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|State Police #||14-02102|
|Pollutant||Duration||Point Source||Greenhouse Gas||Criteria Pollutant||Ozone forming chemical||Amount of Release|
|Carbon Monoxide||14m||BD5 Unit post fractionator||NO||YES||NO||72.0 pounds|
|Nitrogen Oxide||14m||BD5 Unit post fractionator||NO||YES||YES||13.0 pounds|
|Particulate Matter||14m||BD5 Unit post fractionator||NO||YES||NO||2.0 pounds|
|Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs)||14m||BD5 Unit post fractionator||NO||NO||YES||48.0 pounds|
|1,3-Butadiene||14m||BD5 Unit post fractionator||NO||NO||YES||48.0 pounds|
Accident Classified As: Reportable Quantity
On 5/9/2014, Shell Chemical's BD5 Unit flared process gas at the OL5 Ground Flare (FG-101). The pressure of the post fractionator unexpectedly increased resulting in a unit upset requiring BD5 to flare 1,3 butadiene product to safely stabilize the unit. It was determined that the pressure increase on the post was the result of a malfunctioned pressure transmitter.
The incident was not preventable as the malfunction of the pressure transmitter was unexpected.
Immediately, to minimize additional unit upset conditions and impacts, various process parameters were monitored and it was determined that the pressure increase on the post was the result of a malfunctioned pressure transmitter. The transmitter was monitored until repairs could be completed. To prevent the reoccurrence of this incident, maintenance evaluated the pressure transmitter and found that there was moisture inside the wiring terminal portion of the transmitter and the transmitter had loose wiring. The moisture was removed, wiring was tightened and it was verified that the transmitter cover was sealed to prevent reentry of moisture.