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|State Police #||13-05279|
|Pollutant||Duration||Point Source||Greenhouse Gas||Criteria Pollutant||Ozone forming chemical||Amount of Release|
|Sulfur Dioxide||26m||OL-5 Elevated Flare (EPN 6-84) & Ground Flare (7-84)||NO||YES||NO||6.7 pounds|
|Carbon Monoxide||26m||OL-5 Elevated Flare (EPN 6-84) & Ground Flare (7-84||NO||YES||NO||1.6 pounds|
|Nitric Oxide||26m||OL-5 Elevated Flare (EPN 6-84) & Ground Flare (7-84||NO||YES||NO||0.3 pounds|
|Particulate Matter||26m||OL-5 Elevated Flare (EPN 6-84) & Ground Flare (7-84||NO||YES||NO||0.5 pounds|
|Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs)||26m||OL-5 Elevated Flare (EPN 6-84) & Ground Flare (7-84||NO||NO||YES||0.1 pounds|
Accident Classified As: Below Reportable Quantity (BRQ)
On November 28, 2013, OL-5 operations experienced a false high flow reading on a flow controller that resulted in high pressure in the diethanolamine stripper overhead. The high pressure caused a backup pressure controller to open the OL-5 Elevated Flare and OL-5 Ground Flare.
Shell Chemical LP (the owner and operator of both OL-5 flares) has determined that the event was not preventable because the malfunction was sudden and unexpected.
Upon investigation, it was discovered that the false high flow was the result of the plugging of one of the two transmitter taps. OL-5 operations and maintenance personnel cleared a plug from the transmitter taps of the flow controller, and the flow reading returned to normal operating conditions. The OL-5 Process Unit was safely returned to normal operation conditions, and the flaring stopped. Follow up report states that "additional measures to prevent reoccurrence have not been identified".