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Accident # | 83087 |
State Police # | 05-07361 |
Accident Date | 2005-10-13 |
Report Date | 2005-10-20 |
Follow-up Date | 0000-00-00 |
Follow-up: | No |
Pollutant | Duration | Point Source | Greenhouse Gas | Criteria Pollutant | Ozone forming chemical | Amount of Release |
Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs) | 3h | Flare No. 2 | NO | NO | YES | 4,800.0 pounds |
Accident Classified As: No Information Given
#2 flare was smoking. In an attempt to reduce the smoke, the flare steam was engaged. Repairs to the flare steam system from the Hurricane Katrina shutdown were still ongoing. The steam was engaged with allowance for draining the lines of condensate prior to putting the steam to the flare.. there was some water carryover, resulting in intermittent steam and a surge of steam which extinguished the flare and pilots.
The release is considered to be preventable at this time.
This letter is in regard to calls made by the Chalmette Refinery, notifying of a release of compressed flammable gas/volatile organic compounds (VOCs) on 10/13/05.At 15:00, the #2 flare was smoking. In an attempt to reduce the smoke, the flare steam was engaged. Repairs to the flare steam system from the Hurricane Katrina shutdown were still ongoing. The steam was engaged with allowance for draining the lines of condensate prior to putting the steam to the flare. There was some water carryover, resulting in intermittent steam and a surge of steam which extinguished the flare and pilots. Initial investigation indicated that too few drains were present on the steam line to eliminate the quantity of water created, and there were leaking isolation valved on the steam line. Chalmette will establish review the procedure for commissioning steam to the flare after shutdown to ensure that the line is drained prior to putting steam to the tip of the flare and that the line is checked for valve leaks and pluggings. affected refinery personnel will be trained regarding updates to applicable procedures. The refinery anticipates that these measures will minimize the likelihood of a recurrence of an incident due to the same root cause in the future. The flare was re-lit and the steam was adjusted and stabilized, ending the incident. Initial investigation indicates that too few drains were present on the steam line to eliminate the quality of water created, and there were leaking isolation valves onthe steam line. CRLLC will establish and review the procedure for commissioning steam to the flare after shutdown and will train affected personnel for updated procedures. These measurements should minimize the likelihood of a recurrence
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