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Chalmette Refining (1376), Chalmette
Releases of Nitrogen Dioxide
| LDEQ Accident Number Accident Date |
Point Source(s) | Notes | Amount of Release |
| 84745-84794 2005-12-22 | Sulfur Recovery Unit Train 2 | Cause: Instrument malfunction caused the automatic shutdown of the refinery sulfur recovery unit train 2, resulting in the routing of refinery acid gas to the flare system (No. 1). Equipment malfunction on SRU 2...leak ongoing...NOX, SO2, H2S.
Siting the related incident, ldeq # 84794: According to the refinery, an electrical supply malfunction on the Rich DGA Pump G-8291 caused the automatic shutdown of the refinery Sulfur Recovery Unit Train 2. The shutdown resulted in routing of refinery acid gas to the flare system Loss of one of the amine circulating pumps #g8291 on SRU train 2...NOX, NO2, SO2, H2S Followup: No Notes: The following details are for LDEQ incident # 84745, but there is another event (ldeq 84794) which will be discussed in further detail in the 2nd section below: Operations were conducted in order to minimize emissions while maintaining a safe and orderly stabilization of refinery operations and restart of the impacted process unit. Repairs were made to applicable instrumentation and SRU Train 2 was restarted, ending the incident. The refinery has initiated an investigation into the cause of this incident. Based on the result of that investigation, appropriate measures will be taken in order to prevent a recurrence due to the same cause. SO2, H2S, nitric oxide, NO2 released to atmosphere through the refinery number 1 flare and to a lesser extent via the refinery sulfur recovery unit thermal oxidizer stack. Operations were conducted in order to minimize emissions while maintaining a safe and orderly stabilization of refinery operations and restart of the impacted process unit. Repairs were made to applicable instrumentation and SRU Train 2 was restarted, ending the incident. In a separate but related incident report that is linked to the event detailed above (LDEQ # 84794) the following details pertain to that release, but the pollutant totals have been combined: pollutants from incident number 84794 have been combined in the pollutant totals in the table below, but the original report for 84794 had listed these quantities which have all been added to the totals mentioned in report 84745: Hydrogen Sulfide 273.0 pounds Nitric Oxide 239.0 pounds Nitrogen Dioxide 27.0 pounds Sulfur Dioxide 103,560.0 pounds Operations were conducted in order to minimize emissions while maintaining a safe and orderly stabilization of refinery operations and restart of the impacted process unit. Repairs were made to applicable electrical equipment and SRU train 2 was restarted, ending the incident. The refinery has initiated an investigation into the cause of this incident. Based on the result of that investigation, appropriate measures will be taken in order to prevent a recurrence due to the same cause. The Sulfur recovery unit train 1 (SRUTR1) which included the release of 33375 lbs of sulfur dioxide to the atmosphere through the facility's Refinery Sulfur Recovery Unit Thermal Oxidizer Stack. The emissions occurred intermittently from 12/22-25/05 over 35 hour time frame. The unit was shutdown over this timeframe to make necessary repairs. An investigation concluded that a dip-leg of srut1 unit was identified and the unit had to be shutdown. Further investigations revealed that SRUTR1 unit was shutdown prior to katrina and was brought back on line on 12/22/05 when the incident occurred. The shutdown to the SRUT2 resulted in the routing of refinery acid gas to the flare system from 12/22-23/05 for 13.5 hour timeframe. The unit was shutdown over this timeframe to make necessary repairs. Operations were conducted in order to minimize emissions while maintaining a safe and orderly stabilization of refinery operations and restart of the impacted process unit. Repairs were made to applicable electric equipment and SRU Train 2 was restarted, ending the incident. Appropriate measures will be taken in order to prevent a recurrence due to the same cause. These releases of sulfur dioxide exceed reportable quantity. Incident #84745 occurred 12/22 to 12/23 and Incident #84794 occurred from 12/24 to 12/25. The two reports here are also linked to a third report, LDEQ Incident #84723 which is separate on our database. | 99.0 pounds |
| No LDEQ Reported 2005-12-18 | Coker 2 Wet Gas Compressor K8101 | Cause: Compressor went into high alarm for high vibration. It was determined that the vibration probe had provided a false alarm due to a faulty connection.
Coker 2 Wet Gas Compressor K8101 went into alarm for high vibration on 12/18/2005. Followup: No Notes: This is a letter rescining the notification made relative to Hydrogen Sulfide (H2S). Upon further review, the total amount of H2S is estimated to be less than the reportable quantity (RQ= 100 lbs). Chalmette refinery estimates that approximately 70 lbs of H2S was released to the atmosphere during the 12/18/05 event. In order to avoid equipment damage and associated emissions, refinery personnel shut down the machine in order to evaluate and develop a repair strategy. The vibration probe was repaired and the machine was put back in service, ending the incident. Instrument and electrical connections directly related to K8101 were double checked for proper connections in order to avoid a recurrence due to the same root cause. It was determined that the vibration probe had provided a false alarm due to a faulty connection. The vibration probe was repaired and the machine was put back in service, ending the incident. Instrument and electrical connections directly related to K8101 were double checked for proper connections in order to avoid a recurrence due to the same root cause. Although the facility claims that this was a false alarm, there must have been some type of equipment failure to result in the release of 26,127 lbs of sulfur dioxide. The incident released 26,127 lbs of S02, which exceeds the reportable quantity for S02 (RQ= 500 lbs). | 28.0 pounds |
| 84474 2005-12-10 | Wet Gas Compressor K8101 | Cause: Coker 2 Wet Gas Compressor K8101 shutdown on multiple occasion for uncertain reasons. On December 13, 2005 it was determined that some shutdown relay wiring on K8101 had become less secure than required for consistent operations. Followup: No Notes: Chalmette Refinery notified the office regarding a release of Nitric Oxide, Nitrogen Dioxide, Sulfur Dioxide, and Hydrogen Sulfide on December 10,12, and 13. This is a notification by CRLLC rescinding the notification made relative to Hydrogen Sulfide (H2S). Upon further review, the total amount of Hydrogen Sulfide is estimated to be less than the reportable quantity. The RQ for H2S is 100 pounds. Chalmette Refinery estimates that approximately 25 pounds of H2S was released to the atmosphere during the combination of the events. The incident occurred on four separate occasions, during three days. Due to incremental emissions caused by downtime of K8101, the compressor was re-started as quickly as possible during the trips on 12/10 and 12/12. On 12/12, when the compressor once again tripped, the machine was left off-line and refinery instrument and electrical resources were mobilized to conduct more extensive evaluation of the machine before re-start. Coker 2 rates were reduced in order to reduce emissions. It was determined on 12/13/05 that some shutdown relay wiring on K8101 had become less secure than required for consistent operations. The wiring was reinstalled, and the machine was re-started ending the incident. The machine was left off-line until refinery instrument and electrical resources could be mobilized to conduct more extensive evaluation of the machine before re-start. K8101 was repaired in order to minimize recurrence due to the same root cause. Sulfur Dioxide, Nitric Oxide and Nitrogen Dioxide released to atmosphere through the refinery No. 1 flare. | 10.0 pounds |
| 84328 2005-12-05 | Sulfur Recovery Unit Thermal Oxidizer Stack | Cause: Loss of power triggered upset of refinery and shutdown of the refinery's operating sulfur recovery unit. Followup: No Notes: A power outage and refinery shutdown resulted in flaring, including a release of Sulfur Dioxide, Hydrogen Sulfide, Nitric Oxide, and Nitrogen Dioxide beginning 12/5/05 and continuing intermittently during the repair of equipment damaged by the outage. The power outage occurred when Entergy was doing some work at the Meraux substation. The entire refinery lost power. The units are now back on line but at minimal rates while repairs are being performed. The refinery is still flaring S02 and H2S because there was damage to the sulphur plant. Operations were conducted in order to minimize emissions while maintaining a safe and orderly stabilization of refinery operation and restart of some refinery process units. Refinery Management has met with Entergy to stress the impact of this incident and request that appropriate measures be taken in order to prevent a recurrence. Operations were conducted in order to minimize emissions while maintains a safe and orderly stabilization of refinery operations and restart of some refinery process units. This is clearly far exceeding the reportable quantity for sulfur dioxide (RQ=500 lbs). | 230.0 pounds |
| 84073 2005-11-23 | No. 2 Coker Wet Gas Compressor | Cause: The wet gas compressor shut down due to the axial thrust alarm, resulting in emissions from the No. 1 Flare. Following investigation, refinery personnel believe the Wet Gas Compressor shut down due to a momentary loss of lube oil. Followup: No Notes: In an effort to stop the release, the compressor was restarted, but the alarm remained. Following determination by refinery personnel that maintenance was required on the compressor, K-8101 was taken out of service and sent out for repair. A variance was applied for with the LDEQ to authorize the emissions associated with the compressor maintenance. The variance was approved on November 29, 2005, ending this release. | 277.0 pounds |
| 81776 2005-08-27 | FCC debutanizer overhead condenser no.1 and no.2 flares | Cause: HURRICANE KATRINA (storm)
Release of sulfur dioxide, nitric oxide, nitrogen dioxide, and hydrogen sulfide was due to overpressurization of the FCC debutanizer overhead condenser, resulting in flaring and a small ground fire. Followup: Yes Notes: This follow-up letter has been delayed due to Hurricane Katrina. This is a notification that the total refinery shutdown resulted in an evacuation of the refinery and the potential emergency release of wastewater from the wastewater treatment plant outfall. Chalmette Refining conducted a detailed analysis of emissions resulting from the refinery shutdown for Hurricane Ivan in September 204. Since the refinery shutdown for Hurricane Katrina was similar, they have assumed that the quantities released during Katrina shutdown are the same as the Ivan shutdown. Chalmette Refinery is rescinding the 8/27/05 notifications for S02, H2S, NO2, and hydrocarbons (non-speciated VOCs). Upon further review, the facility claims that the total amounts were estimated to be less that the reportable quantities (RQ= 100 lbs). The original estimated quantity of NO was 467 lbs, and was later changed to be estimated at 74 lbs. Shutdown was undertaken in preparation for the forecasted potential for Hurricane conditions. Operations were conducted in order to minimize emissions while maintaining a safe and orderly shutdown. Emissions resulted from gas flaring, fuel gas quality changes, and standby operation modes necessitated by the shutdown. Sometime after Hurricane Katrina, the pilots on the flares were extinguished. By that time, predominantly natural gas was being flared and no reportable quantities were exceeded.The pilots were re-lit on all flares by September 8, 2005 At approximately 12:00 hours on 8/27/05, the FCC debutanizer overhead condenser overpressured due to a failure with a pressure controller, resulting in flaring and a small ground fire. For the FCC, the tower was returned to normal pressure and the pressure transmitter on the overhead condenser was repaired. The small ground fire was extinguished. | 52.0 pounds |
| 81795 2005-08-27 | FCC Debutanizer Overhead Condenser | Cause: Condenser overpressured due to a failure with the FCC debutanizer overhead condenser, resulting in flaring and a small ground fire. Followup: No Notes: For the FCC, the tower was returned to normal pressure and the pressure transmitter on the overhead condenser was repaired. The small ground fire was extinguished. This follow-up letter was delayed due to Hurricane Katrina This is a letter rescinding the 8/27/2005 notification for Sulfur Dioxide (S02), Hydrogen Sulfide (H2S), Nitrogen Dioxide (NO2), and Hydrocarbons (non-speciated VOCs). Upon further review, the total amounts were estimated to be less than reportable quantities. Nitric oxide was released to the atmosphere through the refinery Number 1 flare. | |
| 80685 2005-08-03 | No information given | Cause: Followup: No Notes: BELOW REPORTABLE QUANTITIES | |
| 80865 2005-07-22 | Hydrocracker | Cause: Hydrocracker overpressured Followup: No Notes: BELOW REPORTABLE QUANTITIES | 0.3 pounds |
| 80533 2005-07-15 | Cat feed hyrdrotreater unit problem caused release to the No. 2 Flare | Cause: Cat feed hydrotreater (CFHT) developed a leak due to a failure in the piping. The unit was shut down in order to eliminate the lead and safely conduct repairs. Vented through flare 2 Followup: No Notes: Cat Feed hydrotreater (CFHT) was shut down and hydrogen and process gas vented to the refinery flare system. Operations were conducted in order to minimize emissions while maintaining a safe and orderly shutdown and restart of the CFHT. Chalmette Refinery rescinded its notifications of both gas oil and sulfur dioxide, stating that there was not a reportable amount of gas oil spilled on the concrete slab, and also that 0 lbs of sulfur dioxide was released. | 14.0 pounds |
| 80502 2005-07-13 | Transformer power outage - emitted at No. 2 Flare | Cause: Loss of a refinery power transformer resulted in unplanned shut-down of coker 1, resulting in flaring to no. 2 Followup: No Notes: Backup transformer was placed in service to replace the one that failed. | 29.0 pounds |
| 80322 2005-07-06 | No information given | Cause: Power failure due to Tropical Storm Cindy, resulting in an unplanned shutdown. Followup: No Notes: Due to the multi-day nature of the event CRLLC was unable to give a comprehensive report at this time. As of this report, equipment repairs were still ongoing and addition emissions may occur. Operations were conducted to minimize emissions while maintaining a safe and orderly shutdown. | 19.0 pounds |
| 78674 2005-04-29 | Coke drum | Cause: Coke drum got too hot, causing gases to be sent to flare Followup: No Notes: Below reportable quantities. LDEQ notes that the event that prompted the call was part of a Continuous Release Report filed October 14, 2002. | |
| 78541 2005-04-26 | Sulfur Recovery Unit, Hydrocracker, #2 Coker, #2 Crude | Cause: A loss of power to the Refinery's Boiler Instrumentation System caused the shutdown of the three plant boilers which generate the Refinery's 600 lb. steam. The loss of 600 lb. steam production caused upset conditions at a series of Refinery Process Units including the Sulfur Recovery Unit, Hydrocracker, #2 Coker and #2 Crude Followup: No Notes: The refinery has initiated an investigation into the cause of this incident. Based on the result of that investigation, measures will be taken in order to prevent a recurrence due to the same cause. The report's Summary of Emissions also states 692 lbs. of HC, 1131 lbs of CO, and 36 lbs of PM were also released at this time. | 36.0 pounds |
| 78361 2005-04-19 | K-401 (waste gas compressor number 2) | Cause: Waste gas compressor number 2 (K-401) automatically shut down, automatically diverting waste gas to the flare system. Followup: No Notes: Low-Sulfur content streams were routed to the flare to minimize sour gas flaring. Output was adjusted to minimize total amount of waste being sent to the flare. Same language about doing an investigation to understand the underlying cause and prevent future incidents. | |
| 78341 2005-04-17 | K-401 (waste gas compressor number 2) | Cause: Waste gas compressor number 2 (K-401) automatically shut down, automatically diverting waste gas to the flare system. Followup: No Notes: Low-Sulfur content streams were routed to the flare to minimize sour gas flaring. Output was adjusted to minimize total amount of waste being sent to the flare. | |
| 78226 2005-04-13 | K-401 (waste gas compressor number 2) | Cause: Waste gas compressor number 2 (K-401) automatically shut down, automatically diverting waste gas to the flare system. Followup: No Notes: Low-Sulfur content streams were routed to the flare to minimize sour gas flaring. Output was adjusted to minimize total amount of waste being sent to the flare. Letter rescinds report of nitric oxide because below reportable quantity. | 1.0 pounds |
| 78042 2005-04-06 | K-402 (Refinery waste gas compressor number 3) | Cause: K-402 unexpectedly shut down. Shortly after shutdown, refinery personnel identified the cause of the shutdown as a malfunction of the compressor motor ignition system. Followup: No Notes: The compressor motor was repaired and the compressor restarted, ending the incident. | 12.0 pounds |
| 77936 2005-03-31 | K-400 (Refinery waste gas compressor number 1) | Cause: Refinery waste gas compressor number 1 (K-400) unexpectedly shut down. Refinery waste gas automatically diverted to the flare system. Followup: No Notes: Adjustments made to the fuel/air mixture and K-400 restarted. | |
| 77649 2005-03-16 | No information given | Cause: Waste gas compressor number 2 (K-401) automatically shut down due to a high temperature. Followup: No Notes: Letter rescinds verbal report because incident was not reportable. No release to atmosphere. | 1.0 pounds |
| 77549 2005-03-13 | C-2307 (Second Stage High-Pressure Separator) level controller; K-2303 (HCU Second Stage Recycle Compressor) | Cause: During maintenance, the Hydrocracker (HCU) Second Stage High-Pressure Separator (C-2307) level controller was inadvertently left in the manual position. Later, HCU Second Stage Recycle Compressor (K-2303) shut down due to high level in C-2307. Shutdown of K-2303 caused automatic depressurization of C-2307 to the refinery flare system. Followup: No Notes: Letter rescinds report of Sulfur Dioxide because below reportable quantity. | 3.0 pounds |
| 77290 2005-03-02 | Waste Gas Compressor Number 4 (K-406); Copper tubing connecting C-435 (first stage suction drum) to high-level instrumentation | Cause: Waste gas compressor number 4 (K-406) shut down due to failure of piece of copper tubing connecting C-435 to high-level shutdown instrumentation. When it failed, a false high level reading was recorded, causing automatic safety shutdown system to become engaged. Followup: No Notes: Low-Sulfur content streams were routed to the flare to minimize sour gas flaring. Output was adjusted to minimize amount sent to the flare. C-435 was retubed, K-406 was checked and restarted. | 3.0 pounds |
| 76869 2005-02-11 | No information given | Cause: Power failure caused many of the processes to shut down. Followup: No Notes: | 1.0 pounds |
| 76795 2005-02-07 | Unintended over pressurization of the Hydrocracker Light Ends Plant (HCU LEP) Depropanizer surge drum | Cause: Due to the isolation of the sight glass of the hydrocracker light ends plant depropanizer, the automatic level indication equipment was disabled and false reading was transmitted; this condition caused an unintended over pressurization of the HCU LEP Depropanizer surge drum, which was venter to the refinery flare system (No. 2 flare) Followup: No Notes: Refinery personnel evaluated the process operation, identified the source of the problem and made appropriate corrections, ending the incident. | 10.0 pounds |
| 76775 2005-02-04 | Electrical breaker G-457; Waste gas compressor number 2 (K-401) | Cause: Electrical breaker for G-457 malfunctioned, unexpectedly cutting power to all pumps and fin-fans within the refinery waste gas compressor area. Waste gas compressor number 2 (K-401) shut down as a result of the electrical power outage and refinery waste gas was diverted to safety flare system. Followup: No Notes: Low-Sulfur content streams were routed to the flare to minimize sour gas flaring. Output was adjusted to minimize total amount of waste being sent to the flare. Note: the breaker for G-457 had been identified for repair and was supposed to be replaced that week. | 1.4 pounds |
| 76382 2005-01-24 | Waste gas compressor shut down and caused an over pressure situation | Cause: Waste gas compressor shut down and an over-pressure situation. Followup: No Notes: Rescinding notification for below reportable quantities. (There is a hand-written T76382 on incident # 76355 PDF, but LABB believes that they are unrelated). | 1.0 pounds |
| 76355 2005-01-22 | K-406 (waste gas compressor number 4) | Cause: Waste gas compressor number 4 (K-406) unexpectedly shut down. Waste gas was automatically diverted to refinery safety flare system. Followup: No Notes: Rescinding notification for NO2. The refinery waste gas system and refinery operations were adjusted in order to minimize the amount of waste gas being sent to the flare. Sweet streams were routed to the flare in order to minimize sour gas flaring. K-406 was removed from service on 01/27/05 to complete an evaluation of the machine and perform other maintenance. Additional emissions listed in the Summary of Emissions were not mentioned in the report. This incident is related to incident # 76362.(There are two hand-written incident numbers, T76377 & T76382, on the PDF, but LABB believes they are not related to this event). | 2.5 pounds |
| 76362 2005-01-21 | Hydrocracker Light Ends Plant Butane Splitter Tower & LEP Depropanizer Tower Bottoms Flow Control Valve 50FC060 | Cause: (1) 0600 hrs: Hydrocracker Light Ends Plant (LEP) Butane Splitter Tower began to overpressure because LEP Depropanizer Tower Bottoms Flow Control Valve (50FC060) had failed in the open position, letting propane to exit to the Butane Splitter. (2) 1700 hrs: Butane Splitter again began to overpressure due to the presence of propane. The level indication on the level instrument was detecting a false reading. Followup: No Notes: Letter speaks of two incidents on same day at 0600 hrs and 1700 hrs but attached report shows three incidents: (1) 4:05 a.m. lasting 3h 42m; (2) 3:15 p.m. lasting 41m; (3) 4:30 p.m. lasting 1h 25m. Amounts of compounds are only given in totals for all 3incidents. This incident is related to incident # 76355. LDEQ states that it is also related to incident # 76395. | 5.8 pounds |
| 76033 2005-01-06 | K-406 (waste gas compressor number 4) | Cause: K-406 unexpectedly shut down and waste gas was automatically diverted to refinery safety flare system. Followup: No Notes: Sweet streams (lower Sulfur content) were routed to the flare to minimize sour gas flaring. Process unit output was adjusted in order to minimize the total amount of waste gas being sent to the flare. Shortly after shutdown, personnel re-started K-406 restoring the systems ability to process available refinery waste gas streams, ending the incident. | |
| 92440 2006-12-05 | #2 Flare - AE-AOA-05-0109 EPN 29 | Cause: Quench pump G-7621 was down which increased gas production and caused a sudden increase in off gas from crude 2 vacuum tower. Followup: No Notes: Unknown why quench pump was down. Will install a switch guard to prevent unintentional shutdown. | 13.0 pounds |
| 92095 2006-11-15 | AE-AOA-05-0109 EPN 28 | Cause: FCC tripped due to a blown fuse and a malfunctioning component within the FCC multi lin and fuse system. A second mechanical failure (currently under investigation) dropped the remaining voltage to below the sct point. Followup: No Notes: Investigation ongoing. Unit feed rates reduced to a minimum and reactor severity was reduced. In addition, moves were made to minimize the main fractionators overhead receiver pressure. Process gas was routed to the #1 Flare while troubleshooting was performed. | 42.0 pounds |
| 91667 2006-10-29 | AE-AOA-05-0109 EPN 28 and 29 | Cause: electrical switchgear failure. Followup: No Notes: DEQ report indicates that unknown amounts of the pollutants were released. | 61.0 pounds |
| 91273 2006-10-10 | Thermal Oxidizer and Flare 1 - AE-AOA-05-0109 EPN 46 | Cause: Discharges came from THOX and Flare 1. The Amine and Sulfur Recovery Units were upset. It was determined that hydrocarbons contaminated the Diglycolamine (DGA¨) and required both units to be taken offline. The upset caused excess emissions from the SRU 1 Thermal Oxidizer (THOX). Sulfer Plant feed was diverted to the refinery safety flare system while the conditions which cause the upset were isloated and remedied. CRLLC reduced the rates of acid gas productin units to minimum and lowered total sufer content of remaining feed, within refinery capability. Followup: No Notes: CITIZEN COMPLAINT COINCIDES WITH INCIDENT - all acid gas producing units were cut back to minimum rates. The source of hydrocarbon in the DGA system was isolated and then purged. The refinery has initiated an investigation into the cause of this incident. Based on the result of that investigation, appropriate measures will be take in order to prevent a recurrence dut ot the same cause. | 352.0 pounds |
| 91023 2006-10-01 | #2 Flare - AE-AOA-05-0109 EPN 29 | Cause: FCCU PGC was tripped during maintenance activities resulting from a fire on Sept. 25, 2006 (incident number 06-06025). When replacing burnt conduit, PGC shut down and resulted in an increased back pressure on the Naphtha stripper tower. PSV lifted to flare 2. Followup: No Notes: refinery has initiated an investigation into the cause | 30.0 pounds |
| 91000 2006-09-29 | #2 Flare - AE-AOA-05-0109 EPN 29 | Cause: pressure safety valve on the F-402 bOiler fuel gas drum was found intermittently lifting fuel gas to the flare. The pressure indicator was out of calibration and reading low. The false readings in fuel pressure resulted in the PSV lifting to the flare. Followup: No Notes: pressure controller set pressure point was reduced. The pressure control indicator will be calibrated during the next turnaround (Feb. 2007) | 592.0 pounds |
| 89604 2006-07-31 | AE-AOA-05-0109 EPN 46 | Cause: loss of instrument air pressure resulting in upset and shutdown of multiple process units within the refinery Followup: No Notes: Process adjustments were made to restore refinery instrument air and steam systems. Process units were stabilized, ending the incident. | 61.0 pounds |
| 87269 2006-04-19 | No information given | Cause: coker compressor failed Followup: No Notes: Letter states that emissions were BRQ | |
| 86447 2006-03-13 | AE-AOA-05-0109 | Cause: loss of power resulted in the unplanned upset of the refinery. External power supplied by Entergy was lost due to activity external to refinery operations. Release from Nos. 1 and 2 Flares. Followup: No Notes: Specific action taken: met with Entergy to stress the impact of this incident and request that appropriate measures be taken in order to prevent a recurrence. | 1,821.0 pounds |
| 85834 2006-02-15 | Waste Gas Compressor | Cause: process equipment allowed light ends to enter Tank 75 during an upset. The tank vent ignited briefly during this period. Followup: No Notes: Letter written to rescind notification of 2/15/06 | |
| 100419 2007-10-23 | Tank 1024 | Cause: due to heavy rain, personnel were filling Tank 1024 to manage excessive storm water for processing. The tank overflowed. Followup: No Notes: Isolated the tank. 3rd party environmental clean up firm called in to do clean up. Vacuum trucks deployed; foam applied to minimize volatilization of spilled material and absorbent materials used to contain the discharge to the vicinity of the tank. | |
| 99999 2007-10-05 | Emergency Flare System | Cause: power failure. Followup: No Notes: CRLLC followed the Loss of Power Emergency Shutdown Procedures for each unit. | 1,097.0 pounds |
| 99870 2007-09-30 | #2 Flare | Cause: pressure safety valve release Followup: No Notes: Letter states that no RQ's were exceeded | |
| 99557 2007-09-18 | #1 Flare | Cause: Malfunctioning FCC PGC seal oil level controller. I/E was requested. While I/E's were making adj. the compressor shutdown and excess gas was sent to #1 flare. Followup: No Notes: Compressor was restarted ending the flaring. The seal oil level control was replaced. | |
| 98210 2007-07-29 | #2 Flare | Cause: No information given Followup: No Notes: No information given | |
| 97457 2007-06-27 | Emergency Flare System South Flare | Cause: LPG recovery compressor shut down on a high interstage level due to a faulty level indicator Followup: No Notes: Temporary modifications made to LPG interstage level bridle. A new LPG Interstage level indication and shut down system has been designed and the parts have been ordered. | |
| 97329 2007-06-22 | Number 2 Flare No information given | Cause: chain operator on the sour waste gas block valve on the #3 Deoctane Overhead Off-Gas Line failed allowing waste gas to go to flare Followup: No Notes: CRLLC repaired the malfunctioned chain operator on the #3 Deoctane Overhead Off-Gas sour waste gas block valve. | |
| 96641 2007-05-30 | Number 1 Flare | Cause: failure of the central processing unit within the ignition control system for the engine driver for K-402. Followup: No Notes: Central Processing Unit within the ignition control system was replaced | |
| 96227 2007-05-15 | No information given | Cause: No information given Followup: No Notes: Letter written to rescind notification of 5/15 concerning release of SO2, NO, NO2 | |
| 96051 / 96092 2007-05-10 | #1 Flare | Cause: after renovation, a low point develops in flare line. Liquid accumulation is blown to flare during coker cycle blow down. Followup: No Notes: Letter written to rescind notification of 5/10 concerning release of SO2. Letter states that NO and NO2 were BRQ. Layout of the flare line is being checked to allow the plant to eliminate the problem | |
| 95652 2007-04-25 | No information given | Cause: No information given Followup: No Notes: Letter sent to rescind notification of 4/25 concerning release of SO2, NO, NO2, H2S, | 1.0 pounds |
| 93412 2007-01-21 | No information given | Cause: No information given Followup: No Notes: Letter sent to rescind notification of 1/21/07 concerning release of NO and NO2 | |
| 93200 2007-01-10 | 1st Stage Fin Fan E2415 tube | Cause: leak in tube on 1st stage fin fan Followup: No Notes: Root cause analysis initiated. Tube has been sent offsite for analysis. Measures will be taken based on result of analysis. | |
| 123894 2010-06-01 | FLARE: #1 Flare (Solenoid Valve) | Cause: LDEQ states that the failure was caused by corrosion in the solenoid. An unplanned activation of the solenoid valve occurred, and the FCC Process Gas Compressor was shut down. Eventually, gasses were vented to the flare. Followup: No Notes: Process rates were decreased, and the incident was given to the unit engineer for review. The solenoid was replaced, and the weatherization of the system was updated. LDEQ Report included. No Refinery Letter. | |
| 142422-142489-143217 2012-08-27 | Wastewater treatment Unit Coke Conveyor Facilities isolated areas of standing stormwater flare | Cause: Chalmette Refining LLC shut down operations because of the approach of Hurricane Isaac. Following established shutdown procedures and protocols, CRLLC was safely and systematically shutdown due to the approach of Hurricane Isaac. Likewise, CRLLC followed standard startup procedures and protocols and minimized excess emissions during recovery and startup efforts. Followup: Yes Notes: There are three LDEQ incident numbers assigned for the events at Chalmette Refining LLC surrounding Hurricane Isaac: 142422, 142489, 143217. On August 27, 2012 the CRLLC began to safely shut down unit operations due to Hurricane Isaac. The emergency shut down resulted in potential permit deviations and reportable quantity exceedances. However CRLLC believes that this event qualifies as an upset as defined in LAC 33:III.507.J. Below are the detailed quantities released from each unit during the startup/shutdown activities: Acid Gas and Hydrocarbon Flaring: During the shutdown and equipment preparation, excess process gases were vented to the flare system in order to reduce emissions to the atmosphere. The duration of flaring was approximately 21.1 hours. Below are the emissions which occurred during shutdown activities: 23.6 Tons S02 126 lbs H2S 133 lbs NO 133 lbs N02 714 lbs CO 558 lbs VOC 72 lbs PM10 On August 31, 2012, CRLLC began start-up operations and equipment preparation which required periodic hydrocarbon flaring. There were temporary visible emissions of smoke from flaring activities. Further, during startup of the SRU, there was a transient period which resulted in flaring amine acid gas prior to directing to the SRU. Below are the estimated emissions during startup of refinery operations. The duration of the amine acid gas flaring was 89 minutes and the duration of the intermittent hydrocarbon flaring during startup was 84 hours. Actual emissions were: 10.03 Tons S02 (> 500 lbs RQ) 0.03 Tons H2S (> 100 lbs RQ) 0.28 Tons NO/N02 (> 1000 lbs RQ) 1.52 Tons CO 0.69 Tons VOC (>5000 lbs RQ) 0.08 Tons PM10 <1 00 lbs Benzene (> 10 lbs RQ) There were approximately 9 hours where the H2S 162 ppm 3-hour rolling flare limitation was exceeded during shutdown and startup activities. These excess emissions are covered under startup/shutdown provisions provided in NSR CD Paragraph 58. As such, no additional action is required by agency. Flare Gas Recovery equipment was being repaired and so no FGR was used during this process. Tail Gas Incident: On August 27, 2012 the CRLLC Sulfur Recovery Unit was safely shut down and equipment was prepared. During this process Tail Gas Incident resulted from Source ID EIQ193. Predicted emission estimates were approximately 25 tons S02 for the shutdown. On September 5-6, 2012 the Sulfur Recovery Unit was started-up. There were no tail gas incidents during this process. As such, no additional action is required by agency. Sulfur Pit Venting: Emission estimates were expected to be less than 200 pounds H2S during shutdown and start-up operations. It is important to note that these exceedances occurred during the period when CRLLC was shutting down equipment and subsequently starting up and lining out operations. Actual emissions were -72 lbs. H2S and -50 lbs. S02. These excess emissions are covered under startup/shutdown provisions provided in NSR CD Paragraph 58. As such, no additional action is required by agency. H2S Concentration of 162 ppm in Fuel Gas: During shutdown on August 27, 2012 the refinery had the potential to exceed the H2S concentration of 162 ppm in the fuel gas system. FCCU NOx, S02, CO, PM, and Opacity Permitted Emission Limits: During shutdown and subsequent start-up operations, the refinery exceeded the emission concentration limit for CO for 14 hours and the differential pressure parameter for 32 hours at the FCCU. There were no Title V permit limit lb/hr exceedences during these times. SRU Permitted Emission Limits (lbs/hr & concentration): During the shutdown and subsequent start-up operations, the refinery exceeded the permitted emission limit of 95 lbs/hr for S02 for three (3) hours at the Sulfur Recovery Unit. The 250 ppm concentration limit was exceeded for approximately 48 hours. It is important to note that these exceedances occurred during the period when CRLLC was starting up and lining out operations. These excess emissions are covered under the start-up/shutdown provisions provided in NSR CD Paragraph 23 and 29. Flare Pilot Outages: During the shutdown due to the higher than normal rain and wind volumes, flare pilots experienced temporary outages. Data Availability from Continuous Emission Monitoring Systems (CEMS): The CEMS analyzers at the CRLLC may be adversely affected by nitrogen constraints. Some selected CEMS may have reduced data availability during the time period of storm landfall, recovery, and start-up activities. The specific duration of reduced data availability will be provided in the 30- day follow-up report. Missing LDAR Monitoring: CRLLC is subject to several Louisiana & Federal Regulations requiring Leak Detection and Repair (LDAR) as noted below. Hurricane Isaac and its aftermath have not allowed completion of some of the timing obligations, and will prevent us from meeting all the timing obligations of the required August monitoring. Approximately 250 components will receive delayed monitoring, but will be monitored in September. Details of the number of components subject to delay will be provided in the 30-day follow-up report. Consistent with USEPA's decision for Hurricane Gustav, CRLLC requests that the delayed monitoring and repair be exempted from enforcement under the applicable Force Majeure provisions. Approximately 255 monthly LDAR components received delayed monitoring, but were monitored in September. In addition, 7 leaks that missed the 5 day attempt and 6 leaks that missed the 15 day attempt due to Hurricane Isaac. Isolated Areas of Standing Stormwater: There were isolated pockets of stormwater in the refinery which contained some sheen material and potential hydrocarbon. All of these areas were contained within the refinery boundaries and no material migrated offsite. Areas include tank firewall areas, overflow of sumps, and low-lying areas. There is the potential to exceed more than one (1) barrel of total oil accumulative across the complex from all the isolated areas. All hydrocarbon and sheen material was removed and properly disposed/treated. Any contaminated soil has been remediated. This information is reported in accordance with the site waste management plan. Coke Conveyor Facilities: The coke conveyor facilities sustained some minor damage which resulted in loss of covers over portions of the conveyor belt system. There are also minor amounts of coke material on the ground which is being collected. Some small particulate emissions may result from recovery and re-start Operations. Covers will be repaired/replaced as soon as possible. The 30-day follow-up report will describe the specific repairs and dates of completion. The conveyor covers that were damaged during the hurricane have been repaired/replaced. This accident is linked to Bypass of Wastewater Treatment Unit (LSP incident # 12-05781; NRC Incident # 102-2486). Actual storm rainfall was 30". In consideration of personnel safety and increasing weather severity, the refinery initiated the emergency discharge bypass for Outfall 004 from wastewater treatment facilities to MS River on August 28, 2012. It is important to note that the refinery process operations were shutdown previously which mitigated wastewater hydrocarbon content. Water discharge was essentially storm water. Samples were collected to document wastewater quality. On August 29, 2012 all parameters were within current permit limits with the exception of Total Suspended Solids. Preliminary analysis indicates a potential exceedance of 4,444 lbs/day versus permitted limit of 3,180 lbs. | 133.0 pounds |
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