|Home||Search||Emissions||Pollutants||About the Database|
|LDEQ Accident Number
|Point Source(s)||Notes||Amount of Release|
|Tank 20D-12||Cause: Floating roof on Tank 20D-12 partially collapsed into the hydrocarbon product during heavy rains, releasing product to ground via the roof drain and into air via evaporation.
No LDEQ report in this file--hazmat and two letters.|
Notes: discontinued product transfers to and from tank and began preparations to remove product from the floating roof and the tank.
|Process Unit: Catalytic Reformer Unit||Cause: line leak developed due to internal corrosion|
Notes: Motiva Pressure Equipment Integrity Group has been tasked with evaluating this line and making recommendations that will reduce the likelihood of a recurrence.
|pump 4G-559||Cause: On August 19, 2013, a fire was experienced on pump 4G-559 due to a seal failure. HTU-1's recycle compressor tripped on high K.O. drum level. A decision was made to slowdown, stabilize, and shutdown. Part of the activities to slowdown included putting the CRU unit on hydrogen circulation; therefore, operations shutdown the CRU charge pumps, 4G-501/559. Shortly after the pumps were stopped, 4G-559 failed, and a seal fire occurred.
After thorough investigation, the cause of the seal fire was determined to be the failure of a check valve on the discharge of 4G-559. When the charge pumps were stopped, the downstream hydrogen pushed the naptha in the line backwards through the discharge line. the check valve in the discharge line did not operate as designed and the naptha and hydrogen entered 4G-559 causing it to spin in reverse. This caused friction, heat, and vibration significant enough for the pump to seize. Under these conditions, a seal fire is expected.|
Notes: The units were brought down in order to stabilize the situation. The materials involved in the fire were largely combusted, as were the materials routed to the flare; they were then dispersed naturally into the air. All residual unburned materials from the pump seal fire were captured by the unit secondary containment system and recycled back into the refinery's recovered oil system. A second check valve has been installed on the discharge line to provide an additional factor of safety against the potential failure of a single check valve.
Connect With Us: