|About the Database
|LDEQ Accident Number
|Amount of Release
|Cause: Light control valve causing the PSV to actuate from Tank 521.
Notes: Investigation indicated potential faulty pressure reading resulted in relief system actuating. Pressure indicator has been recalibrated. An evaluation is being conducted re: location of the pressure indicator and pipe vent system. Delayed report to state police because Hotline circuits were busy.
|Flammable Gas: 22,151.0 pounds
|Cause: Tank 52 level gage malfunctioned
Notes: Being monitored by hand gauging until tank gage is repaired
|Phenol: 1,814.0 pounds
Ortho-Cresol: 401.0 pounds
|88861 & 88862
|Cause: level controller malfcuntion st the Lube Vacuum Unit 1
Notes: Claims emission was below RQ
|A-Sulfur Recovery Unit
|Cause: analyzer malfunction at the A-Sulfur Recovery Unit
Notes: off site odor complaint
|Cause: tank gauge was damaged and did not indicate that tank was overflowing; - tank seals damaged
Notes: Report indicates that DEQ deferred incident to next inspection. According to Citgo's Lebendorfer, liquid on side of tank was water from seal
|Cause: malfunction of automatic sump level indicator gauge results in sump overflow
Notes: Sump level indicators repaired
|Slop Oil: 3.0 pounds
Sulfuric Acid: 101.0 pounds
|Cause: Tank 528 was filled with butane. Natural gas, used to displace butane in the barge was introduced into Tank 528. This was caused when a malfunctioning level indicator in the barge allowed the butane level to fall to a point where natural gas could enter the transfer line. The increase in pressure in Tank 528 tripped the pressure safety valve(PSV) causing flammable gas to be vented to the atmosphere.
Notes: Transfer line was blocked and head space pressure lowered.
|Flammable Gas: 2,307.0 pounds
|C-Cat PC152 Instrument
|Cause: State police report states that the C-Cat PC152 instrument failure caused over-pressurization of the E1 Fractionator.
Notes: BRQ. Refinery letter states that "review of operating data showed that no RQ were exceeded." Pressure was relieved by releasing the hydrogen sulfide and sulfur dioxide to the B-7 Flare. Refinery letter and SPOC report only. No LDEQ report.
|Cause: The cause of the incident was an unforeseen failure of a level indication to a control valve on a water wash vessel. This failure allowed hydrocarbons to enter the oily water sewer. Hydrocarbons from an oily water sewer backed up into the K-16 pit where a portion evaporated into the atmosphere.
Notes: Evaporative loss calculations indicate that Benzene and flammable gas reportable quantities were exceeded. The length of time was estimated from the time the water wash level controller valve output opened fully to the time the K16 pump pit was foamed and draining activities initiated. Upon discovery of hydrocarbon in the K-16 pit, a search of the source of hydrocarbon was initiated. When identified as the source of the hydrocarbon to the oily water sewer, the water wash valve was closed. In addition, foam was applied to the K-16 pit to limit the amount of evaporation to the atmosphere and vacuum trucks were called to remove the remaining material in the pit. A block has been added to the TDC water wash level controller to limit the flow rate of material to the oily water sewer.
|Benzene: 59.0 pounds
Flammable Gas: 2,252.0 pounds