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|State Police #||07-02700|
|Pollutant||Duration||Point Source||Greenhouse Gas||Criteria Pollutant||Ozone forming chemical||Amount of Release|
|Carbon Monoxide||22 h 54 m||Carbon Monoxide Bypass Stack||NO||YES||NO||996,323.0 pounds|
|Sulfur Dioxide||93 h 51m||Low Pressure Flare, High Pressure Flare, SRU incinerator Stack, 191-PV-105, Heaters||NO||YES||NO||42,788.0 pounds|
|Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs)||15 m||410-PSV-62||NO||NO||YES||49,498.0 pounds|
|Hydrocarbon||39 h 2 m||Induction gas relief valve (APC-105), Low Pressure Flare, High Pressure Flare||NO||NO||YES||17,959.0 pounds|
|Hydrogen Sulfide||7 h 54m||Low Pressure Flare (308F-D-1), High Pressure Flare, 191 APC-105||NO||NO||NO||474.0 pounds|
|Nitrogen Oxide||37 h 34 m||Low Pressure Flare, High Pressure Flare, 191-PV-105||NO||YES||YES||138.0 pounds|
Accident Classified As:
During a rain storm the line from Entergy's substation tripped. The loss of power forced most of the refinery's process units to shutdown resulting in flaring. While shutting down the 191 crude unit the pressure controller relieved vapors and liquid hydrocarbons from a vent at the top of the Vacuum Tower. The hydrocarbons ignited and caused a fire at the top of the Vacuum Tower. With most of the process units down there was insufficient feed to keep the SRU tail gas treater online. The tail gas was routed to the SRU incinerator. When units were started up again they required more flaring for prepare for recommissioning.
Power outage was considered not predictable.
Determined that although there are back up systems there are no ways to prepare for these types of power outages. Electrical department will preform preventative maintenance and replacement of components. 191-PV-105 pressure controller at the crude unit no longer vents to the atmosphere. Piping was installed that routes gases from this vent directly to the flare.