|Home||Search||Emissions||Pollutants||About the Database|
|State Police #||14-01019|
|Pollutant||Duration||Point Source||Greenhouse Gas||Criteria Pollutant||Ozone forming chemical||Amount of Release|
|Carbon Monoxide||16h 45m||Process gas compressor in OL5 Unit||NO||YES||NO||18,346.0 pounds|
|Nitrogen Oxide||16h 45m||Process gas compressor in OL5 Unit||NO||YES||YES||3,372.0 pounds|
|Particulate Matter||16h 45m||Process gas compressor in OL5 Unit||NO||YES||NO||635.0 pounds|
|Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs)||16h 45m||Process gas compressor in OL5 Unit||NO||NO||YES||8,771.0 pounds|
|Ethylbenzene||16h 45m||Process gas compressor in OL5 Unit||NO||NO||YES||8.0 pounds|
|1,3-Butadiene||16h 45m||Process gas compressor in OL5 Unit||NO||NO||YES||574.0 pounds|
|Benzene||16h 45m||Process gas compressor in OL5 Unit||NO||NO||YES||90.0 pounds|
|Toluene||16h 45m||Process gas compressor in OL5 Unit||NO||NO||NO||62.0 pounds|
|Xylene||16h 45m||Process gas compressor in OL5 Unit||NO||NO||NO||32.0 pounds|
Accident Classified As: Reportable Quantity
On 3/6/2014, Shell Chemical's OL5 Unit flared process gas at the OL5 Elevated Flare due to low seal oil pressure on the process gas compressor (PGC). To improve the performance of the seals on the PGC, operations manipulates valves on the PGC seal oil system. While shifting from automatic operation of the pressure controller on the second stage seal of the PGC to manual operation of the pressure controller, the valve on the pressure controller closed and caused low seal oil pressure. As a result, the PGC unexpectedly shut down as a safety measure to prevent potential catastrophic failure of the equipment.
The incident was not preventable by Shell Chemical LP as the issues with the tube oil system on the PGC were unexpected.
To minimize additional unit upset conditions and impacts, the OL5 Unit was safely stabilized. Operations adjusted the valve on the pressure controller and the seal oil pressure was restored. Operations was able to safely restart the PGC and return normal operating conditions. To prevent the reoccurence of this incident, it will be determined if tuning adjustments are needed on the pressure controllers associated with the PGC operation. As an additional precautionary measure, all employees that operate the PGC will review the transfer process for these local controllers. In the report, it is stated that the process gas was flared at the OL5 Elevated Flare. Later in the document both the OL5 Elevated Flare (EPN 6-84) and the OL5 Ground Flare (EPN FE-101) are implicated in the flaring of the process gas. There is some improper labeling on the EPN number in the tables, but it appears that the flaring occurred at both flares simultaneously. As such, all values released are combined in this database.