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|LDEQ Accident Number
|Point Source(s)||Notes||Amount of Release|
|Includes U21, U43, U55, U212, and U243||Cause: On 10/21/11 the Propane Shipping Pump, 63-1537-01, was shutdown due to vibration problems which limited propane throughout the refinery. Operations made moves to cut charge rates and lined up the propane to the fuel gas system. Intermittently flared from Units 21, 43, 55, 212, and 243. No known off site impacts. Incident investigation is being conducted to determined the why the incident occurred.|
Notes: Opened 21P6431C, sweet fuel gas valve to flare to reduce pressure on fuel gas header and lower the level in 43-1202 (3:22am -4:09 am) bullet. Unit 63 shutdown propane shoppin pump, 63-1537-01, and U22 & U222 propane was routed to the bullet, 21HC6431 sweet fuel gas valve opened to the south flare from (8:21 am - 3:30pm). Fuel Gas Mix Drum 243-PC-0180B opened to flare due to Unit 205 sending excess propane to fuel gas header. Valve opened intermittently during this time from (11:15 am- 4:28pm) not opened above 10%. C3 propane from Domains 1 and 9 in refinery fuel gas causing high fuel gas pressure and 43PC5355 opened to flare three times (11:20am-11:30am), (11:53am-12:20pm), (12:45pm-1:05pm). Unit 55 Flare sweet refinery fuel gas from C3 propane in RFG Domain 1 and 9, 10/22/11 (11:28 am -3:55pm), 10/22/11 (7:42pm)- 10/23/11 (4:07am). An incident investigation will result in recommendation items designed to prevent the recurrence of this event. Values for carbon monoxide and nitrogen oxides do not match the sum of the daily reports. They are higher than the sum of the reportable values.
Unit 59 South Flare
|Cause: A tube leaked on the Unit 15 Hot Separator Overhead Fin Fans at 17:52 hours. At 18:00, the unit was undergoing emergency shutdown procedures and the U15 dump valve was opened to the flare. The incident was a Gas Oil leak in the Unit 15 Hot separator Overhead Fin Fan Exchangers.
This leak caused a vapor release of hydrocarbons and hydrogen in addition to a small amount of hydrogen sulfide.|
Notes: PDF was too large to upload. Unit 15 was depressurized to the South Flare to safely isolate the leaking Overhead Fin Fan. Once the unit pressure was sufficiently low in the unit, the Fin Fans were isolated and the leak stopped. An incident investigation will result in recommendations to prevent recurrence. The reportable quantities for hydrogen sulfide, compressed flammable gas, and compressed flammable liquid were exceeded during this event. A report on October 9, 2013, removed greenhouse gas emissions and revised the estimate of VOC emissions.
|leak from process line in U263 piperack||Cause: On June 29, a pinhole leak was discovered in the LPG feedline from U212 to U222.|
Notes: The line was purged with nitrogen and isolated for repairs. The Shift Emergency Response Team was activated and fire monitors were put on the leak to suppress any vapors. Reduced the U212 charge rate to minimize the leak. The line was isolated at battery limits in U222 and U212 to stop the leak. Once the investigation is complete, recommendations will be implemented.
|Flow indicator 15FI0214||Cause: On May 19, the impulse lines on flow indicator 15FI0214 pulled away from the root valve. Blow taps on the valve blew off and released make-up hydrogen to the atmosphere. The causal factors leading to the failure of the tubing was Equipment Difficulty/Design Specs/Problem Not Anticipated. There were issues with the metallurgy of the tubing and the elevation of the transmitter in relation to the orifice taps.|
Notes: Water from the fire monitors was sprayed on the release to help disperse the gas and prevent ignition. The board operator began depressurizing the unit through the dump valve in preparation for emergency shutdown. The line was isolated from the rest of the process unit to prevent further release of make-up hydrogen. To prevent recurrence, the following recommendations were made: 1) relocate the transmitter above the orifice taps on 15FE0214, and 2) replace stainless steel components of 15FT0214, including the impulse tubing with Hastelloy to prevent chloride-induced stress corrosion cracking. Also to tag the instrument tubing to indicate that the material is Hastelloy. Approximately 6.214 pounds of compressed flammable gas and 28 pounds of hydrogen sulfide were released.
|Sour Water Tanks in Units 33 and 233||Cause: The incident took place when fixed and personal H2S monitors were alarming in the area of the Sour Water Tank in Units 33 and 233. After some time, it was determined that the non-degassed Sour Water was allowed to bypass the surge drum due to high pressure, which routed this material directly to the Sour Water Storage Tanks. This resulted in a vapor release from the Sour Waste Tanks, A root cause analysis is being conducted to determine why the incident occurred. The refinery's fence line Ambient Air Monitors did not pick up any excess emissions at the time of the incident. The incident released approximately 620 pounds of Hydrogen Sulfide.|
Notes: Air monitoring was conducted in the area around the tank. A perimeter was established around the affected area. The flow of sour water to the Sour Water Tanks was decreased ending the vapor release from the tanks. The root cause analysis will result in recommendations designed to prevent the recurrence of this event.