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Phillips 66 (2418), Belle Chasse

Releases of Carbon Monoxide

LDEQ Accident Number
Accident Date
Point Source(s) Notes Amount of Release
No LDEQ Reported

FCC Unit #1291
Cause: The FCC Unit #1291 system tripped off-line due to a false airflow alarm.

Followup: No information given

Notes: They claimed they restarted it and it is now safe and secure.
952.0 pounds
No LDEQ Reported

(308F-D-1) Low Pressure Flare; (308F-D-2) High Pressure Flare; (301-D-3) CO Bypass Stack; (591-D-21X) SRU Incinerator
Cause: Entergy experienced a ground fault and the backup supply failed to switch in a timely manner. Forced most process units to shutdown resulting in flaring and venting of CO. Two pressure valves relieved to the atmosphere.

Followup: No

Notes: With most of the process units down, there was isufficient feed to keep the SRU tail gas treater online. The tail gas from SRU 591 was routed directly to the SRU incinerator until other refinery process units restarted to provide sufficient feed to support stable TGT operation. There was some smoking form the flares.
38,536.0 pounds
No LDEQ Reported

301-D-3 FCC Generator Flue Gas Bypass Stack;308F-D-2 High pressure flare
Cause: FCC regenerator flu gas expander, 1291-k-1 tripped offline due to a mechanical failure causing an emergency shutdown of the FCC Unit

Followup: Yes

Notes: They claimed preventative maintenance is possible, but just the regenerator failing was unforeseeable.
20,645.0 pounds
No LDEQ Reported

301-D-3 FCC Regenerator Flue Gas Bypass Stack; 308F-D-1 Low Pressure Flare; 308F-D-2 High Pressure Flare
Cause: The FCC process control system malfunctioned causing upset operating conditions at the FCC Unit. This malfunction caused an immediate and unecpected shutdown of the entire FCC Unit.

Followup: yes

Notes: According to the report: "Although preventative maintenance procedure exist, conditions of this type cannot be anticipated. An investigation is continuing to determine the root cause of this accident."
7,169.0 pounds
No LDEQ Reported

1291-D-1 (FCC Regenerator Flue Gas Vent)
Cause: Unexpected trip of the forced draft fan of the CO-B Boiler.

Followup: No

Notes: The forced draft fan was checked for any damage and then put back on line and the CO-B Boiler was broght back on line with minimal impact to refinery operations.
22,355.0 pounds

301-D-3 FCC Regenerator Flue Gas Bypass Stack
Cause: A portion of the process control system for the Fluidized Catalytic Cracking Unit was taken offline to perform software maintenance. At the time of reactivation, the control system malfunctioned causing the High Integrity Pressure Protection System to activate and shut down the FCC Unit via computer software control. During shutdown, the FCC regernator flue gas is diverted to the bypass stack.

Followup: No

Notes: The FCC Unit was brought into safe condition and to allow evaluation of the control system before re-commissioning the unit.
21,192.0 pounds

301 D 3 CO Bypass Stack
Cause: The actuator on the 301 HV 2 malfunctioned and would not respond to commands from the distributed control system board to open to allow CO gases to be routed to the boilers.


850,074.0 pounds

Carbon Monoxide Bypass Stack
Low Pressure Flare, High Pressure Flare, SRU incinerator Stack, 191-PV-105, Heaters
Induction gas relief valve (APC-105), Low Pressure Flare, High Pressure Flare
Low Pressure Flare (308F-D-1), High Pressure Flare, 191 APC-105
Low Pressure Flare, High Pressure Flare, 191-PV-105
Cause: During a rain storm the line from Entergy's substation tripped. The loss of power forced most of the refinery's process units to shutdown resulting in flaring. While shutting down the 191 crude unit the pressure controller relieved vapors and liquid hydrocarbons from a vent at the top of the Vacuum Tower. The hydrocarbons ignited and caused a fire at the top of the Vacuum Tower. With most of the process units down there was insufficient feed to keep the SRU tail gas treater online. The tail gas was routed to the SRU incinerator. When units were started up again they required more flaring for prepare for recommissioning.

Followup: No

Notes: Determined that although there are back up systems there are no ways to prepare for these types of power outages. Electrical department will preform preventative maintenance and replacement of components. 191-PV-105 pressure controller at the crude unit no longer vents to the atmosphere. Piping was installed that routes gases from this vent directly to the flare.
996,323.0 pounds
No LDEQ Reported

Fluid Catalytic Cracker (FCC) Unit
Cause: The Fluid Catalytic Cracking Unit was shut down to repair an eroded slide valve stem at the regenerator.

Followup: No

Notes: Alkylation Unit placed on standby and low sulfur gasoline unit lost feed. All three units restarted. Emissions Below reportable quanitities.
No LDEQ Reported

Fluid Catalytic Cracker (FCC) Unit

Followup: Yes

Notes: Discovered a leak in the slurry recycle pump and had to shut the FCC down to repair it. Verbal report was made but no written report followed.
No LDEQ Reported

Fluid Catalytic Cracker (FCC) Unit

Followup: Yes

Notes: Restart of FCC unit after shutdown in incident # 106591 on 6/19/2008 due to a problem with a slide valve. Facility experimenting with "Full burn mode" during start up to try to reduce emissions. Investigation into root cause to take place.
3,909.0 pounds
No LDEQ Reported

Fluid Catalytic Cracker (FCC) Unit

Followup: no

Notes: Courtesy call and notice of potential falring during a shutdown because of a slide valve problem with the FCC. Emmissions Below Reportable Quantities.
85.0 pounds
No LDEQ Reported

(308F-D-1) Low Pressure Flare, (308F-D-2) High Pressure Flare, (301-D-3) CO Bypass Stack

Followup: Yes

Notes: FCC slide valve mechanical failure discovered while the FCC was down for maintenance. FCC restarted in full combustion mode and vented through the Carbon Monoxide boiler which was then later restarted. Investigation into how to prevent further emmissions during start up to follow.
No LDEQ Reported

Fluid Catalytic Cracker (FCC) Unit

Followup: No

Notes: (See Incident Report 106039) Incident caused by a starting up the Fluid Catalytic Cracker (FCC) after it underwent repairs for a faulty valve. Investigated on 6/28/2008
No LDEQ Reported

Fluid Catalytic Cracker (FCC) Unit, 308-D-1 Low Pressure FLARE, 308F-D-2 High Pressure FLARE, 301-D-3 CO Bypass Stack

Followup: Yes

Notes: FCC shut down to repair a crack. During repairs, a broken valve was discovered and also repaired (#106247). Emissions released during startup of FCC and below reportable quantities. Investigation into procedures to prevent flarting during shutdown/startup
23.9 pounds

no information given
Cause: Following maintenance of the air blower train, a planned and controlled start up of the Fluidized Catalytic Cracking (FCC) Unit was begun on August 7th followed by the planned and controlled start up of the Alkylation Unit and Low Sulfur Gasoline Unit. All units started up as planned. However, following the start up of the FCC Unit in full-combustion mode, some feed quality issues caused a small amount (826lbs) of carbon monoxide to be emitted.

Followup: No

Notes: No offsite impact reported.
826.0 pounds

308F-D-1 (Low Pressure Flare); 1391-FF (1391-PSV-009); 301-D-3 (CO Bypass Vent)
Cause: During the startup of the FCC Unit following a 36 day refinery maintenance turnaround outage, the unit unexpectedly transitioned to partial-burn combustion in the catalyst regenerator for less than an hour before the bypass vent was closed. Shortly after starting up the Reformer Unit during a test of newly installed burners in heater 1391-H-4, a high concentration of very light material (hydrogen and propane) caused the Depentanizer tower's overhead pressure to rise, resulting in the PSV-009 to relive for approximately 3 minutes. This reduced the pressure and the PSV re-sealed properly. While starting up the Coker Unit, light material in its feed stream from the Crude Unit also caused an unexpected increase in pressure in the suction drum of the compressor which caused the flare valve at the suction drum to open into the low pressure flare. Compressor suction drum pressure was stabilized as feed quality to the Coker Unit improved and the flare valve was closed.

Followup: No

Notes: Operations has developed for its operators responsive drills for rapidly occurring unstable conditions which will eventually help minimize impact of emissions to the environment.
15,764.0 pounds

FCCU Flue generator bypass stack (301-D-3)
Cause: LDEQ report states "the release of Carbon Monoxide and Sulfur Dioxide into the atmosphere from the FCC Regenerator Flue Bypass Stack. As of 2/24/2011, the only follow up notification to LDEQ, dated 7/16/2010, still indicated that an investigation was pending to determine the root cause of the release..."

Followup: Yes

Notes: RQ: Realease of CO was exceeded the reportable quantity. Investigation is ongoing. LDEQ report states, "A written request to the facility on 2/21/2011 yielded no additional information. The facility will be referred to the Circuit Rider Review process for failure to submit an updated notification within 60 days of the 7/16/2010 follow up letter as required by LAC 33:I.3925.A.3."
7,318.0 pounds

Fluid Catalytic Cracking Unit
Cause: Loss of air blower as a result of an "unexpected electrical signal" caused the shut down of FCC Unit. Shut-down caused shedding of FCC gas streams until unit was back on-line.

Followup: No

Notes: Personnel troubleshooted trip alarms that caused FCC unit to go offline and restarted FCC.
298.0 pounds

FLARE: Low Pressure and High Pressure Flares (308F-D-1 and 308F-D-2)
Cause: The Unit 1291 Fluid Catalytic Cracking (FCC) Unit's slurry pumparound pump (1291 L-6C) deteriorated and was shutdown. This disrupted cooling of the FCC Unit's fractionator tower and this was also shutdown. Overhead gases were routed to the Low Pressure and High Pressure Flares (308F-D-1 and 308F-D-2).

Followup: No

Notes: BRQ. No Information given regarding remedial actions because gases were routed through permitted emission points. No SPOC report available. The incident date on the LDEQ report (7/30) and the Incident report (7/31) are different.
219.0 pounds

301-D-3: CO Bypass Stack
Cause: LDEQ and refinery letter state that false signals were being sent due to an electrical problem. More specifically, wires were damaged by corrosion due to moisture exposure. A small break in the conduit that contained the wires was found. HV-4 Limit Switch.

Followup: No

Notes: RQ. The broken conduit was replaced. A low point drain was installed on the electrical conduit. The system was then returned from manual to automatic.
9,458.0 pounds

FCC Regenerator Flue Gas Bypass Valve
Cause: The Fluid Catalytic Cracker (FCC) Regenerator flue gas is normally routed to the CO Boilers 301-B-2A adn B-2B and then those gases are routed to the Wet Gas Scrubber. On July 2nd power was unexpectedly interrupted to the FCC Regenerator Flue Gas Bypass Valve (301-HV-1) solenoid causing the valve to partially open for 12 minutes. HV-1 closed when power was re-established. Operations and Maintenance responded by troubleshooting the source of the intermittent power loss. On July 3rd the same phenomenon recurred, HV-1 opened partially for 6 minutes. A root cause analysis (RCA) investigation was completed and revealed that during troubleshooting of soot blower problems, contract employees opened three fuses in the Remote Instrumentation Enclosure (RIE) to isolate the fuses and disconnect the wires. This caused HV-1 to open, releasing carbon monoxide to the atmosphere. Operations saw the vent open and close twice but no one was in the RIE when operations went to investigate. Operations requested the instrument shop troubleshoot all connections for HV-1, but everything was found in order. The next day contract employees received their work permit to continue troubleshooting the soot blowers and again opened three fuses and disconnected the wires in the RIE. The vent valve was observed open by Operations and Instrument Technicians were once again called in to investigate. The instrument technicians found the fuse block was open and the wires were removed from the HV-1 fuse block. The wires were reconnected, the fuse block was closed and HV-1 went in to normal operation.

Followup: Yes

Notes: Operations and Maintenance teams began and continued to investigate the origin of the intermittent power loss. The RCA identified several corrective actions: 1) Enforce existing procedure that states a Phillips 66 Instrument Technician must be present when electricians are troubleshooting electrical related systems 2) Clearly label, color code and move the soot blower fuse terminals in order to segregate fro the HV-1 wiring.
1,598.0 pounds