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Accident # | 86001 |
State Police # | 06-01106 |
Accident Date | 2006-02-22 |
Report Date | 2006-03-01 |
Follow-up Date | 0000-00-00 |
Follow-up: | No |
Pollutant | Duration | Point Source | Greenhouse Gas | Criteria Pollutant | Ozone forming chemical | Amount of Release |
Hydrogen Sulfide | 17m | FLARE | NO | NO | NO | 83.0 pounds |
Sulfur Dioxide | 17m | FLARE | NO | YES | NO | 8,171.0 pounds |
Nitrogen Oxide | 17m | FLARE | NO | YES | YES | 11.0 pounds |
Nitric Oxide | 17m | FLARE | NO | YES | NO | 11.0 pounds |
Hydrocarbon | 17m | FLARE | NO | NO | YES | 98.0 pounds |
Accident Classified As:
the 100, 200, 400 Sulfur Trains shut down due to high pressure on the primary burners. The 100 Train started up after 2min., the 200 Train started up after 3min., and the 400 train started up after 10min. During the time the Sulfur Trains were shutdown,the pressure increased on the MEA Regenerators, so clean acid gas was flared for 17min. Equipment failed due to a a failure to operate and maintain that equipment in a manner consistent with good engineering practice.
This event was not preventable -SEE Follow Up Consent Decree letter dated 04/07/2006 - Had the limit switch for valve 182 not been connected in the manner in which it was to the valve posistioner, then the AG Flaring Incident would not have occurred. The fact that valve 192 lacks valve posistion feedback to the Controller to indicate the actual posisiton of the valve was a signifigant contributing factor in this incident. A second contributing factor was that there as no visual checkitiated by the Controller, on the valve to provide absolute certainty that valve 182 was actually open. This was considered, for purposes of stipulated penealties under the consent decree, equipment failed due to a failure to oper
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