| Home | Search | Emissions | Pollutants | About the Database |
Marathon Ashland Petroleum (3165), Garyville
Releases of NOx
| LDEQ Accident Number Accident Date |
Point Source(s) | Notes | Amount of Release |
| 132261 2011-07-07 | Unit 259 South Ground Flare (EQT 286) | Cause: A heat exchanger in the Hydrocracker Unit (Unit 215) began to leak as the unit was starting up and achieving normal operating conditions. Some material was depressured to the flare so that maintenance on the exchanger could be performed.
An incident investigation is being conducted to determine why the incident occurred. Followup: No Notes: The equipment was allowed to depressure to the flare until repairs could be made. At the time of the police report, all had been secured. An incident investigation will result in recommendation items designed to prevent the recurrence of this event. | 8.0 pounds |
| 142430-142532 2012-08-28 | flare outfall 002 | Cause: There were multiple units that experienced upsets during the shutdown and startup activities surrounding Hurricane Isaac:
In preparation for Hurricane Isaac, the refinery units were at minimum rates anticipating a shutdown condition. As a result of these abnormal conditions, the refinery 150 PSIG steam header pressure was significantly low. The U205 Delayed Coker unit uses steam to purge resid and coke from the switch valve and ball valves on the coke drum structure. the low steam pressure ultimately led to the valve failing due to coke build up on the valve. On 8/28/2012 the unit was forced to go on bypass and internal circulation due to inability to switch feed to the offline drum. After the unit was on bypass the Wet Gas Compressor tripped three times. These trips resulted in releases to the flare. This resulted in a small amount of hydrocarbon material to be routed to the ground flare.
Propane Flaring: Due to atypical operating conditions and the shutdown of our third-party propane pipeline, MPC flared propane starting on August 31 at 06:52 AM intermittently until September 1 at 02:45 AM. The flaring of propane was required to balance refinery operations.
No reportable quantities were exceeded. The release calculations are provided in Attachment 4.
North Stick Flare Flame Outage: On September 1, the North Stick Flare flame was snuffed out with steam for a total of five minutes. This occurred while decreasing the amount of propane flaring mentioned above. No reportable quantities were exceeded. This event was reported verbally on September 1st and a follow-up written report was submitted on September 7, 2012 (see Attachment 5).
North Stick Flare Damage: The North Stick Flare was observed to have some abnormal flame patterns prior to Hurricane Isaac. However, during the hurricane it was noticed that one side of the flare tip had more significant flames. After the hurricane on September 11 th an inspection, via a remote helicopter, observed that a natural gas supply line to the pilots had a broken union.
This was causing natural gas to burn just below the flare tip. It is believed that the high winds experienced during the hurricane caused the union to completely break apart. A repair plan is being formulated to correct this issue.
Wastewater Discharge:
MPC discharged untreated process area stormwater via Outfall 002 to the Lake Maurepas drainage system beginning on August 30, 2012 at 07:00 hrs intermittently until September 3, 2012 at 13:00 hrs. The amount of wastewater discharged is estimated to be 300,000 bbls (which is 12,600,000 gallons). Samples were collected prior to the discharge and after the start of discharge to verify that the water being discharged was sufficient quality to ensure no harm to environment. The discharge was monitored to ensure that there was no sheen on the water discharged off-site. It should be noted that prior to discharging the untreated process area stormwater, MPC had reached the on-site WWTP storage capacity of 619,995 bbls of water. In addition, MPC placed an out of service crude oil tank (500-2) back into service prior to the hurricane specifically to be used for wastewater and slop oil storage as needed. This tank was used for excess water storage prior to any wastewater being discharged off-site. Followup: No Notes: This report is linked to two LDEQ incident numbers: 142430 and 142532. Unit 205 Coker sent to the North Ground Flare. The release was identified at approximately 06:35 hours on August 29. 2012 and lasted for approximately 1944 minutes (1d 8h 24m). The compound of concern was Propylene. Totals of 76.54 lbs and 86.15 lbs were released during the 2 24-hour periods involved. MPC considers these emissions to be covered under the temporary variance issued on August 27 of 2012. That variance authorized the temporary permit for the emissions: Sulfur Dioxide 13.3 tons; Nitrogen Oxide 0.9 tons; Carbon Monoxide 7.03 tons; Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs) 8.51 tons; Hydrogen Sulfide 0.73 tons. There was also a variance for 3,750 long tons(8,400,000lbs) of sulfur to be stored on a "sulfur pad". These variances were considered the maximum allowed during that period, therefore they are not included in LABB pollutant totals in this report. As soon as conditions allowed, the compressor was restarted. Missed Monitoring/Repair/Inspections Due to the hurricane, personnel were not available to complete several regulatory required tasks, such as weekly inspections, PMs, monitoring, and repairs. The programs and the specific missed requirements are listed below: LDAR Program 5-day first attempt at repair requirement (five components) 15-day final repair requirement (twelve components) Waste Program Weekly satellite collection area inspection (two locations) Weekly hazardous waste storage area inspection Weekly non-hazardous waste storage area inspection Weekly universal waste area inspection Weekly used oil storage area inspection Stormwater Pollution Prevention Program Weekly refinery inspection Spill Prevention Control & Countermeasures Program Weekly inspection of the Contractor Village area MACT II - NSPS Subpart UUU Weekly PM for the pH meter used for compliance demonstration Benzene Waste Operation NESHAP Carbon Canister monitoring for breakthrough (eight events) 15-day repair requirement (four sumps) There is a separate report on this database for the sinking of the "Big Tuna" response boat. Response Boat Fuel Loss: The oil spill response boat became submerged in the Mississippi River on August 29th, due to a surge in the river level which resulted in the loss of ten gallons of gasoline. The reportable quantity for oil was exceeded. This event was reported verbally on August 31 and a written follow-up report was submitted on September 7, 2012 (See Attachment 3). (Attachment 3 was deleted from this file, and added to the report for this event) | 738.0 pounds |
| 152171 2013-11-06 | North Ground Flare, Heaters on Unit 243, Unit 43, and Unit 59 North Ground Flare | Cause: According to the the 60-day report, the Triconix safety control system inadvertently tripped the Unit 247 Amine Unit Lean Amine Pumps. The pump shutdown caused lean amine to stop circulating to the Fuel Gas Treaters which caused high H2S-laden fuel gas to be sent to the Unit 243 Fuel Gas Drum. In addition, untreated fuel gas was sent to the Unit 43 Fuel Gas Mix Drum. The Fuel Fuel Gas Mix Drums were supplying fuel ga to 26 different process heaters and boilers with the refinery during the incident. As a result, each heater and boiler experienced an increase in SO2 emissions above the maximum allowable permitted lbs/hr rate. In addition, the Unit 247 Flash Drum overfilled into the vapor line to the Unit 210 Compressor Suction Drum, thus causing the compressor to temporarily shut down which resulted in venting to the North Ground Flare. Followup: Yes Notes: The refinery Air Monitoring Team was dispatched inside and outside the refinery fenceline. All SO2 and H2S readings were non-detect except for one 4ppm SO2 reading on Marathon Avenue in the refinery. No elevated ambient air monitoring readings from MPCs four ambient air monitoring stations were detected during the event. Operations re-started the Unit 247 lean amine pumps and re-established amine circulation to the Amine Treaters. This recirculation brought the H2S amounts in the fuel down to acceptable levels. The reportable quantity for sulfur dioxide was exceeded during the event. In addition, the permitted SO2 and the NSPS Subpart J/Ja SO2 limit for the emission sources was exceeded for multiple hours. The opacity limits for the above listed heaters and boilers were exceeded. Report was unable to be uploaded. Recommendations made for the Root cause were:1) Human Performance- Revise the Unit 19 Start up procedure with more detailing events on when to the internal lean circulation line while starting up Unit 25 with the appropriate line terminology, label lines accordingly, and retrain operators with the revision. 2) Equitment Difficulty- Evaluate the design of the existing steam tracing for the analyzer, and recommend proper mitigation. | 6.0 pounds |
| No LDEQ Reported 2013-07-24 | Unit 250 North Ground Flare | Cause: On July 24, 2013, the Unit 210 Crude Overhead Compressor shut down at 16:11 hours and was restarted at 16:26 hours. A second shutdown occurred at 16:48 hours and was restarted at 17:02 hours. A third shutdown occurred at 17:25 hours and was re-started at 17:56 hours. The duration of Unit 210 venting to the North Ground Flare was 60 minutes.
Approximately 613 pounds of sulfur dioxide were released (over the reportable quantity of 500 pounds). Followup: No Notes: Liquid was drained from the Unit 210 Compressor Suction Drum. The Unit 210 Crude Overhead Compressor was re-started. A very similar event occurred on March 25, 2013 with emissions from the same point source. This report retrieved from EDMS was labeled with the LDEQ number corresponding to the March 25, 2013 incident (LDEQ # 147603). The March 25th event also involved multiple shutdowns of the Unit 210 Crude Overhead Compressor, and the report labeled that event as preventable. It is interesting to note that a similar event labeled preventable occurred less than four months later. | 25.2 pounds |
| No LDEQ Reported 2013-07-21 | Crude Unit Overhead Accumulator | Cause: On July 21, 2013, an overpressure condition in the Crude Unit Overhead Accumulator due to the shutdown of the Sats Gas Unit. Followup: Yes Notes: An initial report for this incident, which included details on what happened and what pollutants were emitted in what quantities, was submitted to LDEQ on July 26, 2013. This follow-up report corrects emissions data submitted by Marathon which originally included greenhouse gas emissions in the incident calculations. | 17.8 pounds |
| 148974 2013-05-31 | North Stick Flare (EQT 162/EIQ 83-74) | Cause: On May 31, 2013, while discharging a propylene tank truck, the operator noticed that the propylene unloading drum was leaking to the North Stick Flare. There were no known offsite impacts. Followup: Yes Notes: Shutdown the unloading of the tank truck and blocked in the propylene drum to prevent any additional product into the drum. To reduce pressure, the liquid in the drum was pumped down from 50% to 20% and routed to the spheres. Both the truck and rail racks were shutdown. The bypass valve will be replaced An additional followup on 10/23/13 corrected the initial followup report's emissions data regarding greenhouse gas releases. | 0.1 pounds |
| 148876 2013-05-22 | U212 Platformer unit | Cause: On May 22, a small leak and hydrogen fire was observed on the 48" flange on the process piping going from cell 1 of the Unit 212 Charge Heater to Reactor #1. The leak was pinhole sized in width and no larger than 1" around the circumference of the flange.
The emission point involved was a flange on a process line in the U212 Platformer unit. Followup: Yes Notes: Steam was applied to the flange to extinguish the flame and the flange was hot bolted to secure the leak. Once the investigation is complete, recommendations will be implemented. An additional followup on 10/23/13 corrected the initial followup report's emissions data regarding greenhouse gas releases. | 0.1 pounds |
| 148240 2013-04-20 | Unit 259 North Ground Flare | Cause: On April 20, 2013 the Unit 210 Crude Unit experienced an upset due to a change in the incoming crude state. The flaring in U210 and U222 associated with the upset started at 7:12 AM on April 20, 2013 and was complete at 8:35 AM on April 20, 2013. The duration of Unit 210 and 222 venting to the North Ground Flare was 83 minutes. Approximately 75 pounds of sulfur dioxide were released.
The Unit 210 Crude Unit experienced an upset due to a change in the incoming crude state. The incoming crude had a greater quantity of light components as well as some water. The upset resulted in high liquid levels in vessels upstream of the crude off-gas compressors and the sals gas compressor. In order to minimize the amount of liquid sent to the compressors, which could cause a shutdown of the compressor, a portion of the liquid generated in the upset was routed to the North Ground Flare knock out drum. This action reduced the severity of the incident. Followup: Yes Notes: The crude tank line up was modified to remove the tank thought to be the cause of the water and light ends going to the Crude Unit. In addition, the crude charge rate was reduced to help manage the unit upset. The routing of liquids to the flare knock out drum was an attempt to minimize the results of the upset and prevent equipment shutdowns which would ahve resulted in a much more significant release. An additional followup on 10/23/13 corrected the initial followup report's emissions data regarding greenhouse gas releases. | 3.0 pounds |
| 147603 2013-03-25 | Unit 259 North Ground Flare | Cause: The two root causes identified were the benzene stripper lower level controller malfunctioned and the operator did not have sufficient response time.
On March 25, 2013 the Unit 210 Crude Overhead Compressor shut down at 18:03 hours and was restarted at 18:26 hours. A second shutdown occurred at 19:23 hours and was re-started at 19:41 hours. The duration of Unit 210 venting to the North Ground Flare was 40 minutes. Approximately 3,385 pounds of sulfur dioxide were released (above the reportable quantity of 500 pounds).
On March 25, 2013 at 17:45 hours, issues developed in the Unit 210 Desalter vessels. As a result of the event, liquid was carried over from the Desalters to downstream Unit 210 vessels. Eventually, liquid filled the Unit 210 Overhead Compressor Feed Knockout drum which shut down the Overhead Compressor. The ambient air monitoring stations located by the ground flares did not detect a significant increase in sulfur dioxide emissions. Followup: Yes Notes: Liquid was drained from the Unit 210 Crude Overhead Compressor Feed Knockout Drum. The Unit 210 Crude Overhead Compressor was re-started. While sulfur dioxide was the only chemical released above reportable quantity, NOx, monoxide, VOCs, PM10, PM2.5,HRVOCs, and hydrogen sulfide were released over the permit limit. An accident investigation was conducted to determine the cause(s) of the incident. The two root causes identified were 1. Equipment difficulty, design, problem not anticipated (Benzene stripper lower level controller malfunctioned); and 2. human engineering, non-fault tolerant system, errors not recoverable (operator did not have sufficient response time). The following recommendations will be implemented: 1. redesign or upgrade the benzene stripper level indicator 210L10197 to provide backup level indication for 210LC0187 due 12/20/13; 2. add soft stops to 210L1097 to limit flow from the 1st stage Desalter to the Benzene Stripper- complete; and 3. evaluate the hydraulics of the Benzene Stripper bottoms circuit and consider developing a project to eliminate constraints in the system- due 12/20/13. | 14.6 pounds |
| 146849 2013-02-21 | Unit 259 South Ground Flare and Unit 259 North Ground Flare | Cause: The Unit 214 Kerosene Hydrotreater experienced an emergency shutdown at 16:18 hours on February 21, 2013. The process unit vented to the South Ground Flare for 94 minutes. The Unit 210 Crude Overhead Compressor shutdown at 16:39 hours on February 21, 2013 was re-started at 16:58 hours on February 21, 2013. The duration of Unit 210 venting to the North Ground Flare was 19 minutes.
On February 21, 2013, at 16:18 hours, a power failure caused the Unit 214 Kerosene Hydrotreater to experience an emergency shutdown. As a result of the event, liquid was carried over from Unit 214 to the Unit 210 Crude Overhead Compressor system. The liquid filled the Unit 210 Overhead Compressor Feed Knockout drum which shut down the Overhead Compressor. The ambient air monitoring stations located by the ground flares did not detect a significant increase in sulfur dioxide emissions.
The main parts of this accident were the emergency shutdown of the 214 Kerosene Hydrotreater and flaring from the Unit 210 Crude Overhead Compressor.
The causal factor for the Unit 214 Power Failure and subsequent emergency shutdown was determined to be Equipment Difficulty/Tolerable Failure. The Causal factor for the Unit 210 flaring event was determined to be Human Performance Difficulty/Management System/SPAC Not Used/Enforcement Needs Improvement. Followup: Yes Notes: Power was restored to the Unit 214 Kerosene Hydrotreater and the unit was re-started. Liquid was drained from the Unit 210 Crude Overhead Compressor Feed Knockout Drum. The Unit 210 Crude Overhead Compressor was re-started. An incident investigation will result in recommendation items designed to prevent the recurrence of this event. In the 60 day follow up report dated 4/22/13, the following remedial actions were listed in response to the release: Unit 214 portion of the upset: 1) Maintenance corrective actions immediately following release. Electricians and instrument Techs responded to the Satellite building. Power panel 214-PP-B01 main breaker and substation 214-MCC-B01 were reset establishing power to the first power supply. 214-HVAC-B008 was repaired and brought back online. 2) Operations corrective actions after the release. Unit 214 board operator started procedures for shutting down unit. Unit 214 valves 214FC0007 (Heavy Coker Naptha Feed Valve) and 214FC0006 (Kerosene from tankage valve) were closed 15 minutes after the start of the release. Operations awaited Maintenance's confimation that the unit was ready to restart. Unit 210 portion of the upset: 1) Unit 210 operators followed the event reponse matrix to verify the compressor suction drum (210-1202) level, the compressor suction drum valve position, and whether or not the suction drum pumps were running. Operations than began working to get the level down in the suction drum in preparation for restarting the OFFGAS compressors. For the Unit 214 portion of the incident the following recommendations were made: 1) Update the Marathon Standard Practice to require a cicuit breaker cooridination study for all 480V power panel installations for future projects - due 12/31/13; and 2) Evaluate the cicuit breaker coordination for all existing 480V power panels throughout the refinery and determine necessary solutions to achieve coordination where required - due 8/30/14 3) For the Unit 210 portion of the incident the following recommendation was made: Review and Reinforce the Emergency Shutdown Procedures for Unit 214 with the Board Operators - complete. An additional followup on 10/23/13 corrected the initial followup report's emissions data regarding greenhouse gas releases. | 38.2 pounds |
| 146481 2013-02-07 | Sulfur Recovery Unit flange | Cause: On February 7, 2013, at 10:17 hours, the LDEQ Official was contacted via the Louisiana State Police. The incident was a flange fire that began at 9:51 hours on February 7, 2013, and was secured by 10:00 hours (9 minutes). The intial reports approximates that 6 pounds of total volatile organic compounds (VOCs) were released during the flange fire. A followup on October 23, 2013, revised the VOC estimate to 0.58 pounds.
The Unit was placed on internal circulation due to the Sulfur units shutting down. The outlet flange on 56-2501 Reactor outlet developed a small leak and caught on fire and burned for approximately 9 minutes. Followup: No Notes: The flange fire was extinguished with a water hose reel station and a steam hose was placed under the insulation blanket. An incident investigation was conducted to determine the causes or causes of the incident. Per the investigation, the root cause was identified as Management System - Communication of SPAC needs improvement. 1. Evaluate the U 56 Internal Circulation Procedure to determine if any modifications can be made to mitigate or minimize the unit temperature/ pressure swings experienced. This recommendation is to be completed by May 16, 2013. 2. Investigate modifying the insulation core spec (SP-80-01) to state that all flanges are to be uninsulated. This recommendation is to be completed by July 17, 2013. 3. Coordinate the effort to verify the flanges identified which operate at temperatures above 400 degrees Fahrenheit have had their insulation removed. This recommendation is to be completed by May 31, 2013. Material did go offsite as a result of this fire. A final follow up submitted on October 23, 2013 describes greenhouse gas emissions in the original follow-up as erroneous and updates the emission estimates. | 0.0 pounds |
| 157829 2014-08-01 | Wet Gas Compressor | Cause: The wet gas compressor tripped due to a motor issue, which caused the overhead of the Fractionator to pressure up. The high pressure reached a safety limit and the unit shutdown. During the time that motor was undergoing repairs, fuel gas was routed into the unit to prevent excess oxygen from getting into the unit regenerator, fractionator and overhead accumulator which resulted in flaring. The unit was then started up in accordance with a written procedures. An incident investigation was conducted and identified Equipment Difficulty-Equipment/Parts Defective-Manufacturing as the Root Cause. Investigation states that the trip was initiated by the motor differential circuit detecting a differential of currency within the motor. The motor relay was initially expected to be the issue. Followup: Yes Notes: The SIS system reacted as designed to shutdown the Fluid Catalytic Cracking Unit (FCCU) due to the high pressure in the fractionator. An incident investigation was conducted and included the following recommendations: 1) Send relay to manufacturer for analysis (Complete), 2) Review findings from the manufacturer (Complete), 3) Test the differential circuit at the next available opportunity (Deadline-10/31/16) | 580.9 pounds |
| 157090 2014-06-27 | Unit 25 FCCU wet gas compressor shutdown | Cause: The wet gas compressor (WGC) suction flow and discharge pressure dropped suddenly, causing the WGC spillback valve to open 100%. The fractionator overhead pressure increased when the WGC spillback opened up. The high fractionator pressure SIS trip point was reached (36 psi), which tripped the unit. Fuel gas was routed to the fractionator overhead accumulator, which was being vented to the flare to keep pressure on the reactor to prevent O2 from the regen from backing into the reactor. No offsite impacts were observed by the air monitoring team. The reportable quantities for Sulfur Dioxide, HRVOCs and VOCs were exceeded.
Update: cooling coil in Alkyl Unit Vent Gas Absorber (27-1107) failed. Followup: Yes Notes: The SIS system reacted as designed to shutdown the FCCU due to the opening of the compressor spillback valve. An incident investigation will result in recommendation items designed to prevent recurrence of this event. Update: The root causes were identified as 1) cooling coil in Alkyl Unit Vent Gas Absorber (27-1107) failed. Cause of failure is unknown. Root Cause #1: Cannot be determined until the Alkyl Unit Shutdown. Recommendation: Inspect the cooling coil in the Alkyl Unit Vent Gas Absorber (27-1107) and determine cause of failure. Based on the cause of failure, recommendations will be generated to prevent recurrence. [Complete by December 15, 2016] 2) Quaterly PMs on cooling coil in Alkyl Vent Gas Absorber failed to identify the coil was leaking. Root Cause #1: No Procedure. Recommendations: Create Operations procedure for performing the quarterly leak testing on the cooling coil in the alkyl Vent Gas Absorber. Include a step that requires operators to verify proper documentation of test result in PM work order closure. [Complete by November 18, 2014]. Root Cause #2 Preventive/Predictive Maintenance Needs Improvement. Indetify flouride sample locations for discovering a leak in Alkyl Vent Gas Absorber cooling coil [Complete by November 18, 2014]. | 669.9 pounds |
| 157090 2014-06-27 | Unit 25 FCCU wet gas compressor shutdown | Cause: The wet gas compressor (WGC) suction flow and discharge pressure dropped suddenly, causing the WGC spillback valve to open 100%. The fractionator overhead pressure increased when the WGC spillback opened up. The high fractionator pressure SIS trip point was reached (36 psi), which tripped the unit. Fuel gas was routed to the fractionator overhead accumulator, which was being vented to the flare to keep pressure on the reactor to prevent O2 from the regen from backing into the reactor. No offsite impacts were observed by the air monitoring team. The reportable quantities for Sulfur Dioxide, HRVOCs and VOCs were exceeded.
Update: cooling coil in Alkyl Unit Vent Gas Absorber (27-1107) failed. Followup: Yes Notes: The SIS system reacted as designed to shutdown the FCCU due to the opening of the compressor spillback valve. An incident investigation will result in recommendation items designed to prevent recurrence of this event. Update: The root causes were identified as 1) cooling coil in Alkyl Unit Vent Gas Absorber (27-1107) failed. Cause of failure is unknown. Root Cause #1: Cannot be determined until the Alkyl Unit Shutdown. Recommendation: Inspect the cooling coil in the Alkyl Unit Vent Gas Absorber (27-1107) and determine cause of failure. Based on the cause of failure, recommendations will be generated to prevent recurrence. [Complete by December 15, 2016] 2) Quaterly PMs on cooling coil in Alkyl Vent Gas Absorber failed to identify the coil was leaking. Root Cause #1: No Procedure. Recommendations: Create Operations procedure for performing the quarterly leak testing on the cooling coil in the alkyl Vent Gas Absorber. Include a step that requires operators to verify proper documentation of test result in PM work order closure. [Complete by November 18, 2014]. Root Cause #2 Preventive/Predictive Maintenance Needs Improvement. Indetify flouride sample locations for discovering a leak in Alkyl Vent Gas Absorber cooling coil [Complete by November 18, 2014]. | 669.9 pounds |
| 153584 2014-01-27 | Unit 59 North Flare (EQT#0162) | Cause: During propylene truck offloading activities, truck rack personnel began the normal Unit 65 process by opening a line to the flare to begin the transfer process. The line should be closed after the transfer to storage begins. However, the Unit 65 personnel failed to close the flare line and an amount of material went to the flare instead of to storage. Followup: No Notes: Upon discovery, the line that was open to the flare was closed and the procedure was reviewed with the operator to prevent reoccurrence. | 13.6 pounds |
Connect With Us: