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|LDEQ Accident Number
|Point Source(s)||Notes||Amount of Release|
|FLARE- No. 20 & 5||Cause: power failure caused compressor C-551 to shutdown resulting in flaring from No20 and No5 flares|
Notes: A smaller compressor was started up to reduce flaring and the feed rates to the Cokers were reduced until C-551 could be restarted; an investigation was underway to determine why the automatic transfer to the backup power supply failed
|FLARE- Alkylation Unit||Cause: a pump on the cooling tower shut down due to a structural failure on the filter of the pump. Caused alkylation unit to flare.|
Notes: the machinest on the alkylation unit made immediate repairs to the pump and operations personnel were able to restart it; this was not preventable because the failure on the filter could not have been predicted
|FLARE- No. 19||Cause: controls for the REA regenerators were switched to the control backup panel, so part of a controller could be repaired. The REA regenerators had difficulty operating and carried over liquid to the SRLA knockout drums triggering an overabundance of chemical releas|
Notes: the refinery reduced rates to reduce the production of CAG.Ammonia acid gas production was stopped to allow the maximum amount of CAG to be processed.
|No LDEQ Reported|
|FLARE- No17 & 19||Cause: the sulfur plant shut down causing refinery upset and causing flaring from No17 and No18.|
Notes: significant rate reductions were made to refinery units that send hydrogen sulfide to SRLA to reduce flaring.
|FLARE||Cause: flaring occurred when the wrong fan was shutdown on No35 cooling tower; the breakers were labeled 'A' and 'B' instead of 'East' and 'West' so one was mistakingly shut down|
Notes: pressure was reduce in No12 depropanizer by temporarily returning the West Cell to service. The flare was relit, which reduced the emissions of propylene and propane to the atmospher
|FLARE||Cause: caused by the safety valve malfunction|
Notes: this report involved 3 events over the course of 3 days; the source of the additional gas to RGCU was determined and the vapor pulldown line was opened to reduce pressure in the sphere. This allowed to safety valve to reseat; 63 pounds of nitrogen oxide was released during the incident on the 15th and 16th, and an additional 18 pounds were released on the 17th- making the total pounds released of nitrogen oxide
|No LDEQ Reported|
|FLARE- GLA-3x compressor||Cause: the MEA scrubber on No. 2 Light Ends Unit experienced an operational upset due to a high level in the MEA scrubber to overhead drum; GLA-3x compressor shut down causing the RGCU to become overloaded and a gas leakage which flared|
Notes: operations attempted to restart GLA-3x and then reduced rates to the FCCU to eliminate flaring; a new alarm was added that is more visible and will alert the controller of increased level in the interstage drum; other items identified by the ongoing investigation will be evaluated and implemented; flaring occurred from 3:20 PM to 4:40 PM on April 30th; the Wet Gas Scrubber exceeded its regulatory limit of 500 PPM of carbon monoxide from 4-6PM; the carbon monoxide concentration increased to 639 PPM fhe hour from 1-2 on May 1st
|F-501 furnace||Cause: F-501 was releasing more than the permitted amount of nitrogen dioxide per hour|
Notes: The instrumentation system being revised to track compliance for the F-501 furnace calculated that 23.6 lbs of nitrogen oxides were released in one hour, but these emissions are all reported as nitrogen dioxid
|No LDEQ Reported|
|FLARE: GLA-3x compressor||Cause: flaring occurred due to an instrument problem on the Fluid Catalytic Cracking Unit|
Notes: an alternate compressor was started up and the feedrate to the unit was reduced
|FLARE (Nos. 5, 7, 8, 9, 17, 19, 20 and 23)|
Incinerators, Sites 68 and 69
Waste Water Treatment Unit
|Cause: 30 minute power failure on Bulk Power Station #2. See Notes|
Notes: Information for both LDEQ Incident Report numbers included on same report. Electrician doing work in the area injured. Investigation underway and findings will be implemented. May put automatic bypasses around filters in case they plug. Emissionswere minimized because some units shutdown; the vent gas from TGCU was sent through the incinerators emitting sulfur dioxide instead of the more harmful hydrogen sulfide. Power failure caused the following refinery units to shut down: No. 10 PipestilSLA-10), West Coker, 200 and 400 Trains on the Sulfer Plant, the Tail Gas Clean-up Unit, No. 2 Powerformer, Heavy Cat Napatha Units, No.1 and No.2 Sour Water Strippers, and some Depronanizers. The following Chemical Plant Units also shut down: Linea
|FLARE - #17 and #19 Flares||Cause: -compressors had to be shut down for repair - compressor trip.|
Notes: This incident was not preventable because the compressor trip that caused the flaring incident was unexpected. If the findings of this investigation indicate that the cause of the trip was preventable, a modified report will be issued. Remedial Measures - an investigation is ongoing and the appropriate follow-up actions will be completed. an assistant operator at the Refinery Gas Compression Unit (RGCU) noticed an unusual noise coming from one of the refinery gas compressors C-50. These was evaluated by compressor specialists and it was determined that the compressor had to be shut down for repair. An advanced notification was made in anticipation of the flaring event since the spare compressor was unavailable due to other mechan
|FLARE - #17 and #19 Flares||Cause: the cause of the flaring was high pressure in the refinery gas collection system due to a high volume of vent gas from the other refinery units. The source of the high vent gas rate was unable to be determined.|
Notes: This incident was not preventable because the remedial actions were initiated before the flaring incident. These actions should have been sufficient to reduce vent gas rates. Two primary actions were initiated to reduce refinery vent gas rates. First, the compressor at the Hydrocracker was lined with the Refinery Gas Compression Unit Compressors to assist with processing refinery vent gas. Secondly, the crude feed rate to Pipestill #10 was decreased. Remedial Actions -an invgation is ongoing and the appropriate follow-up actions will be completed. The reportable quantity for nitrogen oxide has been exceeded.
|FLARE - #5, #9, #17, #19, #23, #24 Flares||Cause: a control system power failure at the Refinery Gas Compression Unit caused a reduction in compressor capacity due to poor compressor control. As a result of the reduced capacity, the compressors were unable to process all of the refinery gas and the excess gas was routed to the refinery flare syste|
Followup: No Information Provided
Notes: This incident was not preventable because the failure of the compressor control system was a result of a failure in both the primary and alternate power supply systems. The back-up power system should have supplied power to the compressor control systemwhen the primary failed to do so because of an electrical malfunction. Remedial Measures - an investigation is ongoing and the appropriate follow-up actions will be completed. Reportable quantities for nitrogen oxide and sulfur dioxide were exceeded.
|FLARE - #17 and #19 Flares||Cause: the level indicator on the #4 Light Ends T-103 amine scrubber tower failed to function properly. Excess gas was flared in the #17 and #19 flares.|
Notes: This incident was not preventable because failure of the level instrumentation was unexpected. Remedial Measures - an investigation is ongoing and the appropriate follow-up action will be completed. As a result of the faulty level indication, hydrocarbons were carried under to the amine regeneration unit and subsequently the refinery gas collection unit. The gas collection unit was unable to handle the increased load and therefore the excess gas was flared in the #17 and #19 flares.#34;Reportable quantities for sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, nitrogen dioxide, butenes, and propylene were exceeded
|FLARE - C-30 and C-40 compressor||Cause: at the time of this report, the cause of the flaring incident was unknown and was under investigati|
Notes: The only information provided is that the preventability of the incident had not been determined and was under investigation. Remedial Measures are listed the same way. The reportable quantities for nitrogen oxide were exceeded.
|FLARE - as a result of a leak from the ammonia gas line to the No. 100 Sulfur Plant (SRLA-100)||Cause: the pipe leaked due to new corrosion hole that had developed under the edge of a clamp that was installed in November. The existing clamp was tightened which did not stop the leak so it was replaced with a new clamp which also did not stop the leak. Since the newly installed clamp did not stop the leak, the old clamp was then reinstalled with a new gasket which still did not stop the leak. The feed spheres to the Sour Water Strippers became full which required the start up of the Sour Water Strippers to the flare syste|
Notes: The incident was not preventable because, The clamp was installed in Nov. 2005 due to a pinhole leak from condensate corrosion. At that time, the line was x-rayed and no areas of concern were discovered outside the area under the clamp. Therefore, the corrosion hole that led to the release could not have been predicted. Remedial actions- a similar line exists to the SRLA-200 unit. This line will be inspected and repaired while the SRLA 200 unit is down. The letter to LDEQ ss that the reportable quantities for ammonia, hydrogen sulfide, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, and nitrogen dioxide were exceeded. Note: there is a time discrepancy - the report states that the incident started at 2:30pm on 03/24/2006 but was discov
|FLARE - Alkylation Feed Preparation Unit||Cause: The Methyl Tertiary-Butyl Ether Unit was converted to an Alkylation Feed Preparation Unit (AFP). The AFP was beginning its initial start up. As the level in one of the towers increased, steam was added to the reboiler to begin producing overhead product. During this time, the safety valves on the tower began relieving to the flare system, which resulted in the reported flare. During the conversion of the unit the overhead pressure meter was reranged in the field, but was no reranged in the control room. Due to this oversight the operator believed he was at a significantly lower pressure and did not immediately discover that the safety valves on the tower had lifted to the flare system. The calculations automtically completed by the flare system|
Notes: The cause of the accident is listed as preventable in the company's report, but there is no explanation whatsoever as to why it was preventable - that section is blank. The only remedial measure listed is that the pressure meter range was corrected in the control room. The letter to LDEQ states that reportable quantities of nitrogen oxide and butenes were exceeded.
|Cause: c-101 Recycle Compressor on the HCLA unit shutdown due to an instrumentation tubing failure. Compressor trip activated the units emergency depressureization procedure.|
Notes: The unit was depressurized immediately in accordance to emergency procedures. Tubing on the seal oil pump was replaced and properly connected. The investigation is ongoin so an appropriate follow up will be completed. Under Investigation.
|Flare||Cause: cooling tower pump failed|
Notes: Several units were shut down to avoid a serious safety incident or property damage. The pump was repaired and returned to service
|Flare||Cause: broken air supply line was closed to control valve|
Notes: Closed valve was bypassed until repairs,it was then replace
|Flare/Safety valve release||Cause: leaking seal/safety valve release|
Notes: Several actions were taken to avoid or reduce the environmental impacts from this incident. The different gas streams were redirected in a manner appropriate to minimize emissions.
|Exchanger leak||Cause: underdeposit corrosion|
Notes: Leaking exchangers were removed from service. The metallurgy of the exchangers is being evaluated for upgrading.
|FLARE-Flare #5,7,17,19||Cause: OTHER-Electrical failure of Coker units|
Notes: Personnel initiated startup of idle compressor recovering most of coker gas. Alternate electrical coordination settings and power supply designs are being evaluated for this system.
|Flare||Cause: STORMS-startup brought on flaring after rapid shutdwon due to Hurricane Gustav|
Notes: refinery is undergoing startup operations. All efforts are being made to minimize environmental impacts. A follow up report will be submitted when startup flaring has ended.
|FLARE-Sour Water Stripper routed to flare||Cause: STORMS-Hurricane Gustav|
Notes: no information given
|FLARE- All 8 flares|
FLARE-All 8 flares
|Cause: STORMS-Hurricane Gustav|
Notes: Refinery was safely and sytematically shutdown due to the hurricane. Learning from this even will be incorporated into future hurricane preparations.
|flare||Cause: Cause of release to the air form the flare is unknown.|
Notes: Written report states no reportable quantities were exceeded.
|Pulldown line leak/FLARE-Flare 5,17,29||Cause: Leak was discovered on the pulldown line for the Product Separator Drum at the Powerformer Unit. Initial findings indicate that the leak was caused by internal corrosion of the weld in a stagnant area of the line.|
Notes: The line could not be isolated from the drum, so the decision was made to shutdown the unit in order to stop the leak. The line was completely depressured. During the process of shutting down the unit, flaring occurred from the #5, 17, and 19 flared. No reportable quantities were exceeded as a result of the flaring. Regular air monitoring was conducted during this event. The spool piece that leaked was replaced with a straight piece of pipe to eliminate the stagnant area in the line. Reportable quantities for benzene and flammable vapors was exceeded.
|safety valve release/ FLARE-Flare 17,23||Cause: process upset/under investigation|
Notes: In response to the suspected exchanger tube leak, the unit was shut down per appropriate procedures. Safety valve inlet line was cleaned and replaced.
|leak/FLARE-Flare 5,9,19,20,24||Cause: Equipment failure-Hydrocracker unit down; Pressure Swing Absorber out of service|
Notes: Safety valve released itself once the pressure stabilized. Lights end section was depressured to stop H2S leak, which caused many flares to burn. Light ends depressured. Stream was lined up to the tower to stop flarin
|Cause: They are doing a planned power outage at the Methylethylketone (MEK) Unit and sending natural gas to the #5 flare.|
Notes: There was potential to have pilot outages. They added natural gas to keep the pilots lit because the ignitors are electric.
|FLARE-Flare 5,17,19||Cause: Process Upset-recycle gas compressor shut down due to process upset./Other-high pressure in the refinery gas collection system due too a high volume of vent gas from other refinery units.|
Notes: Process upset conditions at the catalytic cracking unit were resolved and recycle gas compressor was restarted to stop flaring. When the high pressure burner line overpressured, efforts were made to reduce the amount of gas sent to HPBL and increase gas amount taken by Enterg
|FLARE-Flare 9||Cause: equipment failure|
Notes: Written report from Exxon Mobile surrounding the flaring accident stating that the source was found to be several leaking evacuator valves on the flare gas compressor system. Steam was injected into the flare drum, and RGCU gas gointo to the flare drumwas blocked out. The leaking evacuator valves were also replace
|FLARE-Flare 9||Cause: Equipment Failure( leaking RGCU evacuator valve)|
Notes: Report from Exxon Mobile surrounding the flaring incident stated that steam was injected into the flare drum, and the RGCU gas going to the flare drum was blocked out. The #9 flare was isolated from the rest of the flaring system. Report stated the leaking evacuator valve would be replace
|no information given||Cause: Compressor malfunctioned leading to flares.|
Notes: RQ not exceeded. Company reports and State Police HAZMAT report differs in pollutants.
|make-up hydrogen compressor (C-102B)||Cause: Make-up hydrogen compressor (C-102B) malfunctioned which caused a higher rate of hydrogen into C-102 compressor. This increased pressure which resulted in a safety valve release and caused flaring.|
Notes: Release exceeded SO2 RQ. The safety valve was removed from service. Pressure maintained by companion safety valve. Compressor will be repaired. Company report and State Police HAZMAT report differs on pollutants released.
|FLARE: Flare #17||Cause: Flare vent #17 released Nitrogen oxides and Nitrogen Dioxide. Though the initial report to State Police [SPOC] states that more than 1000 lbs of both gases were released, the refinery report states that no reportable quantities were exceeded.|
Notes: This release was below reportable quantity.
|Flare: Unspecified flare||Cause: The GLA-3X gas compressor shut down resulting in flaring.|
Notes: The 2x compressor was started to stop flaring.
|FLARE: #4 Unit||Cause: As the #4 unit was starting up, it had a unit swing. To relieve the pressure, flaring took place.
During the same 24 hours, the Powdered Catalyst Unit (PCLA) also underwent startup operations. Difficulties with compressor GLA-2X during startup resulted in additional flaring. As a result of this flaring, 1616 pounds of sulfur dioxide was released.
Combined, these two sources release 1,716 pounds of sulfur dioxide. However, in a follow-up letter dated March 21, 2011, ExxonMobil stated that 2,063 lbs of sulfur dioxide were released.|
Notes: This release is RQ. To end the Light Ends Flaring, pressures on the 4 West Rerun and 4 West Splitter towers were reduced. To end the PCLA flaring, compressor GLA-2X was started. To prevent recurrence, procedures will be reviewed for the Light Ends area startups following unplanned downtimes. Additionally, startup procedures for the GLA-2X compressor will be reviewed.
|FLARE: Flare #7||Cause: Excessive rainfall caused an electrical ground fault to occur with some of the compressor's control instrumentation causing the three compressors to shut down. excesses gases were released to the flares.|
Notes: Air monitoring occurred and eventually two of the three compressors were brought back on-line and flaring ceased. There is no refinery Incident report and no SPOC report attached to this file.
|Flare #17||Cause: The Alkylation Unit lost a cooling tower pump (P-451B), which resulted in the D-301 safety valve lifting and venting to flare #17 for 8 minutes.|
Notes: ExxonMobil later determined that no reportable quantities were exceeded.
|FLARE: Flare #17 and #23||Cause: The Feed Prep unit experienced an upset which resulted in flaring of SO2 from flares #17 and #23.|
Notes: No information given regarding remedial actions taken. Initial notification of a release of an estimated 500 lbs of sulfur dioxide.