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Accident # | 132764 |
State Police # | 11-04563 |
Accident Date | 2011-08-01 |
Report Date | 2011-08-04 |
Follow-up Date | 2011-08-08 |
Follow-up: | Yes |
Pollutant | Duration | Point Source | Greenhouse Gas | Criteria Pollutant | Ozone forming chemical | Amount of Release |
Sulfur Dioxide | 4h 35m | Fired heaters and boilers | NO | YES | NO | 2,354.0 pounds |
Hydrogen Sulfide | 4h 35m | Sulfen Vent Stack EQT297, Tail Gas II Vent Stack EQT298, B-7 Flare | NO | NO | NO | |
Carbon Monoxide | 4h 35m | B-7 Flare EQT347 | NO | YES | NO | |
Carbonyl Sulfide | 4h 35m | Sulften Vent Stack, Tail Gas II Vent Stack | NO | NO | YES | |
Carbon Disulfide | 4h 35m | Sulften Vent Stack, Tail Gas II Vent Stack | NO | NO | NO |
Accident Classified As: Reportable Quantity
The operator failed to manually reset the solenoid valve that controlled the level in the F-104 drum prior to restarting the JC-102 compressor. Based on the definition of control equipment inLAC 33:III.1 1 1, Citgo failed, in this incident, to diligently maintain control equipment in proper working order whenever emissions were being made. That initial failure to reset the solenoid valve cause a string of upsets, which began with the central amine upset.
The solenoid valve should have been manually reset prior to restarting the JC-102 compressor. Had this happened, it is possible that the F-104 drum would not have flooded, and the string of upsets would not have occurred.
Immediate corrective actions taken were removing excess hydrocarbon from the central amine unit, amine feed to the SRUs was reduced, and efforts were made to identify the hydrocarbon source. Citgo conducted an incident investigation, which outlines several actions to be taken. Additional letters from refinery regarding this incident: 8/18/11, 10/27/11
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