it had a unit swing. To relieve the pressure, flaring took place.
During the same 24 hours, the Powdered Catalyst Unit (PCLA) also underwent startup operations. Difficulties with compressor GLA-2X during startup resulted in additional flaring. As a result of this flaring, 1616 pounds of sulfur dioxide was released.
Combined, these two sources release 1,716 pounds of sulfur dioxide. However, in a follow-up letter dated March 21, 2011, ExxonMobil stated that 2,063 lbs of sulfur dioxide were released.|
Notes: This release is RQ. To end the Light Ends Flaring, pressures on the 4 West Rerun and 4 West Splitter towers were reduced. To end the PCLA flaring, compressor GLA-2X was started. To prevent recurrence, procedures will be reviewed for the Light Ends area startups following unplanned downtimes. Additionally, startup procedures for the GLA-2X compressor will be reviewed.
|FLARE: Flare #17||Cause: The cause it unknown. Intermittent flaring on flare #17. Flaring for 10-20 minutes, stopped for 30 minutes, went on for 2 hours total.|
Notes: The root cause of the flaring is under investigation.
|Flare #17||Cause: Flare #17 experienced a lazy flame for a short duration. A detailed investigation is being conducted to determine the root cause of the intermittent lazy flame on flare # 17.|
Notes: No RQ values were exceeded for hydrocarbon gas as a result of this event.
|FLARE: Flare #7||Cause: Excessive rainfall caused an electrical ground fault to occur with some of the compressor's control instrumentation causing the three compressors to shut down. excesses gases were released to the flares.|
Notes: Air monitoring occurred and eventually two of the three compressors were brought back on-line and flaring ceased. There is no refinery Incident report and no SPOC report attached to this file.
|Frac Tank||Cause: On 6/1/2014 ExxonMobil Baton Rouge Refinery was draining a frac tank and some hydrocarbon was spilled onto the soil. Draining was stopped upon discovery.|
Notes: Draining was stopped upon discovery of spill.