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|LDEQ Accident Number
|Point Source(s)||Notes||Amount of Release|
|HCLA unit||Cause: pinhole leak in the HCLA D104 overhead line leaking to the atmosphere.|
Notes: drum operating pressures were reduced to mitigate leak; report stated that repairs have been completed on this line; the inspection history will be reviewed and more frequent inspections will be performed if appropriate; the release was not preventable because the piping inspections were performed according to API code and the inspection did not indicate problems with the overhead system integrity
|No3 Depropanizer condensor||Cause: Leak in the overhead piping system was determined to be from internal corrosion|
Notes: the No3 depropanizer was shut down and the section of pipe containing the leak will be replaced.
|FLARE||Cause: flaring occurred when the wrong fan was shutdown on No35 cooling tower; the breakers were labeled 'A' and 'B' instead of 'East' and 'West' so one was mistakingly shut down|
Notes: pressure was reduce in No12 depropanizer by temporarily returning the West Cell to service. The flare was relit, which reduced the emissions of propylene and propane to the atmospher
|tank 766||Cause: level gauge on tank 766 was not responding correctly. Chemicals began flowing out of the drain on the tank.|
Notes: foam was sprayed on the tank to reduce exposure and fire potential. The tank was slowly emptied to ensure the roof did not shift and damage the tank.
|isopentane line||Cause: block valves in the line were closed allowing pressure to build up, causing a le|
Notes: A block valve in the pipeband was opened allowing the line to return to its normal pressure; a visual cue will be placed on the valve in the pipeline to ensure thermal expansion is considered before valve is closed
|E3A- & E3B||Cause: safety valves lifted|
Notes: There were 2 incidents involved- the 1st did no exceed any reportable quantities, the 2nd incident started on 3/24/05 at 11:21pm and ended at 11:30pm the same day; furnace reboiler was shut down to reduce tower pressure and allow safety valves to reseat; the actual release lasted 9 minutes (from 11:21pm to 11:30pm); the report stated that the safety valve release on 4 LEU was preventable, but the reboiler leak on E-3A was not expected as it was a newer bundle than E-3
|# 3 Light Ends||Cause: a small hole was discovered in the overhead line of the T-103 tower (#1 Depropanizer) at the #3 Light Ends Unit. The hole is thought to have been caused by corrosion.|
Notes: This incident was not preventable because the overhead line was within the expected service life. The portion of the line that leaked will be inspected and repaired or replaced as appropriate. The Louisiana State Police reportable quantity for flammablevapor has been exceeded.
|LELA-E E-9 fin fan cooler, R-401 reactor in LELA-S||Cause: the leak on the LELA-E E-9 fin fan cooler is thought to have been caused by internal corrosion. The leak on the R-401 reactor in LELA-S is thought to have been caused by internal corrosion.|
Notes: This incident was not preventable because the fin fan cooler was within its serviceable life. Remedial Measures - the cooler components will be inspected and repaired or replaced, as appropriate. NOTE: there were two separate leaks within the same time period each occurring on the separately listed sources. ExxonMobil's report has combined the total amount of flammable vapors. The reportable quantity for flammable vapor has been exceeded
|FLARE - C-30 compressor at the Refinery Gas Compression Unit - Flare #5, 23, 17, 19.||Cause: C-30 compressor at the Refinery Gas Compression Unit automatically shutdown due to a high vibration alarm. The high vibration alarm was due to work activities from nearby maintenance personnel. As a result of the shutdown, the refinery flared for 20 minutes from #5, 23, 17 and 19 flares. During the 20 minute flaring the #17 flare experienced a 5 minute duration during which the instrumentation indicates that a flame was not present. Hydrocarbons were being emitted to the air via the unlit flare.|
Notes: There is no information as to why this incident was preventable. Remedial Measures - an investigation is ongoing and appropriate follow-up actions will be completed. NOTE: During the 20 min. flaring event, the #17 flare experienced a 5 min. duration during which instrumentation indicates that a flame was not present. According to the Light Ends Title V operating permit #2589-V3, issued April 11, 2006, flares must be continuously monitored to confirm the presence of a flame. It is constively estimated that during this 5 min. period when the pilot and flame were extinguished, hydrocarbons were being emitted to the air via the unlit flame. These circumstances resulted in the exceedence of the Louisiana State Police reportable quanti
|D-104 Hydrocracker||Cause: the clamp on the Hydrocracker D-104 overhead line was leaking. The pressure of the overhead gas was reduced and several attempts were made to reseal the clamp, including trying several different kinds of sealant. The leak would stop for a short durationand then return|
Notes: As of 7:30am on 5/22/2006 - the date of this letter - the leak was ongoing. In this letter, Exxon claims states that the reportable quantities for hydrogen sulfide and flammable vapor were exceeded only during the first 24 hours of the incident. This incident was not preventable because the clamp was considered to be a permanent repair (installed in Dec. 2005) until the scheduled unit downtime in 2008. Remedial Measures- a larger engineered clamp will be installed over the existing clamp. "
|exchanger||Cause: ExxonMobil has a flange leak on an exchanger.|
Notes: Only data available to LABB on incident is SPOC report, no other reports found on EDMS.
|F-600 furnace at No. 2 Reformer / Powerformer Feed Hydrotreater (RHLA-2) / No. 2 Powerformer||Cause: an instrument malfunction caused the F-600 furnace on the No. 2 Reformer to shut down. The shutdown of F-600 resulted in the Powerformer Feed Hydrotreater (RHLA-2) and the No. 2 Powerformer shutting down. The Powerformer is a major supplier of hydrogen to the refinery, and with the reduction in hydrogen supply, several units were forced to significantly reduce rates or shut down. The Feed Preparation Unit feeds RHLA-2 and with this unit shut down a valve was opened to send this stream from Feed Preparation to tankage. There is a second valve in this line that is normally open, but during this time it was closed. The second valve being closed led to a pressure increase in T-31 and caused the safety valve to release. The towe pressure was returne|
Notes: Remeidal Measures - An investigation is ongoing and appropriate follow-up actions will be completed. Exxon states in their report that the accident was preventable. Their explanation is that the safety valve did not restart as it should have, nor did the operator know the second valve was closed. Could this be human error in addition to Instrument failur
|MTBE Unit Exchanger E-557||Cause: MTBE Unit Exchanger was discovered to leaking into the condensate system causing vapor to flash off. The failure mechanism causing the leak in the exchanger is listed as unknown.|
Notes: Incidents 06-00380, 06-00401 occurred simultaneously on January 19th and on Jan. 20th 06-00406 occurred, overlapping with the first two. The reportable quanitites for highly reactive volitile organic compounds and flamable vapors were exceeded whenthe emissions from these three events were summed over the first 24 hour period beginning with the initiantion of the rlease from the No. 2 Powerformer Unit. With regard to the 24 hour period beginning with the release at the MTBE Unit, there were nportable quanity exceedances for this period of time. The emissions limit exceeded the reportable quanitity threshold only during the time when all three incidents were taking place simultaneously. The mortar in T-4X will be replaced with a Furan re
|Spill||Cause: Incomplete weld on #1 PHLA Line|
Notes: Once identified line was removed from service andleak was clamped to stop release. Line will be re routed in overhead pipeband.
|safety valve release||Cause: overpressure pressure in safety valve caused it to lift|
Notes: The pressure control valve outlet on the outlet of the reactor was opened to lower the reactor pressure. Safety valve was taken out of service after second incident. Unit alarms will be reset and procedures evaluated to prevent further releases.
|Cause: c-101 Recycle Compressor on the HCLA unit shutdown due to an instrumentation tubing failure. Compressor trip activated the units emergency depressureization procedure.|
Notes: The unit was depressurized immediately in accordance to emergency procedures. Tubing on the seal oil pump was replaced and properly connected. The investigation is ongoin so an appropriate follow up will be completed. Under Investigation.
|Leak||Cause: Isolated internal pipe corrosion|
Notes: Unit was shut down and piping depressurized. Corroded pipe replaced. Similar areas of piping will be radiographed to identify other risks.
|Leak-tower leak||Cause: Internal and external|
Notes: Tower shut down to stop leak. Tower repaired before returned to service
|flange leak||Cause: OTHER-Overpressure of flange line|
Notes: unit was depressurized immediately in accordance with emergency procedures.
|Release-Tank vapor release||Cause: employee inadvertently deactivated vapor recovery system|
Notes: the vapor recovery unit was restarted upon the discovery that it was deactivated.
|Flare/Safety valve release||Cause: leaking seal/safety valve release|
Notes: Several actions were taken to avoid or reduce the environmental impacts from this incident. The different gas streams were redirected in a manner appropriate to minimize emissions.
|safety valve release||Cause: safety valve release|
Notes: unit feedrate was reduced until the faulty indicator could be repaired.
|system release||Cause: Emergency Depressurization System inadvertently activated|
Notes: Emergency Depressurization System was restarted and has been bypassed until source of malfunction can be determined.
|Opelousas Natural Gas header||Cause: An atmospheric safety valve was lifted on the Opelousas Natural Gas header at the Baton Rouge Refinery. The pressure of this header is maintained via a control valve which lets down high pressure natural gas to a low pressure natural gas header. The control valve that connected the high and low pressure headers failed and remained in an open position, resulting in increased pressures in the low pressure header. As the pressure increased, the controller called for the start of a booster compressor. Neither of the two booster compressors started immediately, resulting in the lifting of the low pressure header safety valve, resulting in the release.|
Notes: The energy booster compressor was started and pressure control was swapped to a separate control valve. This release exceeded the flammable vapor RQ.
Atmospheric release/FLARE-Flare 17,19,23
|Cause: The C-101 Recycle Compressor on the HCLA unit shut down due to a fault in the transformer that supplies power to the compressor motor. The compressor trip automatically activated the units emergency depressurization procedures, which caused gases in the HCLA reactor system to be vented to the atmosphere via the condensable blow down drum. The transformer failed due to overheating. The air conditioner in the substation was found to have failed causing the temperature in the building to increase and the transformer to overheat. FLaring also occurred.|
Notes: The unit was depressurized automatically in accordance with the emergency procedures. Temporary ventilation conditioning was installed in the substation to cool the remaining electrical equipment. Total amount of flammable vapor released was 108,206 pounds. Total amount of VOC's released was 93,904 pounds
|Pressure vacuum vent release||Cause: Due to excess hydrocarbons in the tanks, the vapor recovery system became overwhelmed and the pressure exceeded the setpoint of the PV vents. Excess hydrocarbons was carryunder from an upstream acid settler drum that had a malfunctioning level instrument.|
Notes: Hydrocarbon source was blocked from tanks. The reportable quantity for flammable vapor was exceeded.
|Cause: SPOC report states far east coker drum # 501 developed a leak on the thermal well (looks cracked).|
Notes: SPOC report states a steam hose was put on leak. Batch process lasts until around 4, the leak will then be stopped and they will be able to access the crack.
|Cause: OIl was found on the piping insulation on the 1st stage suction line to the GLA-2X gas compressor at the PCLA-2. Two pinhole leaks had developed in the line due to corrosion.|
Notes: Once the extent of the leaks was evaluated, a detailed plan was developed to safely shutdown the compressor and replace the leaking portion of the line. Unit rate were cut in order to perform this work, and several Refinery units were required to adjust rates in order to accommodate the downtime. Gas was completely diverted from the compressor ending the release.
|transfer piping||Cause: Failure of line of transfer piping from gasoline tankage to loading line due to corrosion at the air-soil interface of piping.|
Notes: RQ exceeded. Isolated line with blind installation. Replaced with new piping and special program has been initiated to emphasis piping that may be subject to air-soil interface corrosion. Contaminated soil removed. The refinery letter misstates that the accident occurred on 08/21/09. The following RQs were exceeded: xylene, toulene, ethylbenzene, napthalene, benzene, n-hexane, cyclohexane, 2,2,4-trimethylpentane, VOCs, oil to soil, and flammable vapor.
|bypass stack||Cause: The Wet Gas Scrubber had a malfunction which led to failure of an expansion joining at CO Furnace, F-301. The malfunction required venting of PCLA 2 and 3 to bypass stacks and shutdown of Wet Gas Scrubber.|
Notes: This incident exceeded RQs. PCLA-3 vented to bypass stack until shutdown was completed. All of the Wet Gas Scrubber nozzles were replaced. Root cause is under investigation.
|atmospheric safety valve||Cause: An atmospheric safety valve was lifted on the Opelousas Natural Gas header at Baton Rouge Refinery. the pressure of the header is maintained through a control valve, which opens to a lower pressure header. The control valve pressure instrument to the low pressure header failed in an open position, causing the pressure in the header to reach the release pressure of the safety valve.|
Notes: Pressure instrument was replaced before returning to service. The RQ for flammable vapor was exceeded.
|Alkytation Unit||Cause: The Baton Rouge Refinery (BRRF) Alkylation Unit experience a release. This release did not exceed RQ. However a second release occurred at the Refinery's Mixed Gas Oil tanks within the same 24 hours, and the sum of these emissions exceed RQ for flammable vapor.
The Alky Unit leak is described in this report. Please see report for Louisiana State Police Incident #10-06175 for a description of the MGO tank release as well as the sum of the day's emissions.
A leak in the body of an orbit valve in Alky Unit's Stratco Train was discovered. The valve is located on the purge refrigeration gas system. Upon discovery, the purge gas system was depressured and shut down to end the release.|
Notes: Stracto Train's purge gas system was shut down. The corroded carbon steel valve has been replaced with a stainless steel valve. Release was BRQ. Exxon exceeded the reportable quantity threshold for flammable vapors when combined with a second release that occurred within 24 hours. The second release had the LDEQ number 127179. Combined 1,563 pounds for both incidents. Although this individual incident is BRQ, the sum of the two incidents are RQ.
|compressor - hydrocracker unit [HCU]|
compressor hydrocracker unit [HCU]
|Cause: Leak in compressor in the hydrocracker unit.|
Notes: Compressor was shut down. LDEQ report states that no reportable quantities were exceeded. LABB only has access to the LDEQ report.
|Intermediate Crack Naptha Unit; Mixed Gas Oil tank vent||Cause: Equipment on the intermediate Cat Naphtha unit (ICN) was taken out for maintenance and material was sent to Mixed Gas Oil (MCG) tank. The vapor recovery system could not handle the pressure and vents opened releasing RQ of flammable vapors (9,193 lb).
This event is still under investigation.|
Notes: This release is RQ. The ICN was returned to service and stopped the release. The root cause will be determined and appropriate follow up action will be implemented. LDEQ report states that they will address this report at the next scheduled inspection of the refinery.
|Powerformer tower||Cause: Atmospheric safety valve lifted on the Powerformer tower due to operational issues with gas compressor that supply material to different refining units.|
Notes: Relieving the pressure on the tower did not reseat the valve. Operators suited up and isolated the valve when it reseated stopping the release. Procedures for removing the compressors from service will be altered to prevent a similar occurrence. This release exceeded the RQ for flammable vapors.
|D902 drum||Cause: Crack in a weld on the D902 drum leaked flammable vapors.
The leak continues in incident #122931 and results in RQ exceedance. However, in this specific report, the release is still BRQ.|
Notes: Drum isolated and depressurized, and the section of the pipe was modified to prevent occurrence. Initial estimates indicate that 2400 pounds of flammable vapors were released, but a later report ensures that only 416 pounds were released. This release is BRQ. LABB only has access to the LDEQ incident report.
|Air Supply Control Valve||Cause: A leak developed in the air supply control valves that regulate natural gas flow to the Mixed Gas Oil tanks. For safety reasons, the valves are designed to fail open, so loss of instrument air resulted in excess natural gas entering the tanks. The vapor recovery system could not recover all of the gas, and some natural gas was vented to the air.|
Notes: Release exceeds RQ. The instrument air was repaired, and the natural gas control valves were returned to service. LDEQ initially noted 13 months after incident, and there is no explanation provided for the delay. LDEQ report from 3/30/11 only states that incident will be deferred until next inspection.
|Exchanger E-527||Cause: Exxon attempted to contact the State Police and the LDEQ but got busy signals. During this event exchanger, E-527, at 3 Light Ends experienced a tube leak.|
Notes: ExxonMobil is in process of repairing leak of exchanger. 310 pounds of flammable vapor was released and no RQs were exceeded.
|Fuel Gas line to KDLA unit||Cause: A pinhole leak was discovered on a 6 inch fuel gas line going to the KDLA unit.|
Notes: An engineered clamp was installed over the leak. Area monitoring was conducted and all readings were below detection limits. Follow-up letter contained initial report with the addition of emission calculations for the event.
|C-102A and C-102B||Cause: On 10/7/11 at approximately 12:50 am, the Baton Rouge Refinery discovered a release. A controller noticed that the discharge temperature for hydrogen make-up compressor C-102A was increasing, so the compressor was shut down. Operations personnel were dispatched to investigation, whereby they discovered that the compressor had developed a leak. The emergency isolation valves were activated, and the leak was subsequently isolated. The leak was later determined to be from the #2 cylinder head. Approximately 881 lbs of flammable vapor were released. An iNotification was sent at 1:27 am as a precaution. The event was downgraded at 1"37 am, and the close out notification was sent at 2:11 am. During the same 24 hour period, hydrogen make-up compressor C-102B had an ongoing make-up hydrogen leak from a cylinder packing. This event release approximately 182 lbs during the 24 hour period. Combined, the two events resulted in an exceedance of the flammable vapor reportable quantity.|
Notes: #2 Cylinder head leak. To end the release, the compressor was shut down and isolated. To prevent recurrence, the compressor will be repaired before being restarted. Weather conditions during the event: 69 degrees, 9.5 mph from the east, no precipitation.
|storage tank||Cause: A storage tank has some pinhole leaks in the top which allowed vapors to escape from the top of the tank.|
Notes: No RQs were exceeded as a result of this event.
|FLARE: C-50 Flare gas recovery compressor||Cause: On 6/29/11, Exxon Refinery experienced a compressor malfunction. Operations personnel at the #2 Light Ends Unit discovered a vapor release from the C-50 flare gas recovery compressor due to a missing jackbolt. This release lasted 10 minutes.
Additionally, RHLA-1 unit experienced a release from the channel box of exchanger E-700F. Emissions from this release are currently estimated to be 704 pounds per 24 hours. This release, however, is ongoing.|
Notes: The compressor was isolated and depressurized to end the vapor release. Removing C-50 from service resulted in reduced flare gas recovery capacity, and flaring ensued. Evacuating C-50 of vapor also resulted in flaring. The spare compressor, C-40, was started once C-50 was secured to end the event. To end the vapor release, the compressor was isolated. To end the flaring, the spare compressor was started. Additionally, development and execution of a plan to repair the 2nd release is underway. Both of these release are above reportable quantity.
|Bleeder pump P-105 and exchanger E-700F||Cause: On June 21st, 2011, at approximately 6:34 am, the Baton Rouge Refinery experienced a release.
Operations personnel at the Alky unit discovered a bleeder on pump P-105 suction line releasing caustic, propane, and isobutane. Caustic is used throughout the refinery to remove sulfur compounds from the hydrocarbon streams, and a pressure gauge located on the suction line at this bleeder. The nipple connecting the pressure gauge to the suction line had worn threads, allowing the gauge to become disconnected from the piping system. All caustic was contained on concrete and did not reach the environment. Approximately 1,923 pounds of vapor were released.
Additionally, during the same twenty four period, the RHLA-1 unit experienced a release from the channel box of the exchanger E-700F. Emissions from this release are currently estimated to be 704 pounds per 24 hours. Development of a plan to repair this release is underway.|
Notes: To end the P-105 release, the bleeder was closed and the pump suction line isolated. To prevent recurrence, the bleeder will be repaired before being returned to service. Additionally, bleeders in similar service will be evaluated for similar leak potential by x-ray inspection.
|Natural Gas Blanket System||Cause: The Natural Gas Blanket System failed. This caused the vents on the tank to over-pressure.|
Notes: BRQ. Less than one thousand pound of flammable vapor was released. No information about remedial actions was given.
|Tank 261: Pressure Valve Vent||Cause: Sulfur dioxide, flammable gas, and hydrogen sulfide at levels below reportable quantities were released due to a leak in the pressure valve vent on Tank 261.|
Notes: BRQ. Vapor recovery was performed. Refinery letter states that no reportable quantities were exceeded and this is considered a courtesy notification."
|Flare Gas Recovery System||Cause: A safety valve at the LELA-S unit lifted, but was later determined that all emissions were captured by the refinery flare gas recovery system. ExxonMobil states that were no emissions to the environment as a result of this event.|
Notes: ExxonMobil's notification states that there were no emissions to the environment as a result of this event. Correspondence reports from LDEQ and ExxonMobil display that hydrogen sulfide and flammable vapor were released from a unit, but later ExxonMobil stated that all gases were contained by the flare gas recovery system and that nothing was released into the environment.
|MOV XD 21 valve||Cause: The Coker D-1D drum overhead valve, MOV XD 21, leaked.|
|HCLA unity C-102B compressor|
valve at the HCLA unity C-102B compressor
|Cause: HCLA unit C-102B compressor developed a leak near the threads of the valve. Approximately 52 pounds of volatile organic compounds (VOCs), 221 pounds of flammable vapor, and less than 1 pound of hydrogen sulfide (H2S) were released.|
Notes: After further evaluation, ExxonMobil determined that no reportable quantities were exceeded.
|control valve R002||Cause: A flame was discovered at the top of HCLA D-115 condensable blowdown drum stack. 803 pounds of flammable vapor and 60 pounds of Hydrogen Sulfide were released.|
Notes: Steam was injected into the stack to extinguish the flame. Control valve R002 was discovered leaking. No reportable quantities were exceeded.
|R-801 reactor||Cause: Flange leak on the outlet of R-801 reactor due to thermal cycling during start-up operations of the HULA unit.|
Notes: No Information Given
|Furnace F-334||Cause: A packing leak was discovered on the bypass valve at the furnace (F-334)at the Powerformer unit.|
Notes: No reportable quantities were exceeded due to prompt incident response. States that approximately 730 lbs of flammable vapor and VOCs were released in this incident, but does not say if that is the combined amount, or if applies to both pollutants.
|Clamp of the discharge piping from MKC-02 propylene refrigeration compressor at the EPLA-W unit||Cause: Due to vibration of the piping, there was a leak on the clamp of the discharge piping from MKC-02 propylene refrigeration compressor at the EPLA-W unit.
As of 08/06/12, the event is ONGOING, and releasing approximately 6.24 pounds per day of propylene.|
Notes: Upon discovery, the clamp was pumped with sealant to reduce the leak rate. The clamp continues to be pumped with sealant to reduce the leak rate. ExxonMobil and the clamp vendor are continuing efforts to improve clamp efficiency. Periodic leak monitoring will be conducted during normal operational rounds. A 60-day follow-up letter will be submitted, summarizing the permanent repairs.
|No Information Given||Cause: |
Notes: Prompt incident response to mitigate the event duration.
Line 679 in the Gas Collection area
|Cause: There was a leak in line 679 in the Gas Collection area, due to unanticipated corrosion of the piping. Identified the corrosion was not noted in previous inspection and a clamp was used until the pipe could be replaced.|
Notes: The line was isolated to be de-pressured, and all hydrocarbon material was removed from the line. A clamp was installed on the line to prevent recurrence, and other areas of the piping have been inspected for potential corrosion. Other areas of the line have been inspected for potential corrosion. Piping areas identified to have reduced wall thickness will be replaced by the end of 2012. The RQ for Flammable vapor is 1,000 pounds, and the RQ for VOCs is 5,000 pounds.
|Coker unit #D-501-A||Cause: Flammable vapor was released after a small fire took place on coker unit #D-501-A. After the fire was extinguished a crack was discovered in the welding of the top head of the drum causing a leak. Venting release.|
Notes: The fire was extinguished. To stop the leak, the facility personnel steamed the drum for 2 hours and then filled the drum with water for 4 1/2 hours until the leak was isolated. During isolation, perimeter air monitoring was conducted and there were non-detect values. ExxonMobil Refinery originally reported a release of over a 1000 lbs of flammable vapor being released with this event; however, on April 12, 2012 they informed the LDEQ that a total of approximately 42 lbs of flammable vapor was released. During the incident, although the material was going off-site, ExxonMobil only monitored the air quality inside the facility.
|No information given||Cause: |
Notes: There is no information given regarding the cause or the remedial actions of this release. LABB does not have access to the LEDQ report or the SPOC report.
|LELA-S compressor C-351 Safety Valve||Cause: The LELA-S compressor C-351 tripped, venting flammable vapor to the atmosphere through a safety valve.|
Notes: The situation was secured, and the gas vented. ExxonMobil initially reported releasing over a 1000 lbs of flammable vapor, but they report a release of 157 lbs of flammable vapor in the written report.
|Pipe band on PCLA unit||Cause: A pinhole leak was discovered on the top of a pipe band on the PCLA unit.|
Notes: Due to prompt incident response, no RQs were exceeded. LABB does not have access to the LDEQ or SPOC reports. 158 pounds of flammable vapor, .44 pounds of benzene, and .05 pounds of 1,3-butadiene were released as a result of this event.
|Unspecified 3/4" line||Cause: A leak was discovered on a 3/4" line. No other information given.|
Notes: The line was isolated and the leak was secured. Initially, 10 lbs of benzene, 10 lbs of 1,3-butadiene, and 1000 lbs of flammable vapors were reported as being released, but in the written report, Exxon reports that only 209.22 pounds of flammable vapor, 0.85 pounds of benzene, and 0.14 pounds of 1,3-butadiene was released.
|West Coker T-101||Cause: The West Coker T-101 safety valve lifted when the gas balance line valves went into the fail close position due to the failure of the Programmable Logic Controller (PLC). A fault signal was received by the PLC card causing it to fail.|
Notes: The PLC card was reset.
|Flow meter lead line||Cause: Operator discovered a pinhole leak on a flow meter lead line, which was releasing propane.|
Notes: The line was isolated and depressured. In the initial report, it was estimated that more than 1000 pounds of propane were released. However, after further evaluation, ExxonMobil determined that no reportable quantities were exceeded.
|PHLA unit T-2 tower||Cause: Normal operating overhead pressure was exceeded on the PHLA unit T-2 tower due to a pressure controller valve malfunction.|
Notes: The bypass valve was opened to reduce tower pressure, the safety valve was reset, and the unit was returned to normal operating conditions. The pressure controller instrument was replaced immediately following the event. Only the reportable quantity for flammable vapor was exceeded.
|HCLA Unit||Cause: On December 5, the Recycle Feed pump at the HCLA unit experienced an unplanned shut down, causing material to be released to the site's flare gas system and atmospheric safety valves to lift. The unplanned shutdown occurred while swapping the in-service pump with a spare pump for a preventable maintenance inspection. The Recycle Feed pump was immediately isolated and unit feed rate was safely and quickly decreased to minimize flaring and emissions to the atmosphere. This incident is under investigation to determine the exact root cause and to provide mitigating steps to prevent recurrence.
The reportable quantity for flammable vapor, VOC, hydrogen sulfide, sulfur dioxide, and benzene was exceeded as a result of this event.
Follow up report submitted 1/30/2014. Investigation of the accident indicated the failure occurred due to a reverse over speed event caused by a failed pump discharge check valve.|
Notes: Immediately upon the pump shutdown, unit feed rate was safely and quickly decreased to minimize flaring and emissions to the atmosphere. Installed two new check valves on the common discharge line in this service to mitigate backward flow.
|No Information Given||Cause: |
Notes: After further review, ExxonMobil Baton Rouge Refinery determined that no reportable quantities were exceeded.
|No Information Given||Cause: |
Notes: Due to prompt incident response to mitigate the event duration, no reportable quantities were exceeded.
|Pipe||Cause: On September 10, Exxon Refinery discovered a 1/4" hold on a pipe to the HHLA gas compressor E301. The pipe is threaded so it's leaking around the fitting. The fitting is in the process of being repaired.|
Notes: Due to prompt incident response to mitigate the event duration, no reportable quantities were exceeded.
|C-600A hydrogen compressor||Cause: On May 31, 2013, the Baton Rouge Refinery PHLA unit experienced an atmospheric safety valve lift on the T-1 overhead safety valve. This event was due to an unanticipated power outage experienced at the Baton Rouge Refinery causing shutdown of the C-600A hydrogen compressor. Pressure was returned to normal operating conditions and the block valve below the safety valve was closed to reset the valve. The compressor was then returned to service. Approximately 1,496 pounds of flammable vapor were released as a result of this event.|
Notes: Pressure was returned to normal operating conditions and the block valve below the safety valve was closed to reset the valve. The C-600A compressor was immediately returned to service.
|NIG||Cause: Approximately 355 pounds of flammable vapor were released on February 28, 2013. No reportable quantities were exceeded. No information was provided regarding the point source or duration of this release.|
|Hydrocracker unit||Cause: There was a 3/4" pipe break in the Hydrocracker Unit.|
Notes: Approximately 115 pounds of flammable vapor and less than 1 pound of hydrogen sulfide was released. Original SPOC notification states that more than 1000 lbs of flammable gas and more than 100 lbs of hydrogen sulfide were released, and that material did go offsite.
|NIG||Cause: The release was caused by a control valve packing blow out.|
|NIG||Cause: At 11:24 AM ExxonMobil notified the LSP that approximately 734 pounds of flammable vapor were released. No information was given about the root cause of the event.|
Notes: LABB's file only contains the letter from the refinery dated 1/10/13, but no LDEQ or SPOC report.
|No information given||Cause: Release of flammable vapor, hydrogen sulfide and ammonia between 11/18 and 11/22. No information about accident cause given.|
|Coker Unit||Cause: On 11/1/2014 at 1:50PM the safety valve in the west coker area (D101-A) lifted to the atmosphere for approximately four minutes then isolated. This event released 2 pounds of H2S and 171 pounds of flammable vapor.|
Notes: Due to prompt incident response to mitigate the event duration, we have determined that no RQ's were exceeded.
|No information given||Cause: Oil spill reported at ExxonMobil Refinery. Report states no reportable quantities were exceeded and no information given about accident cause.|
|No information given||Cause: Release of methyl ethyl ketone, Methyl isobutyl ketone, flammable vapor and volatile organic compounds. No information about accident cause provided.|
|No information given||Cause: Release of flammable vapor, methyl ethyl ketone and Methyl isobutyl ketone at ExxonMobil on October 2. No other information given about cause of accident.|
|KDLA Unit||Cause: On Sept. 11, 2014 at 9:40 ExxonMobil had a solvent leak off a piece of pipe in the KDLA Unit. The repairs took a few hours and the leak was stopped at 13:30. Exxon reports that no RQ;s were exceeded, a that 12 lbs of flammable vapors were released. Original report from LSP HAZMAT Hotline indicates that 1,424 lbs of flammable vapor were emitted.|
Notes: No Information Given other than the leak was stopped.
|No Information Given||Cause: |
|No Information Given||Cause: An incident resulted in the release of approximately 1,562 pounds of Volatile Organic Compounds and 244 pounds of flammable vapor.|
|pipe||Cause: In the drum, a pipe leaked under the insulation, possibly expelling flammable vapor and fuel gas.|
Notes: Air monitoring was conducted at the fenceline, right at the source, and 4 feet away from the origin. All air monitoring readings were 0. The line was isolated and secured 4 hours and 35 minutes after
|Compressor in hydro cracker unit||Cause: A valve on a compressor leaked at the Hydro Cracker Unit.|
Notes: Mechanics attempted to tighten the leaking valve.
|No Information Given||Cause: Approximately 20 pounds of highly-reactive volatile organic compounds and 538 pounds of flammable vapor were released during this event.|
Notes: Prompt incident response mitigated the event duration.
|No Information Given||Cause: Approximately 528 pounds of flammable vapor was released during this event.|
Notes: Prompt incident response mitigated the event duration.
|NIG||Cause: On February 21, 2014 at the ExxonMobil Baton Rouge Refinery (BRRF), 82 pounds of flammable vapor were released.|
Notes: Prompt incident response mitigated event duration.
|HCLA Unit||Cause: On January 2, 2014 during startup operations of the HCLA unit at the Baton Rouge Refinery, a secondary hydrogen compressor was started to increase the amount of reserve quench available prior to introducing oil into the second reactor. After the secondary compressor was put into service, the unit operating pressure increased significantly and exceeded the specifications of the unit pressure control valves as a result of excess gas from the secondary compressor. The compressor was immediately shut down, decreasing the overall unit pressure.|
Notes: Immediately upon the unit pressure increase, the secondary hydrogen compressor was shutdown. To prevent recurrence, the operating procedure has been modified to include details regarding a secondary hydrogen compressor operation.