LA Bucket Brigade : Refinery Accident Database

Placid Refining (2366), Port Allen

LDEQ Accident Report

Accident #	136143
PDF Available	PDF
State Police #	11-07997
Accident Date	2011-12-23
Report Date	2011-12-28
Follow-up Date	2012-02-23
Follow-up:	Yes

Pollutants Released

Pollutant	Duration	Point Source	Greenhouse Gas	Criteria Pollutant	Ozone forming chemical	Amount of Release
Sulfur Dioxide	38h	incinerator 2 at sulfur plant #3	NO	YES	NO	4,168.0 pounds
Carbon Dioxide	38h	incinerator 2 at sulfur plant #3	YES	NO	NO	BRQ
Nitrogen	38h	incinerator 2 at sulfur plant #3	NO	NO	NO	BRQ
Hydrogen	38h	incinerator 2 at sulfur plant #3	NO	NO	NO	BRQ
Hydrogen Sulfide	38h	incinerator 2 at sulfur plant #3	NO	NO	NO	BRQ
Vapor	38h	incinerator 2 at sulfur plant #3	NO	NO	NO	BRQ
Carbon Monoxide	38h	incinerator 2 at sulfur plant #3	NO	YES	NO	BRQ
Carbon Disulfide	38h	incinerator 2 at sulfur plant #3	NO	NO	NO	BRQ
Carbonyl Sulfide	38h	incinerator 2 at sulfur plant #3	NO	NO	YES	BRQ

Accident Classified As: No Information Given

Cause of Problem: Equipment Design

The #2 SRU tripped causing the air shutdown valve to close, forcing operations to shift the feed from the #2 SRU to the #3 SRU. The catalyst in the #2 TGTU became overloaded from the excess feed and breakthrough occurred causing sulfur to carryover to the #2 TGTU Quench Tower. The #2 TGTU Quench Tower became plugged with Sulfur and could not run at full capacity. The #2 TGTU had to be bypassed in order to clean the #2 TGTU Quench Tower. Reached RQ at 18:45 on the 23rd due to bypassing the #2 Tailgas unit. Normal was not reached until the 25th. The facility goes on to report that the shutdown was caused by a malfunction of a safety shutdown inherent to the technology of the design of the unit.

Discharge Preventable - No

The root cause was determined to be a a sudden and infrequent event that could not be prevented through good engineering practices.

Notes/Remedial Actions

In an effort to reduce the quantity of sulfur dioxide emissions from this incident, the refinery reduced the charge rate to the FCCU, discontinued processing LCO through the Diesel Hydrotreater and put the Sour Water Gas to the #2 SRU. These steps allowed them to keep the #3 SRU at minimum feed rates while the Quench tower in the #2 TGTU (which served the #3 SRU) was being cleaned. The shutdowns on the #2 SRU were tested and found to be in good working order. If it is shutdowns again, their alternative will be to divert the feed to the #3 SRU or flare Acid Gas. Placid does not feel that design, operational, or maintenance changes are required because shutdowns are tested during every turnaround. They classify this incident as unusual and rare, therefore, it is not expected to have a significant probability of occurring again. The sulfur dioxide emission rate was greater than 20.0 pounds per hour continuously for three consecutive hours or more. Placid Refinery then pushed more pollution out of SRU #3. Sulfur component releases from SRU #3 production from the start of the incident on 12/23/11 to 12/25/11 were approximately 1,380 lbs.