|Home||Search||Emissions||Pollutants||About the Database|
|LDEQ Accident Number
|Point Source(s)||Notes||Amount of Release|
|tank 766||Cause: level gauge on tank 766 was not responding correctly. Chemicals began flowing out of the drain on the tank.|
Notes: foam was sprayed on the tank to reduce exposure and fire potential. The tank was slowly emptied to ensure the roof did not shift and damage the tank.
|E-205 A/B exchanger bank on the Heavy Cat Naptha Unit||Cause: the E-205 A/B exchanger bank on the Heavy Cat Naptha Unit was leaking to Cooling Tower #27. The leak is believed to be from corrosion on the tube bundle.|
Notes: This incident was not preventable because the inspection data for this bank of exchangers did not indicate that a failure was imminent. These bundles were tested in January 2005 and were found to have no leaks. Remedial Measures - the exchanger bundle will be inspected and repaired or replaced as appropriate. The reportable quantities for benzene, toluene, naphthalene, volatile organic compounds, xylene mixed isomers, and o-xylene were exceeded. It is possible that the reportable quantities forylene and p-xylene were also exceeded, but available stream specification data does not allow differentiation between the these two isomers
|E-205 C/D exchanger bank on the Heavy Cat Naptha Unit||Cause: the E-205 C/D exchanger bank on the Heavy Cat Naptha unit was leaking to Cooling Tower #27. The leak is believed to be from corrosion on the tube bundle.|
Notes: This incident was not preventable because the inspection data for this bank of exchangers did not indicate that a failure was imminent. These bundles were tested in January 2005 and were found to have no leaks. Remedial Measures - the exchanger bundle will be inspected and repaired or replaced as appropriate. The reportable quantities for xylene, benzene, toluene, naphthalene, and volatile organic compounds were all exceeded
|E-3 exchanger on the Coker||Cause: the leak is believed to have been caused by corrosion and erosion|
Notes: There is no information whatsoever as to why the accident was preventable. Remedial Measures- the bundle was replaced with a new bundle. In the letter to LDEQ, Exxon states that the reportable quantities for hydrogen sulfide and benzene were exceeded
|FLARE - Alkylation Feed Preparation Unit||Cause: The Methyl Tertiary-Butyl Ether Unit was converted to an Alkylation Feed Preparation Unit (AFP). The AFP was beginning its initial start up. As the level in one of the towers increased, steam was added to the reboiler to begin producing overhead product. During this time, the safety valves on the tower began relieving to the flare system, which resulted in the reported flare. During the conversion of the unit the overhead pressure meter was reranged in the field, but was no reranged in the control room. Due to this oversight the operator believed he was at a significantly lower pressure and did not immediately discover that the safety valves on the tower had lifted to the flare system. The calculations automtically completed by the flare system|
Notes: The cause of the accident is listed as preventable in the company's report, but there is no explanation whatsoever as to why it was preventable - that section is blank. The only remedial measure listed is that the pressure meter range was corrected in the control room. The letter to LDEQ states that reportable quantities of nitrogen oxide and butenes were exceeded.
|E-553B Exchanger at the coker|
E-553B Exchanger leak at the coker
|Cause: -the E-553B exchanger on the Coker was leaking to Cooling Tower #44. The leak is believed to be from the corrosion on the tube bundle.|
Notes: Remedial measures - The leaking tube on the E-553 exchanger will be plugged and the exchanger will be pressure tested before it is returned to service. The accident was not preventable because the exchanger had not leaked previously and the tube bundle was approximately 18 months old. The report letter to LDEQ states that the reportable quantities for benzene, hydrogen sulfide, volatile organic compounds, and 1,3-butadine were exceeded.
|F-600 furnace at No. 2 Reformer / Powerformer Feed Hydrotreater (RHLA-2) / No. 2 Powerformer||Cause: an instrument malfunction caused the F-600 furnace on the No. 2 Reformer to shut down. The shutdown of F-600 resulted in the Powerformer Feed Hydrotreater (RHLA-2) and the No. 2 Powerformer shutting down. The Powerformer is a major supplier of hydrogen to the refinery, and with the reduction in hydrogen supply, several units were forced to significantly reduce rates or shut down. The Feed Preparation Unit feeds RHLA-2 and with this unit shut down a valve was opened to send this stream from Feed Preparation to tankage. There is a second valve in this line that is normally open, but during this time it was closed. The second valve being closed led to a pressure increase in T-31 and caused the safety valve to release. The towe pressure was returne|
Notes: Remeidal Measures - An investigation is ongoing and appropriate follow-up actions will be completed. Exxon states in their report that the accident was preventable. Their explanation is that the safety valve did not restart as it should have, nor did the operator know the second valve was closed. Could this be human error in addition to Instrument failur
|atmospheric release||Cause: |
Notes: Unit depressurized immediately in accordance with emergency process. Investigation is ongoing, appropriate follow up will be complete
|Atmospheric release/FLARE-Flare 17,19,23||Cause: The C-101 Recycle Compressor on the HCLA unit shut down due to a fault in the transformer that supplies power to the compressor motor. The compressor trip automatically activated the units emergency depressurization procedures, which caused gases in the HCLA reactor system to be vented to the atmosphere via the condensable blow down drum. The transformer failed due to overheating. The air conditioner in the substation was found to have failed causing the temperature in the building to increase and the transformer to overheat. FLaring also occurred.|
Notes: The unit was depressurized automatically in accordance with the emergency procedures. Temporary ventilation conditioning was installed in the substation to cool the remaining electrical equipment. Total amount of flammable vapor released was 108,206 pounds. Total amount of VOC's released was 93,904 pounds
|transfer piping||Cause: Failure of line of transfer piping from gasoline tankage to loading line due to corrosion at the air-soil interface of piping.|
Notes: RQ exceeded. Isolated line with blind installation. Replaced with new piping and special program has been initiated to emphasis piping that may be subject to air-soil interface corrosion. Contaminated soil removed. The refinery letter misstates that the accident occurred on 08/21/09. The following RQs were exceeded: xylene, toulene, ethylbenzene, napthalene, benzene, n-hexane, cyclohexane, 2,2,4-trimethylpentane, VOCs, oil to soil, and flammable vapor.
|No Information Given||Cause: Leak occurred, but no information provided regarding the cause.|
Notes: RQ not exceeded. LABB does not have access to the LDEQ incident report.
|heat exchanger E-578||Cause: T-570 reboiler [tubing] bundle in heat exchanger E-578 leaked at the #2 Light Ends Unit.|
Notes: Leak isolated, blocked away, and exchanger shut down to stop the leak. No information provided regarding the amount of material released or if release was RQ. LABB only has access to LDEQ incident report.
|E-2 Condenser into CT 18||Cause: On 10/5/11 at approximately 7:25 pm, the Baton Rouge Refinery discovered a release. A leak was discovered by operations personnel during structured rounds at the Pipestill #9 Unit. The release source was determined by a cooling tower, and investigation determined that heat exchangers in the E-2 bank were allowing hydrocarbon to enter the cooling water system. Upon discovery, personnel lowered the E-2 hydrocarbon pressure. By maintaining the hydrocarbon pressure below the cooling water pressure, hydrocarbon will not be released into the water. Gas testing performed in the area confirms that the release ended when the hydrocarbon pressure was lowered. Review of Pipestill #9 operations indicate the release likely began around noon on 10/5.|
Notes: Weather conditions at the time of this release: 87 degrees, 6 mph wind from the east, no precipitation. To end the release, the hydrocarbon pressure was lowered, By maintaining the tower pressure below the cooling water pressure, hydrocarbon will not be released into the water. To prevent recurrence, the hydrocarbon pressure was lowered. The computer control system has been adjusted to minimize the tower pressure. A permanent bundle repair will be completed the next time the exchangers are removed from service. Reportable quantities of benzene and naptha were exceeded.