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ExxonMobil Chemical Plant (286), Baton Rouge

Releases of Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs)

LDEQ Accident Number
Accident Date
Point Source(s) Notes Amount of Release
90675

2006-09-14
Propane safety valve
Cause: Propane safety valve released due to compressor upset.

Followup: No

Notes: They expected to exceed RQ for benzene and VOCs. They returned it back to normal conditions. Amount of VOC's released is unknown.
88052

2006-05-20
wastewater drier
Cause: Bypass of a control device when wastewater drier vented to the atmosphere instead of to the flare system.

Followup:

Notes: Amount of VOC's released is unknown.
100166

2007-10-12
RLA-1 Process unit
Cause:

Followup: No

Notes: At time of report event was still ongoing. Potential RQ for Flammable vapor. Potential RQ for VOC. Potential for highly reactive VOC. Potential for RQ for the Ethylene for DEQ of 100 lbs. There was a fire, but they called the internal fire squad as a precaution. Amount of ethylene released is unknown.
95548

2007-04-21
Flare
Cause: had a flare event associated with RTO3 upset.

Followup:

Notes: May have exceeded RQ's.
102.5 pounds
111419

2008-12-15
valve
Cause: Piping and valve leaked through by tank. Had a piping prepared for mechanical repairs and a valve leaked through by the tank.

Followup: No

Notes: The bleeder was blocked to stop the leak. Need to remediate the contaminated soil. Spill was vacuumed off. RQs for VOCs were exceeded. Release leaked to the soil and evaporated. Report was recorded by SPOC on 12/29/08.
109677

2008-09-01
Weather
Cause: As a result of Hurricane Gustav the Baton Rouge Resins Finishing Plant (BRFP) experienced significant facility damage and power interruptions that required operations to safely shutdown. Hurricane Gustav is clearly considered an "act of god." The Baton Rouge Resin Finishing Plant only had generators for electrical power to maintain a small number of instruments and critical pumps. There was no power available for the compressors that collect vent gases from storage tanks and route them to the site's flare. The seal leg on the flare seal drum prevented the relatively small breathing losses from reaching the flare for combustion. The flare pilots were extinguished during the storm but we have established the ability to relight it. However due to natural gas supply availability and the inability to route the vent streams to the flare tip we elected to allow the flare pilots to remain unlit until we restored power to the vapor recovery compressors. Power was restored to BRFP at 230 pm on 9/6/08 and the flare pilots were relit. All tanks that were venting to the atmosphere were routed to the flare.

Followup: No

Notes: BRFP was safely and systematically shutdown due to hurricane Gustav. Learning from this event will be incorporated into future hurricane preparations. BRFP was unable to complete some of the timing obligations due to Hurricane Gustav. It has prevented from meeting all the timing obligations of the required September monitoring. At the time the primary focus of mechanical resources was on storm related repairs to enable safe startup of unit operations. The plant was to accomplish the LDAR monitoring within the next 60 days. In addition, the availability of parts is also a difficult logistics problem so the focus was on their resources toward startup. BRFP was safely and systematically shutdown due to Hurricane Gustav. Learnings from this event will be incorporated into future hurricane preparations. .
3,800.0 pounds
109655

2008-09-01
Advanced Wastewater Treatment Unit
Flare
Storage Tank
Cause: BRCP Flaring During Shutdown: On September 1, the Baton Rouge Chemical Plant began to safely shutdown operations due to power failures associated with Hurricane Gustav. During shutdown, excess gases were vented to the flare system in order to reduce emissions to the atmosphere. Baton Rouge Turbine Generator NOx steam trip: ExxonMobil experienced difficulty providing NOx suppression steam for our BRTG. Condensate is required to desuperheat the NOx suppression steam prior to using it in the BRTG. The normal condensate supply from operating units to provide desuperheater water is unavailable as these units are down. Temporary demin trailers were used to help provide an interim source of condensate to mitigate the loss of NOx suppression steam, but were unable to continuously supply the condensate for NOx steam to BRTG. Nitrogen blanketing for tanks on vapor recovery: The lack of nitrogen availability has also created a temporary loss of nitrogen blanketing for storage tanks on vapor recovery. Loss of nitrogen blanketing means that air will be pulled into the tank which is unacceptable from a hazard risk standpoint. The tanks without nitrogen blanketing must be blocked away from vapor recovery because it is unsafe to vent oxygen to a fuel gas or flare gas system due to the potential of creating an explosive mixture. Exxon shut down the vapor recovery controls when the site lost nitrogen. Once nitrogen is restored, Exxon will restart vapor recovery systems. Once normal operations are resumed, Exxon will report total excess emissions and duration of vapor recovery outages for affected tanks. Two hatches found open: Two tank hatches were found open after the hurricane was over. These tank hatches were blown open when wind speeds were highest (>90 mph) during the hurricane. Tank hatches must remain closed to prevent emissions; as such, these incidents are considered bypassing of a control device. The estimated emissions from these open tank hatches are below RQ amounts. AWT overflow to Monte Sano Bayou: The separator at the Advanced Wastewater Treatment unit overflowed to the Monte Sano Bayou. The incident occurred when the pumps lost power and could not pump down the level in the separator. Approximately 1300 gallons of untreated wastewater was discharged in to the bayou. Power to the pumps was restored and the level in the separator was pumped down to stop the overflow to the bayou. The composition of the discharged wastewater is unknown at this time due to a disruption in laboratory samples as a result of the hurricane.

Followup: Yes

Notes: BRCP was shutdown due to hurricane Gustav.
12,612.0 pounds
109655

2008-09-01
Advanced Wastewater Treatment Unit
Flare
Storage Tank
Cause: BRCP Flaring During Shutdown: On September 1, the Baton Rouge Chemical Plant began to safely shutdown operations due to power failures associated with Hurricane Gustav. During shutdown, excess gases were vented to the flare system in order to reduce emissions to the atmosphere. Baton Rouge Turbine Generator NOx steam trip: ExxonMobil experienced difficulty providing NOx suppression steam for our BRTG. Condensate is required to desuperheat the NOx suppression steam prior to using it in the BRTG. The normal condensate supply from operating units to provide desuperheater water is unavailable as these units are down. Temporary demin trailers were used to help provide an interim source of condensate to mitigate the loss of NOx suppression steam, but were unable to continuously supply the condensate for NOx steam to BRTG. Nitrogen blanketing for tanks on vapor recovery: The lack of nitrogen availability has also created a temporary loss of nitrogen blanketing for storage tanks on vapor recovery. Loss of nitrogen blanketing means that air will be pulled into the tank which is unacceptable from a hazard risk standpoint. The tanks without nitrogen blanketing must be blocked away from vapor recovery because it is unsafe to vent oxygen to a fuel gas or flare gas system due to the potential of creating an explosive mixture. Exxon shut down the vapor recovery controls when the site lost nitrogen. Once nitrogen is restored, Exxon will restart vapor recovery systems. Once normal operations are resumed, Exxon will report total excess emissions and duration of vapor recovery outages for affected tanks. Two hatches found open: Two tank hatches were found open after the hurricane was over. These tank hatches were blown open when wind speeds were highest (>90 mph) during the hurricane. Tank hatches must remain closed to prevent emissions; as such, these incidents are considered bypassing of a control device. The estimated emissions from these open tank hatches are below RQ amounts. AWT overflow to Monte Sano Bayou: The separator at the Advanced Wastewater Treatment unit overflowed to the Monte Sano Bayou. The incident occurred when the pumps lost power and could not pump down the level in the separator. Approximately 1300 gallons of untreated wastewater was discharged in to the bayou. Power to the pumps was restored and the level in the separator was pumped down to stop the overflow to the bayou. The composition of the discharged wastewater is unknown at this time due to a disruption in laboratory samples as a result of the hurricane.

Followup: Yes

Notes: BRCP was shutdown due to hurricane Gustav.
5,054.0 pounds
107433

2008-07-22

H furnace
Cause: Three events occurred within 24 hours of one another at the ExxonMobil Baton Rouge Chemical Plant. Two are reported in this report (LDEQ #107433), the other is reported separately (LDEQ #107421). In this incident (107433), a furnace tube leaked into convection section of H-furnace and caught fire. The tube leak occurred as a result of the incident described in report #107421. At approximately 5:56 PM on July 21, 2008, the charge gas compressor at the Olefins unit shut down when several processing cards in the gas turbine control system failed. When the compressor shut down, four furnaces automatically shut down and the gas in the furnaces was evacuated to the flare system. One of the remaining three furnaces was subsequently shut down while the remaining two furnaces continued to operated at 50% rates in order to maintain stable unit operations, which resulted in additional flaring for the duration of the event. The high rate of gas to the flare system resulted in the #25 flare smoking for 2 hours and 17 minutes. When the Olefins unit shut down, steam was introduced into the furnaces to displace the hydrocarbon feed to reduce flaring emissions. At 12:20 PM on July 22, 2008, while the H furnace was in the process of starting up, a leak was discovered in the convection section of the furnace. To stop the leak, water was introduced into the leaking pass of the furnace to displace the hydrocarbon feed. It is believed that the leak developed when steam was introduced into the furnace. Tube leaked into convection section of H-furnace and caught fire.

Followup: Yes

Notes: This incident is the result of the incident #107421 (see comments under that incident). Immediately after the incident began, five of the seven furnaces at the Olefins unit were shut down. Excess gas was sent to flare system. Water was introduced into the leaking furnace pass to displace the feed and prevent uncombusted hydrocarbons from leaking into the atmosphere. Concerning subsequent preventative actions, the failed processing cards were replaced. The H furnace was taken out of service to be inspected for leak location and repairs will be completed as necessary. Used water in the tube to eliminate the burning material. Flammable gass consisted of mainly Butane.
369.0
104714

2008-04-12
compressor
Cause: Fire developed on a compressor C-500 B associated with the Aromatics Unit. Cause of the fire was mechanical failure of the compressor which controls the vapors from storage tanks in the Aromatics Unit.

Followup:

Notes: As a result of the compressor shut down, the fire vapors from the tanks went to the air. Vacuum jets were turned on to control these tanks emissions. Concentrations of 7 ppm of Benzene were detected 10 ft downwind from the compressor after the fire was out. Hot zone was established as called for. Hydrocarbons were blocked off from the compressor to prevent further ignition.
107.0 pounds
118173

2009-09-23
B furnace
Cause: Tube rupture in B furnace.

Followup: No

Notes: Tube taken out of service. Report says there was a potential for benzene and VOC emissions. LDEQ received the written report from Exxon but did not include it in this report, but stated that no RQs were exceeded.
115101

2009-05-20
Furance A
Furnace A
Cause: Cracking furnace A was put back into service when tube leaks in the convection section occurred and smoke evolved.

Followup: No

Notes: The products probably exceeded reportable quantities. They were putting "A" furnace in service and experienced convection section tube leaks. They have taken the feed out of the furnace and put steam back in. They eliminated any fuel. They said they would update with more information. No final quantities of release.
5,000.0
115101

2009-05-20
Furance A
Furnace A
Cause: Cracking furnace A was put back into service when tube leaks in the convection section occurred and smoke evolved.

Followup: No

Notes: The products probably exceeded reportable quantities. They were putting "A" furnace in service and experienced convection section tube leaks. They have taken the feed out of the furnace and put steam back in. They eliminated any fuel. They said they would update with more information. No final quantities of release.
113980

2009-04-06

RTO unit
Cause: RTO unit atmospheric safety and associated flaring caused by loss of an electronic card and computer failure. Failure of a computer control card resulted in several control valves to fail in the closed position and the atmospheric safety valve then lifted to the flare.

Followup: No

Notes: The card was replaced with a spare and the unit operations were reduced to minimize released.
100.0 pounds
112825

2009-02-17
EPLA-W Compressor, flares #10, 25, and 26
Flares #10, 25, and 26
Cause: A fire resulted in a compressor shut down and material being flared from 10:30 pm - 11 pm. Around 10:30 pm the charge gas compressor (EPLA-W compressor) for the Olefins Maintrain furnaces tripped due to failed overspeed wiring. This occurred because of a small leak of lube oil from the steam driver which caught fire. This fire was small but close to the wiring which malfunctioned.

Followup: No

Notes: This incident is linked to incident #112824. The effluent gases were diverted to flares before the compressor could be repaired. Start up began around 8:45 pm on 2/18/09. Flaring during shut down through start up resulted in exceedances of RQs for ethylene, propylene, butadiene, nitric oxide, and sulfur dioxide. Also they had three compliance excursions from smoking of flares #10, #25, and #26. This was a non preventable incident from a malfunction. They are looking into preventing lube oil leaking and collecting near compressor wiring.
308.0 pounds
123193

2010-05-03
Exchanger-18X
Cause: On 4/15/10 the Baton Rouge Complex sampled cooling tower #33 for MACT CC compliance using the El Paso cooling tower sample method, as required by refinery operations. Cooling tower #33 is located in the refinery and services both refinery and chemical plant units. The sample results from 4/15 showed more hydrocarbon than expected, so the tower was resampled on 4/16. These results also indicated a hydrocarbon leak.

Followup: No

Notes: The unit personnel began looking for the source under the premise that the release had to be repaired within 45 days, as required by MACT CC. On 4/3/10, the leaking exchanger (E-18X) was identified as the leak source. The exchanger is part of the Baton Rouge Chemical Plant so MACT CC provisions do not apply. Once the leaking exchanger was identified, the release calculations were updated based on the actual stream speciation. These updated calculations relevealed that the release was larger than orginially calculated using the EL Paso method and exceeded the reportable quantity for propylene. RQ for VOC was not exceeded. The exchanger bundle will be repaired before returning to service. Cooing tower MACT CC sampling procedures will also be updated for cooling towers that service both refinery and chemical plant units. Caused by an unforseen exchanger leak. Release of HRVOC during ozone reason, will take up upon next inspection.
6,678.0 pounds
120826

2010-01-16
bleeder valve
Cause: The block valve was discovered to be leaking

Followup: No

Notes: Leaking valve. Valve was isolated. Planned to repair it that day. Released quantities are minimum estimates. Exceeded RQs. When the leak was discovered, the bleeder was closed to prevent further release. An investigation is underway to determine root cause.
6,201.0 pounds
120703

2010-01-10
flare
Cause: Unknown cause for leak in the propylene line of the EPLA (Ethylene Purification Unit). The EPLA uses high pressure propylene for refrigeration.

Followup: Yes

Notes: Initial report was received on 1/19/10. Ethylene Purification Unit (EPLA) uses high pressure propylene for refrigeration. Leak in pipe started 1/9/10 but discovered 1/10/10 at 8:20 pm. Proper and safe disposition of high pressure propylene is flaring. EPLA unit was shut down and more flaring occurred. Flaring occurred. Ended 1/11/10 at 3:22 am. Subsequent start up also resulted in flaring which are covered under permit. This was not preventable as it was an unusual incident. Follow up report after invesitgation was received on 3/22/10. Following corrective actions were contemplated: Design and install a permanent repair for the line, Review vibration study, Increase HAWK camera utilization to detect leaks early, Implement flow alarms for early warning via Real Time Advisor computer system. Exxon Mobil personnel requested and met with the Enforcement Divsion to settle the penalty on this preventable release.
141,454.0 pounds
135902

2011-12-14
PV vents in tank field on OXO vapor recovery system
Cause: OXO vapor recovery system compressors malfunctioned causing an increase in the system pressure which resulted in tank vents opening to the atmosphere. Discharge check valve was leaking through causing the system to circulate and decrease the compressor's effectiveness. In combination with another event (11-07738) from the preceding 24 hours the RQ for flammable vapor was exceeded.

Followup: No

Notes: Inconsistency in reported quantities released. Initital SPOC verbal notification listed release of 403 lbs of Methane to the atmosphere through PV vents. This release occurred when a OXO vapor recovery system compressor tripped off which lead to the tank vents being opened. A spare compressor was used to reduce system pressure. The check valve was replaced, and the compressor internal cooler has been cleaned.
46.5 pounds
135181

2011-11-09
compressor KC-01
Cause: A combination release occurred due to a cracked pipe in the thermo well of the ethylene production unit.

Followup: Yes

Notes: An engineered clamp is being fabricated and will be installed to isolate the leak. Estimated 72 hours to install clamp and secure leak. Individually this event did not exceed the RQ for HRVOC, but in combination with another incident (#11-07037) the RQ for HRVOC was exceeded on Friday, November 11. Approximately 122 pounds of HRVOC's were released. On November 11, 2011 at approximately 13:51 Derek Reese stated the ongoing release subsided to 4.25 lbs/hr and was now below RQ. (still ongoing on report date 11/16/11) Area monitoring and LDEQ monitoring on the fenceline (including grab sample) did not detect anything. LDEQ did pick up .25ppb of Benzene. A total of 108 pounds per day of charge gas is being released as a result of this event. Cumulative emissions which include the total emissions from the incident and complete response, will be included in the follow-up report.
58.0 pounds
133994

2011-09-16
Halobutyl Finishing Unit
Cause: A thermocouple failed, which resulted in the release. Halobutyl Finishing Unit Thermotreatment unit tripped.

Followup: No

Notes: The thermocouple was replaced allowing the unit to be restarted around 8:30am. no injuries, complaints, or offsite impact resulted from this event. Amount of chemicals released is unknown. After evaluation, it has been determined that all emissions were permitted and no reportable qualities were exceeded.
145209

2012-12-06
flare
Cause: Had problems with a compressor (see incident # 12-07709) so they planned a shut down for repairs. As stated during the courtesy notification calls, the flaring occured during a planned unit shutdown.

Followup: No

Notes: All emissions were permitted, and no RQs were exceeded. Rhonda Arledge with EMCP noted that they will do a follow up letter with DEQ involving their permit at a later date. Within their permit to flare the chemicals (Volatile Organic Compounds) that are own this line in order to isolate the compressor to take it off line for repairs. VOCs were released to flare.
144539

2012-11-09
Flare gas system
Cause: A failure of the fuel gas control valve servomechanism actuator failed due to particulate matter in the hydraulic system, causing OLA-2X gas turbine to trip and material to be released to the Site's flare gas system.

Followup: Yes

Notes: Feed was removed from five of seven furnaces and the remaining two furnaces were operating at minimal rates in order to reduce the load on the flare system and emissions to the atmosphere. The hydraulic oil filters and servos were replaced upon discovery of the foulant. The hydraulic oil system was drained, cleaned, and charged with fresh oil in December 2012 to remove a suspected contaminate and particulates. ExxonMobil is conducting additional laboratory analysis of the lube oil at our lubes and specialities lab to determine if additional steps are needed to help prevent recurrence. In addition, improved filtration has been installed. A citizen complaint was recorded and given LDEQ incident number 144543. The complaint cites "Exxon release causing terrible odors, making the caller sick." The LDEQ report references this report, incident 144539 for information on the release. The reportable quantities for VOC, benzene, ethylene, propylene, isoprene, 1,3-butadiene, sulfur dioxide, and nitrogen oxide were exceeded as a result of this event.
12,208.0 pounds
143542

2012-08-29
NIG
Cause: Several title V operating permit compliance matters and potential RQ exceedances resulting from upset conditions caused by Hurricane Isaac: During a post-hurricane Isaac storm survey, the PV vent on Tank 867 was discovered leaking. Emissions from the PV vent were approximately 49 pounds of flammable vapor. During a post-hurricane Isaac storm survey, socks on floating roof tank 783 were found missing and/or torn as a result of high winds. The missing/torn socks were replaced on September 19, 2012. Emissions from the missing/torn tank socks were approximately 1.9 pounds of VOC. During a post-hurricane Isaac storm survey, multiple tank hatches were discovered either missing or open as a result of high winds. Due to Hurricane Isaac, the Continuous Emissions Monitoring System (CEMS) analyzers may have experienced less than 90% data availability. Also the data calibration drift check on the analyzers may have been missed. The HFU TTU was bypassed for approximately 1 hour due to failure to maintain TTU temperature of 1600 degrees Fahrenheit. This bypass resulted in approximately 0.08 tons of hexane being released.

Followup: Yes

Notes: There were several compliance matters and potential RQ exceedances resulting from upset conditions caused by Hurricane Isaac. The PV vent on Tank 867 was repaired and returned to service on September 5,2012. The missing socks on tank 783 were replaced on Septermber 19, 2012. The tank hatches that were discovered missing were replaced as soon as possible to prevent any further emissions to the atmosphere. The tank that were found open were closed and remonitored using the HAWK camera. In attachment 1 of the written notification you will find a summary of the emissions from the tank hatches that were discovered missing or open. remediation of Continuous Emissions Monitoring System (CEMS) - EMCP is working to determine the extent to which the CEMS analyzers may have malfunctioned before, during, and after the storm. This information will be included in the CEMS quarterly report. HFU TTU was bypassed for approximately 1 hour resulting in a hexane release. The letter from EMCP asks that LDEQ exercise enforcement discretion and no such penalties be issued for actions and events related to Hurricane Isaac response and recovery efforts. LABB has the 30 day follow up report, as well as the subsequent LDEQ verbal report, but no subsequent written notifications that serve as a follow up to clarify the total pollutants released from the tank hatches that still needed to be repaired as of the October 4th written notification.
400.2 pounds
140470

2012-06-14
Tank 21 and Rain Basin 1
Cause: A failed bleeder plug was found at Tank 801 in the BRCP's Aromatics Tankfield. Approximately 411 barrels of steam cracked naptha reached the sewer system via this bleeder. All material was retained in waste water treatment facility. While the naphtha was being pumped to tanks #778, #26, #22 and #21, a rain event occurred, which overwhelmed the facility's ability to pump the liquid to the tanks. Therefore, the material was diverted to the Rain Basin I surface impoundment. Of the water pumped into the basin, there were 1,712 lbs of benzene and 419 lbs of toluene.

Followup: Yes

Notes: The water was to be pumped to the waste water treatment plant for treatment before being discharged to outfall 001. Firefighting foam was placed on top to reduce volatilized chemicals. Half the materials spilled were recovered. All values are based on the vaporized material and represents a very small amount of loss. The material is being pumped and moved to onsite storage to facilitate recovery and treatment of the material. All recovered liquid material is being placed in tanks 778, 21, 22, and 26, all of which are properly configured and permitted to store this material. On June 14, 2012, the site began the process of understanding the constituents of the steam cracked naptha that may have been released to the air by performing material balance calculations. During the first 24-48 hours of the incident response, the intial assumptions were that a majority of the material was being contained with minimal evaporative losses. Emissions reporting was based on the initial vaporization of material from the leak duration. Sample of the stored and liquid material were collected from multiple areas and storage facilities to help develop a more definitive material balance of the total steam cracked naptha released. As a precaution, at 1230pm on Jun 14, 2012, approximately 400 employees and contractors in the impacted areas of the complex were tested for potential exposure. ExxonMobil believes that none of these individuals will have any adverse impacts. The site conducted regular monitoring at the fence line every four hours and in three unit areas on an hourly basis during the incident response activites. All fence line readings remain below detection. ExxonMobil Industrial Hygiene personel continue to conduct air monitoring and are verifying safe conditions for areas were personnel are working. Fenceline monitoring will be conducted until the steam cracked naptha material in tank 21 and RB-1 have been treated through the Refinery Wastewater Treatment facilities. Firefighting foam was added to the sewer system every 1-2 hours to minimize the amount of evaporative losses. This foam did not impact wastewater treatment operations or capabilities in the quantities utilized during this incident.
14,022.0 pounds
138107

2012-03-19
EPLA-S cooling tower
Cause: Release to EPLA-S cooling tower of 26.7 pounds o VOCs (of which 24.4 pounds were propylene).

Followup: No

Notes: No information given regarding remedial actions. Leak on EPLA-S cooling tower was tested to determine no RQs were exceeded.
2.3 pounds
136458

2012-01-11
KND-72 seal oil drum
Cause: A leaking union was discovered on KND-72 seal oil drum.

Followup:

Notes: They have determined that no reportable quantities were exceeded.
76.1 pounds
148922

2013-05-27
Tank #784
Cause: On May 27, a benzene leak was detected by infrared camera coming from tank #784.

Followup: No

Notes: No specific remedial actions given. There was an attempt to minimize vapors coming from the tank. All air monitoring results were below detectable limits, and an infrared camera inspection of the tank showed no damage. Initially 10 pounds of benzene released was detected by infrared camera and no VOCs were detected.
7.0 pounds
148832

2013-05-21

Cause: On May 21, the Baton Rouge Chemical Plant experienced a turbine trip at the OLA-2X unit. The material released was sent to the site flare gas system. After further investigation, it was determined that this event was due to the failure of the fuel gas control valve servomechanism actuator. The servomechanism actuator failed due to particulate matter build up in the hydraulic oil system.

Followup: No

Notes: Immediate remedial action was to reduce unit feed rates to help minimize emissions. The hydraulic oil filters and servomechanism actuators were replaced prior to restarting the machine.
5,267.0 pounds
158676

2014-09-11
pressure vent on NSHAP
Cause: Pressure Vent failed on the NSHAP. Event emitted approximately 4lbs benzene, 3lbs 1-3-butadiene, and 7 lbs of VOC's.

Followup: No

Notes: No Information Given. Due to prompt incident response the mitigate the event duration, no RQ's were exceeded.
7.0 pounds
156446

2014-06-02
No information given
Cause:

Followup: No

Notes: The report fails to provide an accurate description of the events that took place in regards to how the accident occurred, the duration and the location of the accident.
40.0
154306

2014-03-05
RLA-1 Unit
Cause: On March 5,2014 at approximately 7:21am, a leak was discovered on a flare line at the RLA-1 unit. At the initial notification, a potential reportable quantity excedance for propylene, VOC, isoprene, and methyl chloride was reported. Further refinement of the emissions indicates a current local release of 36 pounds per 24 hours of VOC only. Since event discovery, no reportable quantities have been exceeded. Daily fence line monitoring is being conducted and all readings have been below detectable limits thus far. ExxonMobil is working to safely isolate this release. Any change in release status will be communicated to all agencies.

Followup: No

Notes: As of the 3/12/2014 letter, the release was ongoing.
36.0 pounds