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|LDEQ Accident Number
|Point Source(s)||Notes||Amount of Release|
|Low Pressure Flare||Cause: A contractor came into contact with the instrument air supply line for the FCC Unit's K-2A Supplemental compressor. This caused the lines to separate and for air to leak.|
Followup: No information given
Notes: It was immediately repaired and they claimed to go over similar air supplies.
|Hydrocarbon: 119.0 pounds|
Hydrogen Sulfide: 3.0 pounds
Sulfur Dioxide: 251.0 pounds
Nitrogen Oxide: 8.2 pounds
|Off site gasoline bulk tank||Cause: Operator did not block in bulk tank gasoline fill valve and gasoline spilled out of bulk tank because of this|
Notes: It was above the air quality limit of no more than one barrel of hydrocarbon spilled in the ground. It is still under investigation. In the clean up they took 15 barrels of hydrocarbon and satnding water.
|Hydrocarbon: 210.0 gallons|
|410-PSV-061||Cause: Electrical contractors were working inside the instrumentation building in the Crude Tankage area of the refinery. One of them bumped the on/off switch for the Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) which provides power to the controllers for both the Crude Oil Unit's charge pumps and the Refinery's purchased fuel gas system.
Due to a loss of signal from the control system, when their power was turned off, bumped by an electrical contractor, both the Crude Oil Charge pump valves and purchased fuel gas valves when into their fail safe mode of "closed." This caused a sudden increase in pressure on the fuel gas system, causing a release.|
Notes: Cover has been placed over the on/off switch.
|Methane/Ethane Mixture: 4,469.0 pounds|
|No Information Given||Cause: ConocoPhillips reported a spill of 2 bbls of carbon black feed stock on the ground inside the Alliance Refinery. The spill occurred as the material was being transferred from a tank to a barge and flowed out of a high end bleeder valve, which was unintentionally left open. The material was able to be scraped of the ground for disposal.|
Notes: The material was able to be scraped of the ground for disposal. Verbal report only. No report from the refinery.
|Carbon Black Feedstock: 84.0 pounds|
|FLARE: Sulfur package||Cause: Refinery stated that "the root cause of this incident was due to sour gas not being transferred from the flare to the Sulfur Package in a timely matter..." The root cause analysis provided by ConocoPhillips determined that this incident was due to careless operation by personnel.|
Notes: RQ. LDEQ report states, "this is an area of concern with emission point 308F-D-1 (Low Pressure Flare) of the facility's permit, Permit No.2779-V2.LAC 33:III.905.A: Failure to maintain air pollution control facilities."
|Sulfur Dioxide: 838.0 pounds|
|bleeder line (412-FF)||Cause: LDEQ report states, "a spill of 160 bbls of Benzene to the ground inside the perimeter of the facility. The Benzene was released from an open bleeder line as a result of operator error." Report states that benzene spilled into storm sewer system sump, but that all samples were non-detect for benzene and no permit limits were exceeded.|
Notes: RQ: The amount of liquid benzene product released exceeded reportable quantities. The facility states that it took corrective actions as soon as the release was discovered. Improved employee training, procedures and storage tank monitoring capabilities. However, the facility failed to submit a timely, updated notification within 60 days of the initial follow up letter. Because this release was preventable under LAC 33.III.501.C.4, the facility will be referred to the Circuit Rider Review process. Follow-up reports were dated 7/9/10 and 7/21/10.
|Benzene: 5,040.0 gallons|
|891-V-11A Coke Pot Valve|
FLARE: Low Pressure Flare (308-F-D-1) & 891-V-11A Coke Pot Valve
|Cause: Release notification form states that, during the Fractionator Tower Coke Pot, the unit operator improperly operated the Coke Pot's valves. This allowed hot, tar-like hydrocarbon material into the unit sewer, which caused a fire at the Coke Pots. FIRE.|
Notes: RQ. The Coker Unit was shutdown in an emergency fashion while the fire was controlled and extinguished by the refinery's in-house fire brigade. Disciplinary actions were taken towards the operator and the supervisor of the Coker Unit for not following established procedures. The Coke Pot procedure was enhanced by adding another layer of protection via the requirement to physically lock "closed" the Coke Pot valves prior to unlocking the drain valves.
|Sulfur Dioxide: 659.0 pounds|
Sulfur Dioxide: 1,242.0 pounds
Hydrocarbon: 19,866.0 gallons
|FCC Regenerator Flue Gas Bypass Valve||Cause: The Fluid Catalytic Cracker (FCC) Regenerator flue gas is normally routed to the CO Boilers 301-B-2A adn B-2B and then those gases are routed to the Wet Gas Scrubber.
On July 2nd power was unexpectedly interrupted to the FCC Regenerator Flue Gas Bypass Valve (301-HV-1) solenoid causing the valve to partially open for 12 minutes. HV-1 closed when power was re-established. Operations and Maintenance responded by troubleshooting the source of the intermittent power loss. On July 3rd the same phenomenon recurred, HV-1 opened partially for 6 minutes.
A root cause analysis (RCA) investigation was completed and revealed that during troubleshooting of soot blower problems, contract employees opened three fuses in the Remote Instrumentation Enclosure (RIE) to isolate the fuses and disconnect the wires. This caused HV-1 to open, releasing carbon monoxide to the atmosphere. Operations saw the vent open and close twice but no one was in the RIE when operations went to investigate. Operations requested the instrument shop troubleshoot all connections for HV-1, but everything was found in order. The next day contract employees received their work permit to continue troubleshooting the soot blowers and again opened three fuses and disconnected the wires in the RIE. The vent valve was observed open by Operations and Instrument Technicians were once again called in to investigate. The instrument technicians found the fuse block was open and the wires were removed from the HV-1 fuse block. The wires were reconnected, the fuse block was closed and HV-1 went in to normal operation.|
Notes: Operations and Maintenance teams began and continued to investigate the origin of the intermittent power loss. The RCA identified several corrective actions: 1) Enforce existing procedure that states a Phillips 66 Instrument Technician must be present when electricians are troubleshooting electrical related systems 2) Clearly label, color code and move the soot blower fuse terminals in order to segregate fro the HV-1 wiring.
|Carbon Monoxide: 1,598.0 pounds|