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|LDEQ Accident Number
|Point Source(s)||Notes||Amount of Release|
Unit 59 South Flare
|Cause: A tube leaked on the Unit 15 Hot Separator Overhead Fin Fans at 17:52 hours. At 18:00, the unit was undergoing emergency shutdown procedures and the U15 dump valve was opened to the flare. The incident was a Gas Oil leak in the Unit 15 Hot separator Overhead Fin Fan Exchangers.
This leak caused a vapor release of hydrocarbons and hydrogen in addition to a small amount of hydrogen sulfide.|
Notes: PDF was too large to upload. Unit 15 was depressurized to the South Flare to safely isolate the leaking Overhead Fin Fan. Once the unit pressure was sufficiently low in the unit, the Fin Fans were isolated and the leak stopped. An incident investigation will result in recommendations to prevent recurrence. The reportable quantities for hydrogen sulfide, compressed flammable gas, and compressed flammable liquid were exceeded during this event. A report on October 9, 2013, removed greenhouse gas emissions and revised the estimate of VOC emissions.
|Flange on the Pitch Exchanger 210-1317-08|
North Ground Flare
|Cause: The 210-1513-01 Vacuum Bottoms Pump inboard and outboard motor bearing housings were smoking during routine observations. The 210-1513-02 Vacuum Bottoms Pump (back-up) was already out of service for repairs. The board operator was notified and started reducing Crude charge rate. The 210-1513-01 Vacuum Bottoms pump was shut down due to the outboard motor bearing igniting. The 210 Crude Unit shutdown procedure was initiated. The 210-1801-01 Offgas Compressor tripped due to a high level in the 210-1202 Compressor Suction Drum. Both pumps were already on in automatic. The outsider operator opened the bypass around the flow controller to the Product Receiver. Crude overhead gas was flared in the North Ground Flare. About 5 gallons of crude oil from a flange on the Refinery's Oily Water Sewer and processed in the WWTP.|
Notes: The boardman cut charge rates to Crude Unit 10 and shut down Crude Unit 210. Both Compressor Suction Drum pumps were turned on, and the bypass around the flow controller was opened. The operator increased the suction drum pressure to assist the pumps in pressuring out the level to the startup compressor. The incident investigation will result in recommendation items designed to prevent the recurrence of this event. Initial report states material did go offsite. Verbal report and Hazardous Materials Incident Reporting Form state that H2S was released (and incorrectly reporting that the reportable quantity for it is 500 lbs), while the refinery statement letter reports only SO2.
|Unit 10 Naphtha Splitter||Cause: On November 18 during startup of the Naptha Splitter, a leak was found in the vessel shell. As soon as the leak was discovered, the vessel was deinventoried and all liquid feeds were blocked in. The source of the leak was from a hole the side of a pencil, the cause of which is under investigation.|
Notes: As soon as the leak was discovered, the vessel was deinventoried and all liquid feeds were blocked in. An incident investigation will determine the cause and recommendations to prevent future occurrences will be made.
|flange on process line in U212 Platformer Unit||Cause: On June 29, a small leak and hydrogen fire was observed on the 48" flange on the process piping going from Cell 2 of the Unit 212 Charge Heater to Reactor #2. The leak was hair line sized in width and no larger than 1" around the circumference of the flange.|
Notes: Steam was applied to the flange to extinguish the flame and the flange was hot bolted to secure the leak. Once investigation is complete, recommendations will be implemented. There were no known offsite impacts.
|Heat Exchanger 215-1304-02||Cause: On June 11, 2013, a small vapor leak developed on Heat Exchanger 215-1304-02. There were no offsite impacts.|
Notes: The area was cordoned-off. The exchanger head was hot bolted to secure the leak. No specific action is recommended for this incident.