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Chalmette Refining (1376), Chalmette

Releases of Carbon Monoxide

LDEQ Accident Number
Accident Date
Point Source(s) Notes Amount of Release
78980

2005-05-11
K3304
Cause: Leak on the Hydrodesulphurization (HDS) Unit Off0gas Compressor K-3304

Followup: No

Notes: Sweet streams (lower Sulfur content) were routed to the flare to minimize sour gas flaring. Process unit output was adjusted in order to minimize the total amount of waste gas being sent to the flare. No mention of pollutant other than Nitric Oxide in official report, but attached Summary of Emissions lists multiple pollutants.
388.0 pounds
78361

2005-04-19
K-401 (waste gas compressor number 2)
Cause: Waste gas compressor number 2 (K-401) automatically shut down, automatically diverting waste gas to the flare system.

Followup: No

Notes: Low-Sulfur content streams were routed to the flare to minimize sour gas flaring. Output was adjusted to minimize total amount of waste being sent to the flare. Same language about doing an investigation to understand the underlying cause and prevent future incidents.
19.0 pounds
78341

2005-04-17
K-401 (waste gas compressor number 2)
Cause: Waste gas compressor number 2 (K-401) automatically shut down, automatically diverting waste gas to the flare system.

Followup: No

Notes: Low-Sulfur content streams were routed to the flare to minimize sour gas flaring. Output was adjusted to minimize total amount of waste being sent to the flare.
14.0 pounds
78226

2005-04-13
K-401 (waste gas compressor number 2)
Cause: Waste gas compressor number 2 (K-401) automatically shut down, automatically diverting waste gas to the flare system.

Followup: No

Notes: Low-Sulfur content streams were routed to the flare to minimize sour gas flaring. Output was adjusted to minimize total amount of waste being sent to the flare. Letter rescinds report of nitric oxide because below reportable quantity.
42.0 pounds
78042

2005-04-06
K-402 (Refinery waste gas compressor number 3)
Cause: K-402 unexpectedly shut down. Shortly after shutdown, refinery personnel identified the cause of the shutdown as a malfunction of the compressor motor ignition system.

Followup: No

Notes: The compressor motor was repaired and the compressor restarted, ending the incident.
651.0 pounds
77936

2005-03-31
K-400 (Refinery waste gas compressor number 1)
Cause: Refinery waste gas compressor number 1 (K-400) unexpectedly shut down. Refinery waste gas automatically diverted to the flare system.

Followup: No

Notes: Adjustments made to the fuel/air mixture and K-400 restarted.
14.0 pounds
77649

2005-03-16
No information given
Cause: Waste gas compressor number 2 (K-401) automatically shut down due to a high temperature.

Followup: No

Notes: Letter rescinds verbal report because incident was not reportable. No release to atmosphere.
42.0 pounds
77549

2005-03-13
C-2307 (Second Stage High-Pressure Separator) level controller; K-2303 (HCU Second Stage Recycle Compressor)
Cause: During maintenance, the Hydrocracker (HCU) Second Stage High-Pressure Separator (C-2307) level controller was inadvertently left in the manual position. Later, HCU Second Stage Recycle Compressor (K-2303) shut down due to high level in C-2307. Shutdown of K-2303 caused automatic depressurization of C-2307 to the refinery flare system.

Followup: No

Notes: Letter rescinds report of Sulfur Dioxide because below reportable quantity.
176.0 pounds
77290

2005-03-02
Waste Gas Compressor Number 4 (K-406); Copper tubing connecting C-435 (first stage suction drum) to high-level instrumentation
Cause: Waste gas compressor number 4 (K-406) shut down due to failure of piece of copper tubing connecting C-435 to high-level shutdown instrumentation. When it failed, a false high level reading was recorded, causing automatic safety shutdown system to become engaged.

Followup: No

Notes: Low-Sulfur content streams were routed to the flare to minimize sour gas flaring. Output was adjusted to minimize amount sent to the flare. C-435 was retubed, K-406 was checked and restarted.
182.0 pounds
76869

2005-02-11
No information given
Cause: Power failure caused many of the processes to shut down.

Followup: No

Notes:
93.0 pounds
76795

2005-02-07
Unintended over pressurization of the Hydrocracker Light Ends Plant (HCU LEP) Depropanizer surge drum
Cause: Due to the isolation of the sight glass of the hydrocracker light ends plant depropanizer, the automatic level indication equipment was disabled and false reading was transmitted; this condition caused an unintended over pressurization of the HCU LEP Depropanizer surge drum, which was venter to the refinery flare system (No. 2 flare)

Followup: No

Notes: Refinery personnel evaluated the process operation, identified the source of the problem and made appropriate corrections, ending the incident.
545.0 pounds
76775

2005-02-04
Electrical breaker G-457; Waste gas compressor number 2 (K-401)
Cause: Electrical breaker for G-457 malfunctioned, unexpectedly cutting power to all pumps and fin-fans within the refinery waste gas compressor area. Waste gas compressor number 2 (K-401) shut down as a result of the electrical power outage and refinery waste gas was diverted to safety flare system.

Followup: No

Notes: Low-Sulfur content streams were routed to the flare to minimize sour gas flaring. Output was adjusted to minimize total amount of waste being sent to the flare. Note: the breaker for G-457 had been identified for repair and was supposed to be replaced that week.
78.0 pounds
76382

2005-01-24
Waste gas compressor shut down and caused an over pressure situation
Cause: Waste gas compressor shut down and an over-pressure situation.

Followup: No

Notes: Rescinding notification for below reportable quantities. (There is a hand-written T76382 on incident # 76355 PDF, but LABB believes that they are unrelated).
46.0 pounds
76355

2005-01-22
K-406 (waste gas compressor number 4)
Cause: Waste gas compressor number 4 (K-406) unexpectedly shut down. Waste gas was automatically diverted to refinery safety flare system.

Followup: No

Notes: Rescinding notification for NO2. The refinery waste gas system and refinery operations were adjusted in order to minimize the amount of waste gas being sent to the flare. Sweet streams were routed to the flare in order to minimize sour gas flaring. K-406 was removed from service on 01/27/05 to complete an evaluation of the machine and perform other maintenance. Additional emissions listed in the Summary of Emissions were not mentioned in the report. This incident is related to incident # 76362.(There are two hand-written incident numbers, T76377 & T76382, on the PDF, but LABB believes they are not related to this event).
138.0 pounds
76362

2005-01-21
Hydrocracker Light Ends Plant Butane Splitter Tower & LEP Depropanizer Tower Bottoms Flow Control Valve 50FC060
Cause: (1) 0600 hrs: Hydrocracker Light Ends Plant (LEP) Butane Splitter Tower began to overpressure because LEP Depropanizer Tower Bottoms Flow Control Valve (50FC060) had failed in the open position, letting propane to exit to the Butane Splitter. (2) 1700 hrs: Butane Splitter again began to overpressure due to the presence of propane. The level indication on the level instrument was detecting a false reading.

Followup: No

Notes: Letter speaks of two incidents on same day at 0600 hrs and 1700 hrs but attached report shows three incidents: (1) 4:05 a.m. lasting 3h 42m; (2) 3:15 p.m. lasting 41m; (3) 4:30 p.m. lasting 1h 25m. Amounts of compounds are only given in totals for all 3incidents. This incident is related to incident # 76355. LDEQ states that it is also related to incident # 76395.
314.7 pounds
76224

2005-01-18
No information given
Number 2 Flare -- Pressure Safety Valve (PSV) on Fuel Drum for Number 10 Boiler
Cause: From the verbal report: False pressure indicator on tower, caused relief value to open and gases to mix.

Followup: No

Notes:
76033

2005-01-06
K-406 (waste gas compressor number 4)
Cause: K-406 unexpectedly shut down and waste gas was automatically diverted to refinery safety flare system.

Followup: No

Notes: Sweet streams (lower Sulfur content) were routed to the flare to minimize sour gas flaring. Process unit output was adjusted in order to minimize the total amount of waste gas being sent to the flare. Shortly after shutdown, personnel re-started K-406 restoring the systems ability to process available refinery waste gas streams, ending the incident.
14.0 pounds
103126

2008-02-17
Flare
Cause: conducting functionality test for acid evacuation system. On of vent valves opened to flare.

Followup: No

Notes: Letter states that emissions were BRQ.
60.0 pounds
102953

2008-02-08
No information given
Cause: pump seal failed on G8111 at the #2 Coker causing a fire

Followup: No

Notes: Letter states that emissions were BRQ.
123040

2010-04-27
flare #1
Cause: Compressor inadvertently tripped while executing Emergency Block Valve Prevention Maintenance Program procedure on it--sent material to flare.

Followup: No

Notes: Operations team secured the unit and started up the compressor, full evaluation and troubleshooting will be addressed during next shutdown. Will not perform EBV maintenance program in the meantime.
142422-142489-143217

2012-08-27
Coke Conveyor Facilities
flare
isolated areas of standing stormwater
Wastewater treatment Unit
Cause: Chalmette Refining LLC shut down operations because of the approach of Hurricane Isaac. Following established shutdown procedures and protocols, CRLLC was safely and systematically shutdown due to the approach of Hurricane Isaac. Likewise, CRLLC followed standard startup procedures and protocols and minimized excess emissions during recovery and startup efforts.

Followup: Yes

Notes: There are three LDEQ incident numbers assigned for the events at Chalmette Refining LLC surrounding Hurricane Isaac: 142422, 142489, 143217. On August 27, 2012 the CRLLC began to safely shut down unit operations due to Hurricane Isaac. The emergency shut down resulted in potential permit deviations and reportable quantity exceedances. However CRLLC believes that this event qualifies as an upset as defined in LAC 33:III.507.J. Below are the detailed quantities released from each unit during the startup/shutdown activities: Acid Gas and Hydrocarbon Flaring: During the shutdown and equipment preparation, excess process gases were vented to the flare system in order to reduce emissions to the atmosphere. The duration of flaring was approximately 21.1 hours. Below are the emissions which occurred during shutdown activities: 23.6 Tons S02 126 lbs H2S 133 lbs NO 133 lbs N02 714 lbs CO 558 lbs VOC 72 lbs PM10 On August 31, 2012, CRLLC began start-up operations and equipment preparation which required periodic hydrocarbon flaring. There were temporary visible emissions of smoke from flaring activities. Further, during startup of the SRU, there was a transient period which resulted in flaring amine acid gas prior to directing to the SRU. Below are the estimated emissions during startup of refinery operations. The duration of the amine acid gas flaring was 89 minutes and the duration of the intermittent hydrocarbon flaring during startup was 84 hours. Actual emissions were: 10.03 Tons S02 (> 500 lbs RQ) 0.03 Tons H2S (> 100 lbs RQ) 0.28 Tons NO/N02 (> 1000 lbs RQ) 1.52 Tons CO 0.69 Tons VOC (>5000 lbs RQ) 0.08 Tons PM10 <1 00 lbs Benzene (> 10 lbs RQ) There were approximately 9 hours where the H2S 162 ppm 3-hour rolling flare limitation was exceeded during shutdown and startup activities. These excess emissions are covered under startup/shutdown provisions provided in NSR CD Paragraph 58. As such, no additional action is required by agency. Flare Gas Recovery equipment was being repaired and so no FGR was used during this process. Tail Gas Incident: On August 27, 2012 the CRLLC Sulfur Recovery Unit was safely shut down and equipment was prepared. During this process Tail Gas Incident resulted from Source ID EIQ193. Predicted emission estimates were approximately 25 tons S02 for the shutdown. On September 5-6, 2012 the Sulfur Recovery Unit was started-up. There were no tail gas incidents during this process. As such, no additional action is required by agency. Sulfur Pit Venting: Emission estimates were expected to be less than 200 pounds H2S during shutdown and start-up operations. It is important to note that these exceedances occurred during the period when CRLLC was shutting down equipment and subsequently starting up and lining out operations. Actual emissions were -72 lbs. H2S and -50 lbs. S02. These excess emissions are covered under startup/shutdown provisions provided in NSR CD Paragraph 58. As such, no additional action is required by agency. H2S Concentration of 162 ppm in Fuel Gas: During shutdown on August 27, 2012 the refinery had the potential to exceed the H2S concentration of 162 ppm in the fuel gas system. FCCU NOx, S02, CO, PM, and Opacity Permitted Emission Limits: During shutdown and subsequent start-up operations, the refinery exceeded the emission concentration limit for CO for 14 hours and the differential pressure parameter for 32 hours at the FCCU. There were no Title V permit limit lb/hr exceedences during these times. SRU Permitted Emission Limits (lbs/hr & concentration): During the shutdown and subsequent start-up operations, the refinery exceeded the permitted emission limit of 95 lbs/hr for S02 for three (3) hours at the Sulfur Recovery Unit. The 250 ppm concentration limit was exceeded for approximately 48 hours. It is important to note that these exceedances occurred during the period when CRLLC was starting up and lining out operations. These excess emissions are covered under the start-up/shutdown provisions provided in NSR CD Paragraph 23 and 29. Flare Pilot Outages: During the shutdown due to the higher than normal rain and wind volumes, flare pilots experienced temporary outages. Data Availability from Continuous Emission Monitoring Systems (CEMS): The CEMS analyzers at the CRLLC may be adversely affected by nitrogen constraints. Some selected CEMS may have reduced data availability during the time period of storm landfall, recovery, and start-up activities. The specific duration of reduced data availability will be provided in the 30- day follow-up report. Missing LDAR Monitoring: CRLLC is subject to several Louisiana & Federal Regulations requiring Leak Detection and Repair (LDAR) as noted below. Hurricane Isaac and its aftermath have not allowed completion of some of the timing obligations, and will prevent us from meeting all the timing obligations of the required August monitoring. Approximately 250 components will receive delayed monitoring, but will be monitored in September. Details of the number of components subject to delay will be provided in the 30-day follow-up report. Consistent with USEPA's decision for Hurricane Gustav, CRLLC requests that the delayed monitoring and repair be exempted from enforcement under the applicable Force Majeure provisions. Approximately 255 monthly LDAR components received delayed monitoring, but were monitored in September. In addition, 7 leaks that missed the 5 day attempt and 6 leaks that missed the 15 day attempt due to Hurricane Isaac. Isolated Areas of Standing Stormwater: There were isolated pockets of stormwater in the refinery which contained some sheen material and potential hydrocarbon. All of these areas were contained within the refinery boundaries and no material migrated offsite. Areas include tank firewall areas, overflow of sumps, and low-lying areas. There is the potential to exceed more than one (1) barrel of total oil accumulative across the complex from all the isolated areas. All hydrocarbon and sheen material was removed and properly disposed/treated. Any contaminated soil has been remediated. This information is reported in accordance with the site waste management plan. Coke Conveyor Facilities: The coke conveyor facilities sustained some minor damage which resulted in loss of covers over portions of the conveyor belt system. There are also minor amounts of coke material on the ground which is being collected. Some small particulate emissions may result from recovery and re-start Operations. Covers will be repaired/replaced as soon as possible. The 30-day follow-up report will describe the specific repairs and dates of completion. The conveyor covers that were damaged during the hurricane have been repaired/replaced. This accident is linked to Bypass of Wastewater Treatment Unit (LSP incident # 12-05781; NRC Incident # 102-2486). Actual storm rainfall was 30". In consideration of personnel safety and increasing weather severity, the refinery initiated the emergency discharge bypass for Outfall 004 from wastewater treatment facilities to MS River on August 28, 2012. It is important to note that the refinery process operations were shutdown previously which mitigated wastewater hydrocarbon content. Water discharge was essentially storm water. Samples were collected to document wastewater quality. On August 29, 2012 all parameters were within current permit limits with the exception of Total Suspended Solids. Preliminary analysis indicates a potential exceedance of 4,444 lbs/day versus permitted limit of 3,180 lbs.
3,754.0 pounds