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|LDEQ Accident Number
|Point Source(s)||Notes||Amount of Release|
|Includes U21, U43, U55, U212, and U243||Cause: On 10/21/11 the Propane Shipping Pump, 63-1537-01, was shutdown due to vibration problems which limited propane throughout the refinery. Operations made moves to cut charge rates and lined up the propane to the fuel gas system. Intermittently flared from Units 21, 43, 55, 212, and 243. No known off site impacts. Incident investigation is being conducted to determined the why the incident occurred.|
Notes: Opened 21P6431C, sweet fuel gas valve to flare to reduce pressure on fuel gas header and lower the level in 43-1202 (3:22am -4:09 am) bullet. Unit 63 shutdown propane shoppin pump, 63-1537-01, and U22 & U222 propane was routed to the bullet, 21HC6431 sweet fuel gas valve opened to the south flare from (8:21 am - 3:30pm). Fuel Gas Mix Drum 243-PC-0180B opened to flare due to Unit 205 sending excess propane to fuel gas header. Valve opened intermittently during this time from (11:15 am- 4:28pm) not opened above 10%. C3 propane from Domains 1 and 9 in refinery fuel gas causing high fuel gas pressure and 43PC5355 opened to flare three times (11:20am-11:30am), (11:53am-12:20pm), (12:45pm-1:05pm). Unit 55 Flare sweet refinery fuel gas from C3 propane in RFG Domain 1 and 9, 10/22/11 (11:28 am -3:55pm), 10/22/11 (7:42pm)- 10/23/11 (4:07am). An incident investigation will result in recommendation items designed to prevent the recurrence of this event. Values for carbon monoxide and nitrogen oxides do not match the sum of the daily reports. They are higher than the sum of the reportable values.
|Unit 259 North Ground Flare||Cause: The two root causes identified were the benzene stripper lower level controller malfunctioned and the operator did not have sufficient response time.
On March 25, 2013 the Unit 210 Crude Overhead Compressor shut down at 18:03 hours and was restarted at 18:26 hours. A second shutdown occurred at 19:23 hours and was re-started at 19:41 hours. The duration of Unit 210 venting to the North Ground Flare was 40 minutes. Approximately 3,385 pounds of sulfur dioxide were released (above the reportable quantity of 500 pounds).
On March 25, 2013 at 17:45 hours, issues developed in the Unit 210 Desalter vessels. As a result of the event, liquid was carried over from the Desalters to downstream Unit 210 vessels. Eventually, liquid filled the Unit 210 Overhead Compressor Feed Knockout drum which shut down the Overhead Compressor. The ambient air monitoring stations located by the ground flares did not detect a significant increase in sulfur dioxide emissions.|
Notes: Liquid was drained from the Unit 210 Crude Overhead Compressor Feed Knockout Drum. The Unit 210 Crude Overhead Compressor was re-started. While sulfur dioxide was the only chemical released above reportable quantity, NOx, monoxide, VOCs, PM10, PM2.5,HRVOCs, and hydrogen sulfide were released over the permit limit. An accident investigation was conducted to determine the cause(s) of the incident. The two root causes identified were 1. Equipment difficulty, design, problem not anticipated (Benzene stripper lower level controller malfunctioned); and 2. human engineering, non-fault tolerant system, errors not recoverable (operator did not have sufficient response time). The following recommendations will be implemented: 1. redesign or upgrade the benzene stripper level indicator 210L10197 to provide backup level indication for 210LC0187 due 12/20/13; 2. add soft stops to 210L1097 to limit flow from the 1st stage Desalter to the Benzene Stripper- complete; and 3. evaluate the hydraulics of the Benzene Stripper bottoms circuit and consider developing a project to eliminate constraints in the system- due 12/20/13.
|Sour Water Tanks in Units 33 and 233||Cause: The incident took place when fixed and personal H2S monitors were alarming in the area of the Sour Water Tank in Units 33 and 233. After some time, it was determined that the non-degassed Sour Water was allowed to bypass the surge drum due to high pressure, which routed this material directly to the Sour Water Storage Tanks. This resulted in a vapor release from the Sour Waste Tanks, A root cause analysis is being conducted to determine why the incident occurred. The refinery's fence line Ambient Air Monitors did not pick up any excess emissions at the time of the incident. The incident released approximately 620 pounds of Hydrogen Sulfide.|
Notes: Air monitoring was conducted in the area around the tank. A perimeter was established around the affected area. The flow of sour water to the Sour Water Tanks was decreased ending the vapor release from the tanks. The root cause analysis will result in recommendations designed to prevent the recurrence of this event.
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