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|LDEQ Accident Number
|Point Source(s)||Notes||Amount of Release|
|tank T-04-32||Cause: Due to heavy rains falling onto tank T-04-32 (sour water tank, EQT 099), the tank's external floating roof became imbalanced and began to tilt. This allowed hydrocarbon material to seep onto the rooftop.|
Notes: A vapor suppressing foam blanket was applied to reduce the evaporation of hydrocarbons.
|Oily Wastewater Sewer Line||Cause: Refinery letter states a leak occurred in the underground oily wastewater sewer line in the crude unit.|
Notes: Further remedial action was conducted in the area to properly dispose of all contaminated soil and fill material. Samples will be taken to ensure a proper clean-up. Less than .0001 lbs of CYANIDE were also released.
|Flares 1,2,3,4&5; FCCU; GDU; Boiler B-401C, B-401D, & 401-E|
Flares 1,2,3,4&5; FCCU; GDU; Boilers B-401C & B-401D
Flares 1,2,3,4&5; 30, 1600, & 3700 TOX; FCCU; GDU; Boilers B-401C, B-401D, & 401-E
Flares 1,2,4&5; 30, 1600, & 3700 TOX; Coker No. 2 Steam Vent
Flares 1,2,3,4&5; Coker No. 2 Steam Vent; Boilers B-401C, B-401D, & 401-E
Flares 1,2,3,4&5; Coker no. 2 Steam Vent
Flares 1,2,4&5; Coker no. 2 Steam Vent
Coker No. 2 Steam Vent
6d 14hr 24m
|Cause: On August 9, 2013, at approximately 22:51 hrs, Valero experienced an interruption in power supply caused by a surge arrestor electrical fault. The interruption caused the shutdown of multiple process units and resulted in excess emissions from the boilers, Sulfur Recovery Units (SRUs), Fluid Catalytic Cracking Unit (FCCU), Gasoline Desulfurization Unit (GD), Coker Unit, and refinery flares.
During recovery process of the power loss event, shutdowns occurred to both the Hydrocracker unit (HCU) and Ultra-low sulfur diesel unit (ULSD) resulting in flaring. Both unit shutdowns were related to the shutdown of their recycle gas compressors. The HCU's recycle gas compressor malfunctioned due to a low steam pressure which was directed related to the power loss event. The ULSD shutdown due to a malfunction of the recycle gas compressor's primary lube oil pump, and a delayed response for the startup of the secondary lube oil pump. We are unable to determine if the shutdown of the ULSD was directed related to the power loss event. However, the emission contributed to the HCU and ULSD shutdowns are considered as part of the same power loss event and are included herein.|
Notes: The power loss caused the Crude Unit and Vacuum Unit to shut down immediately, thus preventing the manufacture of intermediates that feed subsequent process units. Downstream units were placed in circulation mode through manually closing valves, lowering reactor temperature and restarting tripped equipment such as compressors and pumps. Steam production was also increased as available to allow units to continue in circulation mode until power was restored. The HCU and ULSD units were re-started to reduce excess emissions. In addition, the flare gas recovery unit remain in operation during the entire incident to reduce the amount of flared gas. To prevent recurrence, the following procedures will be adopted: 1) Perform thermal scans of the surge arrestors in the Prospect and Good Hope Substation yards. 2) Perform routine thermal scans of the surge arrestors in the Prospect and Good Hope Substation yards. 3) Complete the evaluation of all existing Valero owned surge arrestors in the Prospect and Good Hope Substation yards to determine if they are of the same age and model of the T3 arrestors that have shown signs of degradation. To data, the surge arrestors on T4 transformers have been identified as being of the same vintage and design as the failed arrestors and will be the first targeted for replacement as will all arrestors of this design. 4) Evaluate one of the non-failed surge arrestors removed from service to determine if any degradation has started to occur. 5) Develop a plan to routinely replace all surge arrestors in 230KV service at 10 year intervals. 6) Review this incident and emergency procedures with affect personnel. 7) Evaluate raising the autostart pressure setting on the auxiliary lube oil pump. 8) Evaluate increasing the trip time delay on the low-low lube oil shutdown. 9) Consider installing a valve on the make-up hydrogen at the ULSD unit battery limits to prevent fresh hydrogen from being introduced to the unit during a period of malfunction. 10) Add to existing Emergency Operation Procedure to account for Diamond Green Diesel, which is connected to the ULSD. 11) Contact corporate hydrocracking specialists to determine if the logic should be modified to initiate high rate depressurization upon loss of recycle gas compressor. Reportable quantities were exceeded for H2S, SO2, NOx, and VOCs.
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