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|LDEQ Accident Number
|Point Source(s)||Notes||Amount of Release|
|Cooling Towers 1 and 2||Cause: tube leak in E-12 overhead condenser, C-175D at the C-4 Recovery Un|
Notes: The backpressure controller set point was changed from 217 to 210 PSIG. The alarm settings will be changed to a lower setting to prevent Operations from running the tower at such an elevated pressure.
|B-1 Flare (EQT343), B-5 Flare (EQT345), B-7 Flare (EQT347), B-12 Flare (EQT 351), B-16 Flare (EQT352)||Cause: see notes|
Notes: Power Failure resulting from excessive moisture and dirt accumulation in switchgear breaker cubicle ; inadequaet physical clearance b/w insulators covering energized components; REMEDIAL ACTIONS: Clean and inspect all switchgear ; Eliminate practical spaces that allow air infiltration in or out of the switchgear room; modify switchgear purchase specifications to prohibit insulating material covering energized conductors to come in contact with materials from other phases; Modify QA-380-5045 tspect for insulating boots from adjacent phases to be in contact with one another; Verify other Powerhouse switchgear does not contain insulating boots that are in contact with one another; Install local temp and humidity monitors in rm, install anal
D-SRP, A-SRP, C-SRP
|Cause: power outage|
Notes: Partial power outage: Powerhouse System feeder cable 444-PH-FR13004 faulted in a Y-splice in manhole 26. bad cable resulted in loss of interconnection of Powerhouse generators and Entergy utility power. Caused collapse of electric and steam generation systems. Protective relay miscoordination is another cause. Root Cause Failure Analysis submitted 3/25/2008 indicates that startup of three Sulfur Recovery Units results in large emissions of sulfur dioxide. REMEDIAL ACTIONS: Revise Construction Inspen QA/QC procedure for PILC cable/splice installation to include additional clarification of detail; Repair 444-PH-FR13004 ; Perform a complete reevaluation of of protective relay coordination for all breakers assoc'd with Powerhouse main buses; I
|Vessel, Valve on Marpol Line||Cause: LDEQ responded to the incident at Citgo Petroleum D Dock, where the marine vessel Chembulk New Orleans appeared to have started leaking xylene after loading approximately 22,000 bbls onto the vessel. The discharge appeared to be coming from under the bottom of the vessel under a slop tank storage compartment. It was creating a light sheen and a strong odor in the area of the discharge along the dock area, so hard booms were deployed around the vessel by Citgo and ES&H. Slop tank was pumped into another compartment that appeared to slow the leak. Vessel personnel stated that the vessel was double hulled and the xylene was not coming from the vessel. Citgo personnel considered sending a diver on 11/17/11 to assess the discharge area under the vessel. Kevin Natali was notified by Citgo on 11/17/11 that 4 valves on the Marpol line (which discharges overboard) on board the vessel was found to be leaking. The leaks was secured at approximately 4 am on 11/17/11 and it was determined that a diver was not needed.|
Notes: Vessel was inspected by the US Coast Guard before it was released. Incident linked to #135315. Multi Gas Monitor Report included with readings from across the river during the accident. VOC levels fluctuated between 1 and 9 ppm. Readings also show low levels of carbon monoxide and sulfur dioxide. Citgo initially claimed the leak was not coming from the vessel. Later, leak found on board the vessel. VOC had a conversion factor of 0.4, this may mean that values were reduced to 400lbs but the closed report states 1000 lbs.
|Fired heaters and boilers|
Sulfen Vent Stack EQT297, Tail Gas II Vent Stack EQT298, B-7 Flare
B-7 Flare EQT347
Sulften Vent Stack, Tail Gas II Vent Stack
|Cause: The operator failed to manually reset the solenoid valve that controlled the level in the F-104 drum prior to restarting the JC-102 compressor. Based on the definition of control equipment inLAC 33:III.1 1 1, Citgo failed, in this incident, to diligently maintain control equipment in proper working order whenever emissions were being made.
That initial failure to reset the solenoid valve cause a string of upsets, which began with the central amine upset.|
Notes: Immediate corrective actions taken were removing excess hydrocarbon from the central amine unit, amine feed to the SRUs was reduced, and efforts were made to identify the hydrocarbon source. Citgo conducted an incident investigation, which outlines several actions to be taken. Additional letters from refinery regarding this incident: 8/18/11, 10/27/11
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