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|LDEQ Accident Number
|Point Source(s)||Notes||Amount of Release|
|412-A-FF, 308W-FF||Cause: Hurricane Katrina caused flooding to the electrical system rendering it useless disallowing it regulate the Propane Sphere Compressor System. Causing the pressure in the tanks to reach unstable highs. To remedy the problem the propane from one propane sphere to the other (T-550 to T-551) releasing all the propane vapor from T-550 to be released. |
Followup: Yes, follow up on hurrican plan.
Notes: To preven sphere's PSV's from relieving to atmosphere-- both spheres are manually vented to keep pressure below PSV relief setting. Initial assessment is the propane pressure control may not be functinal for 30-60 days. Propane sphere pressure control venting was greatly reduced when one of the refinery's steam generating units was re-lit.
|Asbestos: 1.0 pounds|
Oil: 48,300.0 gallons
Flammable Gas: 209.0 pounds
|308F-D-2 High pressure flare||Cause: An unusually severe thunderstorm caused an upset in the unit 491 Depropanizer Tower|
Notes: The level of NOX exceeded that of a reportable level. The 43 minutes included two seperate times of the day including 19 minutes and 24 minutes). They also claimed corrective actions will be implemented.
|Nitrogen Oxide: 20.0 pounds|
|Tankfield piping bleeder valve (412-FF)||Cause: A valve fell off of a pipe in a piperack in the tankfield. It is suspected that the valve may have been damaged by storm surge debris of Hurricane Katrina.|
Notes: The line was isolated, a vacuum trick removed prioduct from ground and containment pool placed under leak. Line will be removed and replaced.
|Hydrocarbon: 200.0 gallons|
Carbon Monoxide Bypass Stack
Induction gas relief valve (APC-105), Low Pressure Flare, High Pressure Flare
Low Pressure Flare (308F-D-1), High Pressure Flare, 191 APC-105
Low Pressure Flare, High Pressure Flare, 191-PV-105
Low Pressure Flare, High Pressure Flare, SRU incinerator Stack, 191-PV-105, Heaters
|Cause: During a rain storm the line from Entergy's substation tripped. The loss of power forced most of the refinery's process units to shutdown resulting in flaring. While shutting down the 191 crude unit the pressure controller relieved vapors and liquid hydrocarbons from a vent at the top of the Vacuum Tower. The hydrocarbons ignited and caused a fire at the top of the Vacuum Tower. With most of the process units down there was insufficient feed to keep the SRU tail gas treater online. The tail gas was routed to the SRU incinerator. When units were started up again they required more flaring for prepare for recommissioning.|
Notes: Determined that although there are back up systems there are no ways to prepare for these types of power outages. Electrical department will preform preventative maintenance and replacement of components. 191-PV-105 pressure controller at the crude unit no longer vents to the atmosphere. Piping was installed that routes gases from this vent directly to the flare.
|Carbon Monoxide: 996,323.0 pounds|
Sulfur Dioxide: 42,788.0 pounds
Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs): 49,498.0 pounds
Hydrocarbon: 17,959.0 pounds
Hydrogen Sulfide: 474.0 pounds
Nitrogen Oxide: 138.0 pounds
|179 Thermal Hydrodealkylation Unit H1 Heater||Cause: The outlet flanges located on the outside of the convection section of the 179 Thermal Hydrodealkylation Unit H1 Heater leaked toluene onto surrounding hot surfaces. The toluene ignited causing a small fire at the flanges. It is suspected that the heavy rainstorm may have caused the metal to contract creating the slight opening at the flange faces.|
Notes: Fire was extinguished using fire water. Unit was shutdown and de-pressured.
|Toluene: 449.0 pounds|
|1792-FF||Cause: Valve leak during start up of petro chemical unit THD-1792 after Hurricane Gustav. |
Followup: No Information Given
Notes: 30/70% benzene/toluene mixture leaked. Leak sprayed with water washed to the refinery's waste water treatment plant. No mention of the amount of toulene spilled. Monitoring indicated offsite impact.
|Benzene: 10.0 pounds|
|No Information Given|
|591-D-21 (Sulfur Recovery Unit Incinerator)||Cause: Startup after Hurricane Gustav|
Notes: *Same State Police number as an incident on 9/19/2008, but different NRC and LPEC numbers. Unsure if itŐs a separate incident or related. No LDEQ report.* Non-optimal shutdown performed prior to the Hurricane Gustav evacuation inorder to reduce emmisions during shutdown. There was insufficient time to perform 4-6 process to remove residual sulfur to As a result residual sulfur was released directly to the incinerator during startup.
|Sulfur Dioxide: 787.0 pounds|
|308F-D-1 Low Pressure FLARE||Cause: |
Followup: No Information Given
Notes: High pressure in the Sulfur Recovery Unit 591 resulted in part of the acid gas (Hydrogen Sulfide) feed to be routed to the Low Pressure flare. Sulfur dioxide did not exceed reportable quantities. No mention of Hydrogen sulfide emissions in report.
|Sulfur Dioxide: 206.0 pounds|
|591-D21 (SRU incinerator)||Cause: Restarted in "cold" start-up mode after Hurricane Gustav.|
Followup: No Information Given
Notes: Due to hurricane start up Tail Gas Treater Unit (TGT) and Sulfur Recovery Unit (SRU)started up at the same time, rather than with the TGT already running. This sent more gases than usual directly to the incinerator causing increased emissions. Units were stabilized.
|Sulfur Dioxide: 1,906.0 pounds|
|Wastwater Collection System (EQT 088-308 WWTP)||Cause: Flooding caused by Hurricane Gustav caused oil from sewers to overflow to ground areas. |
Notes: Oil spilled onto soil and vegetation in facility. Culverts leading to navigable waters were closed off and oil was confinded to ditch. Vaccum trucks picked up free oil in ditches and booms and spill pigs deployed to contain the oil.
|Hydrocarbon: 336.0 gallons|
|308F-D-1 Low Pressure FLARE||Cause: Dduring start up of Coker unit after Hurricane Gustav evacuation|
Followup: No Information Given
Notes: Extra material was stored in the Coker Feed Tanker to prevent solidification and pluggage of the Coker unit feed system after Hurricane Gustav. This also caused higher than usual pressure in the Coker Fractionator Overhead and the Compressor suction drum (891-V-15), which caused the flare vlave to open. Compressor turned on but flaring continued until material was released from feed and no longer affected the overhead.
|Sulfur Dioxide: 1,506.0 pounds|
|308F-D-1 Low Pressure FLARE, 308F-D-2 High Pressure FLARE||Cause: Shut down and evacuation in preparation for Hurricane Gustav and Ike. |
Notes: Flaring and venting occurred but emissons did not exceed permit quanitities. Oily water sewers overflowed due to pump failure from power outages. Oil spilled to ground, water and pavement. Estimated 80 barrels recovered in cleanup. This incident will be critiqued and lessons learned will be used to update refinery's hurricane plan.
|Crude Oil: 420.0 gallons|
|FLARE-PSV-84 relief valve on Reactor (491-V-49)||Cause: Valve failure cause by a power surge from lightening. |
Notes: Incident due to a valve failure caused by a power surge from lightning. Motor control and trim on valve fixed.
|Ethane: 39.0 pounds|
Hydrogen Sulfide: 3.0 pounds
Isobutane: 8.0 pounds
Isopentane: 5.0 pounds
Methane: 497.0 pounds
Propane: 25.0 pounds
Sulfur Dioxide: 250.0 pounds
n-Butane: 8.0 pounds
n-Pentane: 2.0 pounds
|100-T-128||Cause: Leak from pump suction line on product tank |
Notes: Oil leaked into the process sewer from flange on a pump suction line. Three inches of rain fell and caused the sewer to overflow. Oil picked up and booms put in place to contain spill.
|Oil: 3,402.0 gallons|
|308F-D-2 (High Pressure Flare)||Cause: The flame on 308F-D-2 (High-Pressure Flare) had extinguished due to wind and rain. Multiple attempts were made to relight the flame; including the use of the automatic igniter and hand held flare gun. The wind prevented these methods from working. A manual flare flame generator finally allowed for the flame to be reignited.
During the flame out, 12,082 lbs of hydrocarbon and 2 lbs of Hydrogen Sulfide were released.|
Notes: Operations immediately blocked in the steam controllers and orifices in the High Pressure Flame and added additional purchased fuel to the tip. The manual flame generator was finally used to reignite the High Pressure Flare. The additional purchased fuel gas was then blocked in and the steam controller were unblocked to provide smokeless flaring capabilities.
|Hydrocarbon: 12,082.0 pounds|
Hydrogen Sulfide: 2.0 pounds
|308-WW Collection System-Refinery Drains, Manholes, Catch Basins, and Lift Stations||Cause: On March 27, within five hours, 10 inches of rain fell on the finery resulting in several feet of standing water accumulating at certain points of the refinery. After the rain subsided, it was discovered that hydrocarbon had begun to float on the standing water at certain points. Vacuum trucks were immediately mobilized to recover the oil floating in the water and portable emergency pumps were used to remove the standing water.
Community air monitoring was conducted throughout the recovery phase and no offsite impacts were noted.|
Notes: The refinery was divided into zones for effective oil reclamation. "Projects and plans are in place to improve the pumping capabilities of the refinery's drain system to prevent standing water in the refinery for prolonged periods of time."
|Oil: 967.0 pounds|
|Flare||Cause: On 9/3/11 at 12 noon the Coker Unit was reduced to minimal operating dates due to approaching Tropical Storm Lee. This was done in an effort to extend the Coke Drum cycle time by several hours so that refinery personnel would be out of danger and not located on the tail Coke Drum structure during the highest winds of Tropical Storm Lee. The reduction in Coker feed caused the Coker compressor's surge controller kick back valve to rapidly open several times almost tripping the compressor off-line because of this surging affect. During another surge event, the compressor's kickback valve opened rapidly subsequently increasing pressure at the compressor's suction drum above its set point. When this occurred, the console board operator changed the flare valve from automatic control to manual control in an effort to prevent the flare valve from suddenly opening during future compressor surging events. When the board operator put the flare valve in manual control, the valve was already opened at 8% output and the console board operator thought he had placed the valve in manual control when the computer graphic display showed the flare valve at 0% open. When the flare valve opens, the compressor's suction steam is automatically diverted to the Low Pressure Flare (308F-D-1). The Coker compressor did not surge any further after the flare valve's control scheme was changed. The console board operator was unaware that the flare valve remained opened for hours, and when it was discovered opened, the flare valve was immediately closed and returned to automatic control status.
A root cause investigation of this flaring event revealed the from the archive history of the Distributed Control System (DCS) that at the same time that the flare valve was put in manual mode it was inadvertently opened to 8% even though the control board operator and his supervisor both reported seeing the DCS Screen display 0% on the valve when it was placed in manual. It was also discovered that ie old DCS system the flare valve had an "output" alarm anytime the valve was at or above 1% open. However during the cutover from the old to the new control system the alarm was not picked up in the migration documental. Had the alarm been in place, it would have benefited the board operator to recognize the flare valve had opened and must be closed immediately. A contributing cause in preventing the board operator from recognizing the flare valve had opened 8% was the fact the board operator, for the next hour, was in a "Major Alarm Flood" (>30 alarms per 10 min period) due to major upsets at the Alkylation Unit (part of the board operator's additional responsibilities) which was enhanced because of very low unit operational rates and ever changing weather conditions from Tropical Storm Lee.|
Notes: The compressor's suction drum flare valve was closed and its controller was removed from manual control and returned to automatic control. Corrective actions to address the investigation findings are the following: - Review all control valves to the flare for missing output alarm configurations - Establish the compressor's flare valve with a reoccurring high output alarm at its previous set point of 1% open - Alarm Rationalization team shall review and analyze the alarm flood period surrounding this event for possible alarm improvement opportunities. These tasks have been assigned and are scheduled to be completed before the end of 2011. Weather at the time of the event was rainy and cloudy. Wind direction: 197 degrees SSW Wind speed: 20 mph
|Sulfur Dioxide: 1,695.0 pounds|
|Low Pressure Flare||Cause: On September 16, 2012 the Alliance Refinery began a planned and controlled start-up of its Sour Water Stripper (SWS) Unit following its unexpected shutdown for the approaching landfall of Hurricane Isaac.
With the Refomner Unit 1391 starting up concurrently, refinery hydrogen production had also begun. Refinery hydrogen product is normally routed to various units and can be routed as well to the refinery's fuel gas system.
However, due to the transient nature of refinery start-ups, select refinery units that normally consume hydrogen had not yet begin operations requiring some hydrogen production to be routed to the fuel gas system. It was discovered that this routing to the fuel gas system inadvertently caused a Fuel Gas Pressure Relief valve (410-PSV-30) to intermittently relieve to the Low Pressure (LP) Flare (308F-D-1) as it is designed. The mostly hydrogen based material became intermixed with some of the SWS overhead vapor traffic that was routed lei the LP Flare for only a very short period of time.|
Notes: On 9/16/2012 there was an acccident from 1:30AM to 1:35PM (725 minutes) [it was discovered 9/16/2012 at 6:00AM]. Upon discovery of 410-PSV-30 relieving to the LP Flare, operational adjustments were made and the intermittent flaring stopped. No reportable quantities were exceeded. Linked to NRC report # 1024575. In the refinery letter they describe the pollutant released as mostly hydrogen, but the only quantity listed is for Sulfur Dioxide - 418 lbs (no emission calculations sheet attached).
|Sulfur Dioxide: 418.0 pounds|
|South-end of lhe Refinery Sewer System||Cause: This release of QTY>1 bbl Oil (exceeding RQ) occurred during Hurricane Isaac. The refinery flooded after the winds of hurricane Isaac pushed water over the western levees of Plaquemines Parish. Oily water from the collection system overflowed to the ground and adjacent area near the wastewater collection system inlets. A thin layer of oil was deposited on vegetation and soil in the areas where the wastewater collection system overflowed. Did affect some vegetation and some of the ground. The facility claims the oil was mostly contained within the refinery. A flyover reported a sheen noted in the Mississippi River on 08/30/12 but not on 08/31/12.|
Notes: This accident is inked to NRC Report# 1 023225. According to the written notification, the clean-up started as soon as the release was discovered. Oil Mop Inc. was activated to manage and clean up the entire site. Vacuum trucks were utilized to pick up free oil present within accumulated storm water. Oil booms were deployed to prevent further movement of free oil from affected areas. An investigation will commence following Alliance Refinery's recovery from the impact of Hurricane Isaac. Any identified corrective actions shall be implemented. The SPOC reports lists quantity of oil released as QTY>1 bbl, but no subsequent report gives the actual quantity released.
|Oil: 42.0 gallons|
|no information given||Cause: Leaking oil storage facility released oil into facility and surrounding area due to flooding in the Myrtle Grove area wetlands.|
Notes: This incident which occurred as a result of Hurricane Isaac was assessed and visited by Unified Command which consisted of the USCG, LDEQ, EPA, and NOAA. This incident was signed off by the Unified Command and is considered closed. Only SPOC and verbal report attached.
|Low Pressure Flare and High Pressure Flare||Cause: On the morning of August 27, 2012 while shutting down the entire refinery for the expected landfall of Hurricane Isaac the Flare Gas Recovery System was taken offline due to limited Refinery fuel gas needs and the Units that process recovered flare liquids were shutdown.|
Notes: Minimized flaring emissions by practicing good combustion practicies and making sure the highest flaring contributors were already taken offline prior to shutting down the FGRS. An investigation will commence following Alliance Refinery's recovery from the Impact of Hurricane Isaac.
|Sulfur Dioxide: 1,916.0 pounds|