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Marathon Ashland Petroleum (3165), Garyville
Causal Factor: Power Failure
| LDEQ Accident Number Accident Date |
Point Source(s) | Notes | Amount of Release |
| 95029 2007-03-30 | South Flare | Cause: Electrical failure caused change in valve position to emergency "dump" on the Gas Oil Hydrotreating unit. Followup: Notes: Claims emission was below RQ. | Sulfur Dioxide: 5.0 pounds |
| 95029A 2007-03-30 | South Flare | Cause: Electrical failure caused change in valve position to emergency "dump" on the Gas Oil Hydrotreating unit. Followup: Notes: Claims emission was below RQ. | Sulfur Dioxide: 5.0 pounds |
| 103090 2008-02-15 | North Flare (EQT162 / EIQ 83-70) | Cause: A partial refinery-wide power failure occurred. This caused several units to shutdown and relieve to flare. A small exchanger fire also occurred. Followup: No Notes: Once maintenance personnel secured the power supply, Operations began bringing units back on line. Follow up report with same DEQ incident number lists different emission amounts. | Sulfur Dioxide: 1,738.9 pounds Hydrogen Sulfide: 4.5 pounds Highly Reactive Volatile Organic Compounds (HRVOCs): 71.3 pounds Nitrogen Oxide: 302.7 pounds Carbon Monoxide: 1,648.5 pounds Benzene: 0.1 pounds Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs): 488.1 pounds |
| 128080 2010-12-09 | FCC Unit 205 | Cause: Due to an unexpected loss of power to the control system of the Unit 25 FCCU. FCCU shut down as designed which resulted in less gas feed to the Unit 205 Coker. This decreased in feed caused the Coker Wet Gas Compressor Suction Drum to briefly exceed the maximum safe operating pressure of the drum which resulted in the Coker Wet Gas relieving tot he ground flare. There was no known offsite impacts resulting from this incident. The emissions from the FCCU shut down are permitted as part of the overall North Flare. Compressor spillback opened rapidly to compensate and a high pressure was reached on the suction drum. Pressure control valve opened to flare once pressure reached 21 psig. Followup: No Notes: The FCCU was safely shut down and all other related unit feed rates were adjusted per the FCCU shutdown plan. The Coker Unit Wet Gas Compressor control system compensated for the increased suction pressure by increasing the compressor speed. All aspects of this incident are currently under investigation. | Sulfur Dioxide: 208.4 pounds Highly Reactive Volatile Organic Compounds: 0.6 pounds Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs): 3.4 pounds Hydrogen Sulfide: 0.6 pounds Nitric Oxide: 4.0 pounds Carbon Monoxide: 3.4 pounds Particulate Matter 10: 0.3 pounds |
| 126299 2010-09-11 | FLARE - North [EQT282] & South Ground Flare [EQT160] | Cause: "Due to a power failure, the Shell off-gas compressors shutdown causing Marathon to have an over abundance of fuel gas which required flaring as a safety precaution." FLARE. Followup: Yes Notes: BRQ. Refinery letter states that no reportable quantities were exceeded; detailed emissions report included. No LDEQ report. Refinery follow-up report only; follow-up letter states that original written report was submitted to LDEQ on 9/17/2010, but this is not included in the file. | Highly Reactive Volatile Organic Compounds (HRVOCs): 43.9 pounds Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs): 336.6 pounds Nitrogen Oxide: 57.9 pounds Sulfur Dioxide: 0.2 pounds Carbon Monoxide: 316.4 pounds |
| 121186 2010-01-31 | FLARE - North & South Ground Flares; Thermal Oxidizers #1, #2, #3; GME Thermal Oxidizer #1, #2 FLARE - North & South Ground Flares; Thermal Oxidizers #1, #2, #3; GME Thermal Oxidizer #1, #217m | Cause: Brief power outage caused multiple operating units to briefly shut down including sulfur plants. FLARE. Followup: No Notes: BRQ. No reportable quantities were exceeded. Units brought back online quickly, and had to flare. | Sulfur Dioxide: 471.0 pounds Nitrogen Oxide: 21.8 pounds Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs): 7.6 pounds |
| 137197 2012-02-15 | Unit 59 South Flare | Cause: A compressor in Unit 12 (Platformer) experienced a loss of power which caused the compressor to shut down and pressure up. A pressure relief valve opened on the compressor and caused hydrogen to be routed to the South Flare. Followup: No Notes: Operations restarted the compressor and returned to normal operations. The incident investigation will result in recommendation items designed to prevent the recurrence of this event. There were no known off-site impacts. | Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs): 4.8 pounds Nitrogen Dioxide: 0.9 pounds Carbon Monoxide: 4.7 pounds Particulate Matter 10: 0.1 pounds Particulate Matter 2.5: 0.1 pounds |
| 137005 2012-02-04 | Unit 259 North Ground Flare (EQT #0282) | Cause: During the Unit 215 Startup on February 4, 2012, the Recycle Gas Scrubber foamed shortly after the lean amine circulation started causing a high level in the Recycle Gas KO Drum, shutting down the Recycle Compressor. Shortly after the Recycle Compressor was re-started, a high temperature wave went through the Train 2 Guard reactor and activated the Train 2 Guard Bed No. 3 bottom catalyst layer rate of change trip initiating a high rate de-pressure via ESD-1. There were no known off-site impacts.
On February 4, 2012, 2274 pounds of SO2 were released. On February 5, 2012, 6630 pounds of SO2 were released. Followup: No Notes: Calculations for SO2 emissions provided in attachments 1A and 1B. LABB was unable to find attachments. The compressor was re-started initially. The Emergency Shutdown (ESD) system activated as designed. An incident investigation was conducted to determine the cause or causes of the incident. Per this investigation, the root causes were identified as 1. procedures wrong- situation not covered and 2. equipment difficulty- design specs need improvement. The recommendations (actions) from the investigation were 1. determine correct Unit 232 operation while Unit 215 is shutdown to ensure that sufficient anti-foam is in the system- completed on 3/19/12; 2. add a step to the unit 215 startup procedure to ensure that Unit 232 is injecting high rates of antifoam at least one hour prior to taking amine- completed 10/1/12; and 3. adjust the ESD logic to increase the temperature at which the rate of change alarms become active - completed 9/19/12. Two incident investigations were conducted to determine the cause or causes of the incident. The first investigation focused on the cause of the electrical failure in Unit 215 which was the origin of the problems in Unit 210. Per this first investigations, the root cause was identified as Equipment difficulty- problem not anticipated. This first investigation had four recommendations (actions) which were 1) have IR windows reinstalled on the 215-1501-A charge pump motor connection box during the next available shutdown- due 8/15/14; 2) Logically "AND" a "50N2T" element to the "RUNNING" element and add it to the trip logic for all 15KV motors that are protected by SEL-710 relays -due 2/29/16; 3) Convert all 15KV connection boxes in service and warehouse stock to include rupture panels - due 8/15/14; and 4) modify standard practice SP-60-27 and SP-60-29 for all induction and synchronous motors to include the requirement for a rupture panel to be installed on the motor connection box- 8/2/12. The second investigation focused on the shutdown of the U210 off-gas compressor, source of the flaring in this incident. Per this investigation, the root causes were identified as 1) Training- understanding needs improvement, 2) Human engineering- human machine interface, 3) communication- no communication or not timely. And 4) Procedures- followed incorrectly. This second investigation had six recommendations (actions ) which were 1) review the need for quickly restarting the compressor with domain 9 operations personnel- completed 3/28/12; 2) Add to board operator training outline a section to review critical actions following the loss of multiple pieces of equipment- completed 6/29/12; 3) raise the priority of the alarm for the suction drum vent valve open to flare from high to urgent- completed 3/29/12; 4) lock the primary alarm summary display on the DCS to sort alarms by priority- completed 3/29/12; 5) review the incident and the need for clear and concise communication during upset conditions with Domain 9 operations personnel- completed 3/28/12; and 6) revise the Unit 210 Off-Gas compressor startup procedure to specify that the board operator loads the compressor and verifies good operation- completed 5/1/12. | Sulfur Dioxide: 8,904.0 pounds |
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